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  The purpose of this dissertation is to consider Israel’s biblical wisdom traditions 
comments on collective accountability in a systematic way.  In order to accomplish this, 
each of   five biblical wisdom books—Proverbs, Job, Qoheleth, Ben Sira, and Wisdom of 
Solomon—will be examined individually.  The investigation of each book will include an 
examination of any statement that refers to collective or individual accountability and of 
the author’s position on the power of wisdom instruction to help the student overcome 
intergenerational punishment passed down to him by a sinful parent.  In addition to a 
comprehensive look at biblical wisdom books, this study will also consider a proverb 
concerning collective punishment known from two prophetic books, Jeremiah 31 and 
Ezekiel 18, and the use of the divine attribute formula (Exod. 34:6-7), which describes 
YHWH as a deity who exercises collective punishment and reward, in wisdom texts.  My 
analyses of these investigations produce the following conclusions:  1) The concept of 
collective  accountability  is  not  restricted  to  Israel’s  narrative,  legal,  and  prophetic 
traditions.  Israel’s sages were familiar with and made use of the concept.  2) Israel’s 
sages’ use of collective accountability often differs from the concept’s depiction in other 
parts of the Hebrew Bible.  For the sages, collective accountability serves pedagogical 
functions and vindicates divine justice.  3) The representation of collective accountability 
in  Israel’s  biblical  wisdom  tradition  is  not  static.    As  the  wisdom  tradition  itself   iv 
undergoes developments, like including historical and literary references or drawing upon 
non-biblical philosophical positions, so too does its depiction of collective accountability.  
4)  Israel’s  wisdom  literature  is  not,  as  is  often  claimed,  concerned  solely  with  the 
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Chapter One:  Collective Accountability among the Sages of Ancient Israel 
 
I.  Introduction and Definitions 
The  remembrance  of  one’s  ancestors  and  concern  for  one’s  descendants  are 
frequently occurring themes in the Hebrew Bible.  Israelite men and women often worry 
about producing offspring and the fates that will befall their progeny in the future.  In 
addition to the concern to ensure a promising future for their offspring, Israelites also 
appeal to their ancestors to explain their own fortunes as punishment or reward for their 
ancestors’ deeds.  These concerns, namely that offspring may suffer or prosper because 
of  the  actions  of  their  ancestors,  fall  under  the  rubric  of  collective  accountability.  
Collective  accountability,  in  contrast  to  individual  accountability,  involves  holding  a 
group, whether it be generations of a family or the members of some other collective, 
responsible for the actions of an individual.  Individual accountability holds only the 
individual accountable for the consequences of his actions.  For actions that provoke 
individual  punishment,  the  penalty  generally  fits  the  crime  in  accordance  with  the 
principle of lex talionis (Exod. 21:23-25; Lev. 24:19-20; Deut. 19:21). 
Collective  accountability  does  not  manifest  itself  in  only  one  form.    The 
diachronic  side  of  collective  accountability,  in  which  one’s  offspring  inherit  the 
consequences of their parents’ deeds, is often referred to as intergenerational reward or 
punishment.  The synchronic side of collective accountability, in which the contemporary 
members of a group prosper or suffer because of the actions of an individual member, is 
often  referred  to  as  intragenerational  reward  or  punishment.  These  different   2 
manifestations of collective accountability contain further sub-classifications and likely 
do  not  share  a  common  origin.1    The  different  origins  and  forms  of  collective 
accountability will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
II.  The Problem 
  Although  scholars  have  investigated  the  issues  associated  with  collective  and 
individual  accountability  in  Israel’s  legal,  narrative,  and  prophetic  materials,  Israel’s 
wisdom literature has largely been ignored with respect to this topic.2  The dominant 
trend in Israel’s wisdom literature, which is often packaged as the instructions of a father 
to his son, is to instruct the pupil to avoid the negative consequences associated with sin 
and to reap the rewards of righteousness.3  How, according to wisdom literature, do the 
                                                        
1 For example, David Daube has proposed a category of collective accountability that involves the suffering 
of a group because of the actions of its leaders, such as the king or high priest. David Daube, Studies in 
Biblical Law, vol. reprint ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 154. The successor to a 
sinful leader can even inherit the consequences of his predecessor’s sin.  Joel S. Kaminsky, Corporate 
Responsibility  in  the  Hebrew  Bible  (Continuum  International  Publishing  Group,  1995),  111.    In 
Mesopotamia, for example, the king holds personal accountability for his actions, and this appears to be 
related to the fact that his actions hold consequences for his subjects.  See Hayim Tadmor, “Monarchy and 
the Elite in Assyria and Babylonia:  The Question of Royal Accountability,” in The Origins and Diversity 
of Axial Age Civilizations, ed. S. N Eisenstadt (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 203–
226.  Giovanni B. Lanfranchi, “Ideological Implications of the Problem of Royal Responsibility in the Neo-
Assyrian Period,” in Hayim and Miriam Tadmor Volume, ed. Amnon Ben-Tor, Israel Eph’al, and Peter 
Machinist, Eretz-Israel 27, 2003, 100–110. 
 
2 One exception is Gordis’ work on Job 22:29-30, but studies devoted exclusively to the topic of collective 
accountability  in  wisdom  literature  are  rare.    Gordis’  use  of  the  now  outdated  terminology  “corporate 
personality,” made popular by sociologists Emile Durkheim and Lucien Levy-Bruhl, attests to the need to 
consider this topic more broadly (i.e., beyond the book of Job) and with the benefit of insights into the field 
of collective accountability achieved in the last half century.  The concept of corporate personality will be 
discussed below in connection with the work of H. Wheeler Robinson in Section III on the history of 
scholarship.   Robert Gordis, “Corporate Personality in Job: A Note on 22:29-30,” Journal of Near Eastern 
Studies 4 (1945): 54–55.  See also Robert Gordis, The Book of God and Man: A Study of Job (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1965), 135–156. 
 
3  Of  course,  not  all  of  Israel’s  wisdom  literature  reflects  the  dominant  trends.    For  example,  Job  and 
Qoheleth subvert instruction by forcing a redefinition of wisdom, as will be discussed below.   3 
children of the wicked and of the just fare?  Is a child affected by the sins or merits of his 
ancestors or contemporaries?  
Israel’s  wisdom  literature  generally  recognizes  a  correspondence  between  an 
individual’s deeds and the ensuing consequences. Generations of biblical scholars have 
regarded individual thinking as a hallmark of Israel’s wisdom literature.  For example, 
Moshe  Weinfeld  describes  individual  retribution  as  being  “rooted  in  the  wisdom  (= 
universalistic)  sphere.”4  What  does  Israel’s  wisdom  literature  say  about  collective 
accountability?  Should one expect to find exclusively individualistic ways of thinking 
about punishment, as Weinfeld seems to suggest?  Or do the collective notions that are so 
persistent in other areas of the Hebrew Bible5 also surface in Israel’s wisdom literature? 
As James Crenshaw has noted, one Sitz im Leben of wisdom literature is its use at 
court to facilitate social interactions, and this suggests that collective notions underlie 
wisdom  literature’s  worldview  because  one  of  the  primary  functions  of  wisdom 
instructions was to ensure societal harmony.6  Even without this understanding of the 
function of wisdom literature in the ancient world, the use of wisdom sayings in non-
wisdom books of the Bible may prepare the reader of the Bible to expect some treatment 
of collective accountability in the wisdom books.  Both Jeremiah and Ezekiel quote the 
proverb, “The parents have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge” 
(Ezekiel 18; Jeremiah 31), which appears to be a product of the wisdom tradition.  On the 
                                                        
4 Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (Winona Lake, Ind: Eisenbrauns, 1992), 
40. 
 
5 Kaminsky, Corporate Responsibility in the Hebrew Bible, 30–54. 
 
6 James L. Crenshaw, “Method in Determining Wisdom Influence Upon Historical Literature,” Journal of 
Biblical  Literature  88  (1969):  132.  James  L  Crenshaw,  Old  Testament  Wisdom:  An  Introduction 
(Louisville, Ky: Westminster John Knox Press, 1998), 3.   4 
basis of this proverb, should one expect Israel’s wisdom literature to espouse collective, 
rather than individual, accountability?  Chapter 7 will address this proverb’s relationship 
to the wisdom tradition and its significance for understanding the wisdom tradition’s 
position on collective accountability. 
The  existence  of  a  biblical  proverb  that  appears  to  acknowledge  collective 
punishment as a feature of the way the universe operates invites further investigation into 
whether or not Israel’s wisdom tradition is as individualistic as it is often claimed to be.  
The presence of collective accountability in Israel’s wisdom literature has not received 
adequate  attention  from  scholars.    The  scholarly  treatment  of  Proverbs  11:21 
demonstrates  this  point  well.    Text-critical  issues  entangle  this  verse  and  also  11:18, 
which, depending on the translation followed, may also offer a comment on collective 
accountability.    The  following  discussion  of  Proverbs  11:18,  21  is  intended  to 
demonstrate  the  degree  to  which  the  presence  of  collective  accountability  in  Israel’s 









   5 
Proverbs 11:18, 21 in Hebrew and Greek with English Translations 
Passage  Hebrew  Greek 
Proverbs 11:18  raœsûaœ{ {oœsíeh p⋲§{ullat◊-sûaœqer 
w§zoœreœa{ sΩ§d⋲aœqaœ síek⋲er }§met◊ 
The wicked earns a wage of 
deception, but the one sowing 
righteousness earns a wage of 
truth.7 
asebeœs poiei erga adika, 
sperma de dikaioœn misthos aleœtheias. 
The ungodly does unjust work, 
But the seed of the righteous is the 
wage of truth.   
Proverbs 11:21  yaœd⋲ l§yaœd⋲ loœ}-yinnaœqeh raœ{ 
w§zera{ sΩaddˆîqˆîm nimlaœt√ 
Hand to hand,8  the wicked 
will not go unpunished, but 
the seed of the righteous will 
escape. 
cheiri cheiras embaloœn adikoœs ouk 
atimoœreœtos estai, 
ho de speiroœn dikaiosyneœn leœmpsetai 
misthon piston. 
Hand to hand, the one acting 
wrongfully will not go unpunished, 
But the one sowing righteousness will 
receive a faithful wage. 
 
The  Hebrew  version  of  Prov.  11:18  reads,  “The  wicked  earns  a  wage  of 
deception, but the one sowing righteousness (w§zoœreœa{ sΩ§d⋲aœqa®) earns a wage of truth.” 
The Greek translation of this verse reads “seed of (the) righteous” (sperma de dikaioœn = 
zera{  sΩaddˆîqˆîm)  instead  of  “one  sowing  righteousness.”  Prov.  11:18  bears  several 
similarities  to  v.  21.    The  Greek  and  Hebrew  recensions  of  Prov.  11:21  reverse  the 
situation found in v. 18:  where the Hebrew text of v. 21 reads “seed of (the) righteous” 
(zera{ sΩaddˆîqˆîm), the Greek has “one sowing righteousness” (ho de speiroœn dikaiosyneœn).  
The Greek translation of Prov. 11:21b does not accurately render the Hebrew text for this 
verse, but does resemble v. 18b thematically.   
                                                        
7 Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Hebrew, Greek, and Aramaic texts in this dissertation are my 
own. 
8 “Hand to hand” may mean “assuredly.”  Some scholars suggest that it may reflect a custom of joining 
hands at the conclusion of an agreement.  Michael V. Fox, Proverbs: A New Translation with Introduction 
and Commentary, vol. 2, The Anchor Bible (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 539.  Richard J 
Clifford, Proverbs: A Commentary, 1st ed, The Old Testament Library (Louisville, Ky: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 1999), 125.   6 
Two  possible  explanations  for  the  differences  between  these  versions  present 
themselves.  One possibility is that the Greek and Hebrew texts represent two different 
recensions of the book of Proverbs that were not exactly alike.9   The other is that the 
Greek translator of vv. 18 and 21 recognized two graphically similar expressions and 
accidentally leveled them, either in anticipation or in reminiscence.  A later scribe noticed 
the accidental leveling, but corrected the wrong verse.  The other differences in the Greek 
version of v. 21b would be explained as the result of a corruption in the Hebrew text that 
prompted the translator to borrow themes from v. 18 because of the similarities between 
the verses. 
Regardless of what explanation one follows, there is little reason to regard the 
reference to the seed of the righteous in v. 21 as secondary.  The NRSV, however, omits 
any  mention  of  the  progeny  of  the  righteous  from  its  translation  of  this  verse:    “Be 
assured, the wicked will not go unpunished, but those who are righteous will escape.” 
The NRSV omits the term “seed of” (zera{) from its translation on the basis of the Greek 
translation of the term, “the one sowing” (ho de speiroœn).  The Greek translation appears 
to be highly interpretive, which perhaps results from the difficult phrase “hand to hand” 
in the first colon and the lack of grammatical parallelism between the two lines.   The fact 
that the Greek interprets the consonants for “seed of” (z-r­{) as a verb from the same root 
indicates  that  the  letters  belong  in  the  text.    The  consonantal  text  indicates  that  the 
                                                        
9 This is the easier explanation for the textual differences, but the similarities between the texts seem to 
point  toward  the  likelihood  of  the  role  of  scribal  leveling  in  creating  these  different  texts.    For  the 
conclusion that the Greek translation of Proverbs was based on a Hebrew manuscript that was different 
from the Hebrew Masoretic Text, see Emanuel Tov, “Recensional Differences Between the Masoretic Text 
and the Septuagint of Proverbs,” in The Greek and Hebrew Bible: Collected Essays on the Septuagint, vol. 
72, Supplements to Vetus Testamentum (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 431.  Also, Emanuel Tov, “Recensional 
Differences  Between  the  Masoretic  Text  and  the  Septuagint  of  Proverbs,”  in  Of  Scribes  and  Scrolls 
(Lanham, Md: Univ Pr of America, 1990), 43–56.  Emanuel Tov, Textual Criticism of the Hebrew Bible, 
3rd ed. (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2011), 304–305.     7 
righteous are plural, but the Greek translation construes it as the singular object of the 
participle sowing.  Prov. 22:8 uses a plene spelling for “the one sowing” (zo®reœa{), and the 
only other occurrence of this root as a verb occurs in 11:18.  While its appearance in 
11:18 is close enough to 11:21 that proximity might explain the presence of “seed” in v. 
21 as a corruption introduced by a scribe who was influenced by a verse he had just 
copied, the expression used in v. 18 is “the one sowing righteousness” (w§zoœreœa{ sΩ§d⋲aœqa®), 
which  uses  a  more  appropriate  noun.    The  Greek  translation  of  v.  18  is  sperma  de 
dikaioœn, which matches the Hebrew of 11:21, whereas the Greek translation of 11:21 
matches the Hebrew of 11:18. In sum, I see no reason to favor the Greek translation since 
it appears to be struggling to make sense of unusual terminology and a jarring poetic 
sequence.10 
While  one  major  translation  (the  NRSV)  ignores  the  presence  of  collective 
accountability in the wisdom tradition altogether, commentators also generally skip over 
the significance of it in favor of more interesting features of the text.  In his comments on 
Prov.  11:21,  McKane  writes,  “It  is  just  a  little  puzzling  why  the  descendants  of  the 
righteous rather than the righteous themselves are mentioned here, but this extension of 
the doctrine of theodicy is not so interesting as the fact that…[the descendants of the 
righteous] escape from an unfavorable legal verdict.”11   
In short, most commentators have been content to regard the various references to 
the children of the wicked and the righteous, which are scattered throughout Israel’s 
wisdom books, as curiosities not worthy of systematic investigation.  However, in light of 
                                                        
10 I thank James Jumper for his advice on this matter via private communication. 
 
11 William McKane, Proverbs:  A New Approach (London: SCM, 1970), 437.   8 
widely held claims that the wisdom tradition is individualistic, such “aberrations” deserve 
further consideration.  The purpose of the present study is to address these gaps in the 
scholarship of collective accountability in general and of collective notions in seemingly 
individualistic wisdom books in particular.  The results of this study not only will be 
important to the study of collective accountability, but will also have repercussions for 
the modern understanding of biblical wisdom.  Modern scholarship on wisdom literature 
has produced widespread depictions of this corpus of biblical literature as aberrational 
with  respect  to  its  views  on,  for  example,  history,  the  covenant,  or  the  community.  
However,  this  dissertation  will  demonstrate  that  Israel’s  wisdom  tradition  is  not  as 
individualistic as is often suggested. 
 
III.  A Brief History of Scholarship on Collective Accountability  
Within the scholarly community, the issue of collective accountability in the Bible 
has been explored extensively.12 Two main trends have emerged in the study of this 
topic.  Firstly, many scholars have focused on the theological importance of collective 
accountability by interpreting relevant passages from the Hebrew Bible.  The second 
trend involves the use of sociological, anthropological, and archaeological evidence in 
combination  with  the  biblical  texts  in  order  to  elucidate  the  theological  concept’s 
relationship to Israelite society. 
   The first trend includes textually based studies of the theological concept, and 
these  studies  fall  into  three  categories.  These  are  the  explication  of  the  function  and 
significance  of  collective  accountability  in  Israel’s  narrative,  legal,  and  prophetic 
                                                        
12 For a brief survey of this scholarship, see Kaminsky, Corporate Responsibility in the Hebrew Bible, 16–
29.   9 
materials.  Although studies of collective accountability in Israel’s narrative literature are 
important,13 I will here only focus on the latter two, which are the most useful for my 
thesis.  Although most scholars posit the divine attribute formula in Exodus 34:6-7 as the 
original  locus  for  the  statement  that  YHWH  punishes  children  to  the  third  or  fourth 
generation for the sins of their fathers but rewards them to the thousandth generation for 
their fathers’ good deeds,14 the formula is reiterated in Israel’s most important legal texts, 
namely, the Decalogue (Exod. 20:5; Deut. 5:9; cf. Deut. 7:9).  In addition to these legal 
texts, the rabbis noticed that the concept of collective accountability found in Exodus 
34:6-7 stood in tension with another legal text, Deuteronomy 24:16, which advocates 
individual accountability.15  The attempt to reconcile these laws within Israel’s law code 
has spawned several modern studies that suggest a dual standard for divine and human 
justice.16  Whereas YHWH can punish children for the sins of their fathers (Exod. 20:5; 
Deut.  5:9),  this  juridical  privilege  is  not  afforded  to  human  judges  (Deut.  24:16), 
presumably,  because  human-administered  justice  is  imperfect,  in  contrast  to  that  of 
YHWH.  One important observation resulting from these studies is that whereas laws like 
                                                        
13 Especially useful in this regard has been Yochanan Muffs, “Who Will Stand in the Breach?  A Study in 
Prophetic Intercession,” in Love and Joy; Law, Language, and Religion in Ancient Israel, 1992, 9–48.  
Also crucial has been the work of Joel Kaminsky, especially his work on Joshua 7.  Kaminsky, Corporate 
Responsibility in the Hebrew Bible. Joel S. Kaminsky, “Joshua 7 : A Reassessment of Israelite Conceptions 
of Corporate Punishment,” The Pitcher Is Broken (1995): 315–346. 
 
14 Robert C. Dentan, “The Literary Affinities of Exodus XXXIV 6f,” Vetus Testamentum 13 (1963): 38–39.  
Josef Scharbert, “Formgeschichte Und Exegese Von Ex 34:6f Und Seiner Parallelen,” Biblica 38 (1957): 
130–150.  Michael A Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 
335. 
 
15 Talmud Bavli, Ber. 7a; Sanh. 27b; Mak. 24a. The observation of this tension is both ancient and modern, 
but  it  is  important  to  distinguish  between  divinely-inflicted  intergenerational  retribution  and  human-
executed vicarious punishment.  The distinction will be discussed below. 
 
16 For example, Muffs, “Who Will Stand?”. Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation, 335–347. Moshe Greenberg, 
“Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law,” in Yehezkel Kaufmann Jubilee Volume; Studies in Bible and 
Jewish Religion (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1960), 344–345.   10 
Deuteronomy  24:16  and  other  punishments  administered  by  human  courts  are 
implemented  in  response  to  a  crime,  the  human  belief  in  divine  judgment  is  an 
interpretation  of  one’s  current  circumstances  (or  expectations  of  a  certain  future 
circumstance) that is produced by reflecting on the past.17  This insight will be helpful for 
the study of collective accountability in wisdom literature, which often offers maxims 
and advice based on the observation of patterns of human experiences. 
  Some overlap exists between studies of collective accountability in Israel’s legal 
materials and studies in its prophetic traditions, and one bond between these groups is the 
use of the divine attribute formula in both.18  Although all the instances in which Exodus 
34:6-7 is recycled in prophetic literature cannot be reviewed here (see chapter 7 for a full 
discussion),19 it is interesting to note that Jeremiah 32:18 alludes to the formula and 
praises YHWH for this aspect of his divine nature.  Yet, the apparent rejection of the 
concept of collective accountability by the prophets Jeremiah and Ezekiel has inspired 
numerous studies.  Several scholars have suggested that the usage of the sour grapes 
proverb in Ezekiel 18 (and Jeremiah 31) represents a prophetic attempt to correct the dual 
standard of justice created by Exodus 34:6-7 and Deuteronomy 24:16.20  The use of “a 
                                                        
17 Barnabas Lindars, “Ezekiel and Individual Responsibility,” Vetus Testamentum 15 (1965): 452–467. 
 
18 The passage is quoted in Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2; Nah 1:3.  It is alluded to in Micah 7:18; Jeremiah 30:11b = 
46:28b, 32:18. 
 
19  Fishbane,  Biblical  Interpretation,  335–347.  Peter  Machinist,  “The  Fall  of  Assyria  in  Comparative 
Ancient  Perspective,”  in  Assyria  1995:  Proceedings  of  the  10th  Anniversary  Symposium  of  the  Neo-
Assyrian Text Corpus Project, Helsinki, September 7-11, 1995 (Helsinki: The Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus 
Project, 1997), 179–195. 
 
20 Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation, 338–339.  Moshe Greenberg, “Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal 
Law,” in Essential Papers on Israel and the Ancient Near East (New York: New York University, 1991), 
344–345.  Bernard Levinson, “The Human Voice in Divine Revelation:  The Problem of Authority in 
Biblical Law,” in Innovation in Religious Traditions: Essays in the Interpretation of Religious Change, ed. 
Michael A. Williams and et al. (Walter de Gruyter, 1992), 51–53. 
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simple human proverb, a product of traditional wisdom”
  21 to accomplish this will be 
considered below, as it is the starting point for the consideration of this proverb’s bearing 
on Israel’s wisdom literature’s position on collective accountability. 
  The second main trend in collective accountability studies involves the use of 
sociological, anthropological, and archaeological approaches.  This trend has roots in 
some of the earliest studies on collective accountability in the Hebrew Bible, in which 
biblical scholars drew on the work of prominent sociologists22 and applied their methods 
to  biblical  stories  of  collective  punishment.23    As  with  much  early  scholarship,  the 
conclusions  drawn  from  such  studies  have  not  withstood  the  test  of  time,24  but  the 
method used has driven new insights by modern scholars, like Baruch Halpern, who 
continue to be interested in the topic. Combining archaeological, anthropological, and 
biblical evidence, Halpern argues that a drastic shift from a group-oriented to a more 
individual-oriented  social  system  occurred  as  a  result  of  Hezekiah’s  reforms  and 
                                                        
21 Levinson, “The Human Voice,” 52. 
 
22 For example, Émile Durkheim, Les formes elémentaires de la vie réligieuse: Le système totémique en 
Australie, 2nd ed. (Paris: F. Alcan, 1925).   
 
23 For example, H. Wheeler Robinson applied theories about “corporate personality,”—or the notion that 
the group can function as a single individual through any individual member, dead or living, of it—to 
narratives  in  the  Hebrew  Bible  that  involved  a  group  suffering  punishment  for  the  sin  of  one  of  its 
members.  In Robinson’s views, examples like the punishment of Achan and his family in Joshua 7 were 
outward expressions of an ancient inner conception about the individual and his relationship to the group.  
Unlike the strict modern separation of the individual and his community, Robinson argued that the line 
distinguishing the individual from the collective was much blurrier in ancient Israel.  Most sociologists now 
consider the notion of corporate personality outdated.  Within biblical studies, the model does not always 
fit the text, and so this concept will not be relevant for this study. See H. Wheeler Robinson, Corporate 
Personality in Ancient Israel (Reprinted by Fortress Press, 1980). 
 
24 Rogerson offers a critique of Wheeler Robinson’s conclusions.  John W. Rogerson, “Old Testament View 
of  Nature :  Some  Preliminary  Questions,”  Instruction  and  Interpretation  (1977):  67–84.    For  a  more 
nuanced discussion of the tension between the individual and the collective, see Robert A. Di Vito, “Old 
Testament Anthropology and the Construction of Personal Identity,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 61 (1999): 
217–238.  Jon Douglas Levenson, Resurrection and the Restoration of Israel (Yale University Press, 2006), 
113. 
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Sennacherib’s campaign at the end of the 8
th Century BCE.25  For example, by drawing 
upon the gradually decreasing size of pottery used in the ancient Israelite home, Halpern 
is  able  to  build  an  argument  that  family  life  in  eighth  century  Israel  shifted  from 
including multiple generations to focusing only on the nuclear family unit.  For Halpern, 
sociological, not theological, factors drove this change.  This reintroduction of sociology 
to  the  field  fills  a  significant  gap  in  the  scholarly  discussion.    Halpern’s  theory  that 
sociology leads to theology holds relevance to this study.  Wisdom literature is frequently 
described  as  experiential,  which  is  to  say  that  its  teachings  derive  from  the  lived 
experiences  of  generations  of  sages.    Do  these  social  norms  influence  how  sages 
understand God and the manner in which he executes human justice?   
Although Halpern’s study offers a compelling theory based on abundant evidence 
from varied sources, his interpretations and conclusions are not unassailable.  Scholars 
have  called  into  question  major  components  of  his  archaeological,
26  textual,
27  and 
                                                        
25 Baruch Halpern, “Jerusalem and the Lineages in the Seventh Century BCE:  Kinship and the Rise of 
Individual Moral Liability,” in Law and Ideology in Monarchic Israel, ed. Baruch Halpern and Deborah 
Hobson,  Journal  for  the  Study  of  the  Old  Testament  Supplement  Series  124  (Continuum  International 
Publishing Group, 1991), 11–107. 
 
26 Elizabeth Bloch-Smith has offered an archaeological critique of Halpern’s burial evidence, and James 
Osborne’s  archaeological  and  textual  interpretation  of  secondary  mortuary  practices  also  challenges 
Halpern’s interpretation.  According to Bloch-Smith, Halpern’s dating of the dissolution of larger family 
units and the rise of the individual is largely based on biblical evidence and is not supported by burial 
evidence found in the archaeological record, which lacks any large-scale appearance of individual-centered 
burial features—like ossuaries or coffins, the use of personal names in tomb inscriptions, or the absence of 
secondary repositories—in the ninth to seventh centuries.  Elizabeth Bloch-Smith, “Life in Judah from the 
Perspective  of  the  Dead,”  Near  Eastern  Archaeology  65  (2002):  128.  Osborne  finds  extensive 
archaeological and textual evidence for the widespread practice of secondary burial and the use of a bench 
tomb.  These practices, according to Osborne’s analysis, are “a vital component of Judah’s kinship-oriented 
social structure.  The construction and use of these tombs, and the repeated secondary mortuary rituals that 
were conducted within them, must be seen as some of the most significant practices that generated the self-
sustaining household metaphor of society.”  In other words, the continued use of this practice suggests that 
the demise of lineages in favor of individuals was neither as complete nor as decisive as Halpern argues.  
James F. Osborne, “Secondary Mortuary Practice and the Bench Tomb:  Structure and Practice in Iron Age 
Judah,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 70 (2011): 2, 25. 
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anthropological28 evidence. Despite his tightly crafted argument, his interpretations of the 
evidence  to  dovetail  with  his  theory  of  a  shift  from  a  group-oriented  to  individual-
oriented social system are not necessarily the most plausible interpretations, especially in 
light of much evidence that the clan system remained in tact during the seventh century.  
Furthermore, although Halpern observes a shift from an emphasis on multigenerational 
families to the nuclear family in the archaeological record, this alone does not necessitate 
that collective notions be abandoned in favor of individual ones.  A nuclear family, after 
all, is still a collective unit, albeit a smaller one than a clan.  Nevertheless, Halpern’s 
study  is  a  formidable  piece  of  scholarship  that  demonstrates  the  breadth  of evidence 
available to the study of collective accountability in the ancient world.   
Whereas  Halpern  located  the  origins  of  divinely  executed  collective 
accountability in sociological patterns in the family structure of ancient Israel, Bernard 
Levinson has proposed that the theological concept was borrowed from the realm of 
international treaties, which could include provisions for blessing or cursing the ancestors 
of  the  treaty-makers  for  their  fidelity  or  infidelity  to  the  covenant  forged  by  their 
predecessors.29  Levinson’s contribution to our understanding of the origins of collective 
accountability will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 7 in connection with the 
reuse of the divine attribute formula, found in Exodus 34:6-7, in the Decalogue. 
                                                        
27 Note that Jon D. Levenson has critiqued Halpern’s interpretation of burial customs in ancient Israel on 
the basis of the biblical text alone.  Levenson, Resurrection and the Restoration of Israel, 59–63. 
 
28 Pamela Barmash’s conclusions about the persistence of the notion of the blood feud into the seventh 
century, which requires the preservation of families, lineages, and clans into this time period, also pose 
problems for Halpern’s thesis that society shifted decisively from lineage-oriented to individual-oriented 
during this time period.  Pamela Barmash, “Blood Feud and State Control: Differing Legal Institutions for 
the Remedy of Homicide During the Second and First Millennia B.C.E,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 
63 (2004): 183–199. 
 
29 Levinson, “The Human Voice,” 46. 
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David Daube has been critical of what he believes is a scholarly tendency to 
identify more cases of collective accountability than actually appear in the Bible.  He 
argues that many examples of what scholars consider collective accountability actually 
belong to the category of “ruler punishment,” in which a leader’s group suffers because 
of the actions of its leader as a divine means of punishing the leader, who will be grieved 
by the loss of his power and property, even though this property happens to be human.30  
Daube  understands  vicarious  punishment,  a  practice  prohibited  in  ancient  Israel  by 
Deuteronomy 24:16 but a vestige of which may be preserved in Exod. 21:31,31 as ruler 
punishment of the paterfamilias, who is deprived of his property (his family members) on 
the basis of lex talionis.32   
Daube emphasizes the importance of distinguishing among the various types of 
accountability found in the Hebrew Bible because the concepts do not all originate from 
one source; this caution is certainly merited, but one must bear in mind that even if the 
concepts stem from different origins, they may ultimately function similarly, namely to 
limit in a merciful way the severity of the punishment brought upon the sinner, even if 
that punishment does not seem merciful to the sinner’s offspring and associates.  Because 
of this, the concepts likely already overlapped in ancient Israel,33 just as they did for the 
rabbis who perceived tension between the description of YHWH as a god who practices 
                                                        
30 Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, reprint ed: 168–169. 
 
31  Ibid.,  reprint  ed:154–189.  Fishbane,  Biblical  Interpretation,  211–212.  Kaminsky,  Corporate 
Responsibility in the Hebrew Bible, 127. 
 
32 Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, reprint ed:168–169. 
 
33  Note  that  while  biblical  law  prohibits  vicarious  punishment,  which  is  based  on  the  principle  of  lex 
talionis  from  the  perspective  of  the  pater  familias,  it  still  considers  a  man’s  wife  and  children  as  his 
property (i.e., Exod. 20:17 ; Deut. 5:21).    
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intergenerational punishment in the second commandment (Exod. 20:5-6 ; Deut. 5:9-10) 
yet  who  also  prohibits  the  human  exercise  of  vicarious  punishment  in  Deut.  24:16, 
despite the different origins of these forms of collective accountability.   
Part of Daube’s distinction among the categories involves the presence or absence 
of shared guilt.34  I would argue that none of the various types of punishment that involve 
a  group  suffering  for  the  sin  of  an  individual  relies  on  shared  guilt.    Collective 
punishment need not imply that those who suffer bear any guilt for the sin that prompted 
their  suffering.    For  example,  Daube  understands  the  Deuteronomic  law  mandating 
community-wide  repentance  measures  to  atone  for  the  sin  of  an  unknown  murderer 
(Deut. 21:1-9) to employ communal guilt as a means of ensuring that every member of 
the community make an active commitment to crime prevention.35  However, notions of 
contamination and blood guilty and the perils of contagious divine wrath offer better 
explanations than collective guilt for the collective accountability of an entire city for the 
actions of one unknown murderer.36   
Though Daube criticizes other scholars for not distinguishing carefully enough 
between intergenerational accountability and vicarious/ruler punishment and thus risking 
a confusion of concepts that derive from different origins, he himself does not discern the 
category of intragenerational accountability in his discussion; this concept likely does not 
share its origins with intergenerational or vicarious punishment.  For his part, Daube 
tentatively  proposes  that  the  concept  of  collective  accountability  emerged  from  ruler 
punishment, a category that includes vicarious punishment.  This proposal undermines 
                                                        
34 Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, reprint ed: 169–170. 
 
35 Ibid., reprint ed: 180. 
 
36 Kaminsky, Corporate Responsibility in the Hebrew Bible, 65.   16 
Daube’s complaint that the categories must be carefully distinguished because of their 
different origins.  If collective accountability emerged from ruler punishment, then both 
ultimately have the same origin.  Furthermore, if the purpose of ruler punishment is to 
diminish the power and property of the leader through collective punishment, then it 
achieves a purpose different from that of intergenerational punishment, which appears to 
have merciful, not punitive, intentions. While there is much to commend in Daube’s 
study, such as its reminder to proceed with caution before lumping anything that bears a 
resemblance to collective accountability into a single category, it is important to bear in 
mind that ancient Israelites were not necessarily aware of the origins of every concept or 
practice.  The function of a practice could change over time despite its origins.  For 
example,  in  the  case  of  divinely  executed  intergenerational  punishment,  the  practice 
appears to have originated as an act of mercy, but by the time of the Babylonian Exile it 
could also be interpreted as divine injustice.  This will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 3. 
Though these previous studies will provide a framework for my own study and a 
basis for comparing the results that I find in the wisdom literature to the rest of the Bible, 
they also reveal at least two gaps that need to be filled in the investigation of collective 
accountability.    Firstly,  studies  of  collective  accountability  often  underemphasize  or 
ignore altogether the associated concept of collective reward. I intend to consider both 
collective  punishment  and  collective  reward  without  privileging  one  over  the  other. 
Secondly, no study has yet examined Israel’s wisdom literature systematically.   
 
IV.  Israel’s Wisdom Literature and Collective Accountability   17 
  Although scholars struggle to isolate criteria for identifying wisdom literature in 
the  Hebrew  biblical  tradition,37  most  agree  in  assigning  the  books  of  Proverbs,  Job, 
Qoheleth, Ben Sira, and the Wisdom of Solomon to this category.  Although the latter 
two are not included in the Masoretic canon, both books engage with biblical tradition 
and seem to consider themselves a continuation of the wisdom tradition found in the 
Hebrew Bible.38  While certain affinities may exist between wisdom literature and other 
biblical books,39 such claims are made on the basis of comparison to wisdom themes and 
terminology found in the five books listed above, which provide extensive ruminations 
on the juridical, natural, practical, and theological issues40 related to the sage’s “quest for 
self-understanding in terms of relationships with things, people, and the Creator.”41  The 
books of Job and Qoheleth, as well as the words of Agur in Proverbs 30, complicate any 
                                                        
37 Scholars have offered a variety of criteria.  J. A. Loader describes wisdom as literature “occupied with 
man’s attitude to and conduct in the midst of the realities of life”  (J A. Loader, “Different Reactions of Job 
and Qoheleth to the Doctrine of Retribution,” Studies in Wisdom Literature (1981): 43–48).  J. J. Collins 
notes that, in addition to literary form and world view, over half of the occurrences of the Hebrew word for 
wisdom  appear  in  the  books  traditionally  considered  wisdom  literature  (John  Joseph  Collins,  Jewish 
Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age, Old Testament Library (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1998), 1).  J. L. Crenshaw 
describes wisdom as the “reasoned search for specific ways to ensure personal well-being in everyday life” 
(James L. Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction, vol. Rev and enlarged edition (Louisville, 
Ky: Westminster/John Knox Pr, 1998), 3). 
 
38 For examples of their engagement with biblical tradition, see especially Wis. 2, which seems to be a 
response to Qoheleth, and Sir. 44-50, the Hymn in Praise of the Fathers, which recites the exploits of 
Israel’s  historical  heroes,  including,  however,  one  that  is  post-biblical,  or  post-canonical,  Simon  the 
Righteous. 
 
39  E.g.,  Gerhard  von  Rad,  “Josephgeschichte  Und  Altere  Chokma,”  in  Congress  Volume,  Copenhagen 
1953, Vetus Testamentum Supplements 1 (Leiden, 1953), 121–127. Cf. Shemaryahu Talmon, “‘Wisdom’ 
in the Book of Esther,” Vetus Testamentum 13 (1963): 419–455.  For a critique of von Rad’s theory, see 
Donald  B.  Redford,  A  Study  of  the  Biblical  Story  of  Joseph  (Genesis  37-50),  Supplement  to  Vetus 
Testamentum  (Leiden:  E  J  Brill,  1970).    Michael  V.  Fox,  “Wisdom  in  the  Joseph  Story,”  Vetus 
Testamentum  51  (2001):  26–41.    Other  sources  of  Israelite  wisdom,  especially  Psalm  37:28  and 
4QInstruction, will be introduced to my discussion as necessary. 
 
40 For the delineation of these four types of wisdom, see Crenshaw, “Method in Determining Wisdom 
Influence Upon Historical Literature.” 
 
41 Ibid., 132.    18 
effort to define wisdom literature because they treat the issue of traditional instruction by 
subverting it in order to force a redefinition of wisdom.  Nevertheless, these three books 
will  be  treated  systematically  in  an  effort  to  understand  the  notion  of  collective 
accountability  in  Israel’s  biblical  wisdom  tradition  because  these  books  focus  their 
subversion on traditional wisdom features and, thus, appear to constitute an inner-wisdom 
critique. 
To determine the wisdom tradition’s view of collective accountability, the various 
statements  that  either  endorse  or  reject  collective  accountability  must  be  explored 
systematically, book by book. Except for Qoheleth, all of the books above contain direct 
statements  that  reflect  the  issues  associated  with  collective  accountability  (although 
Qoheleth will still be important to my discussion; see below).  For example, in the book 
of  Proverbs,  several  statements  promise  negative  consequences  for  the 
“house/household” of the individual who commits sins (Prov. 15:27; cf. Prov. 17:13). In 
the  book  of  Job,  the  protagonist  refuses  to  accept  collective  accountability  as  an 
explanation for why the wicked sometimes remain unpunished while the righteous suffer.  
Thus, Job says, “You [O Zophar] say, ‘God stores up their iniquity for their children.’  
Let it be paid back to them, so that they may know it.  Let their own eyes see their 
destruction, and let them drink of the wrath of the Almighty.  For what do they care for 
their household after them, when the number of their months is cut off?” (Job 21:19-21). 
Although  Job  refuses  to  accept  it,  collective  accountability  appears  to  have  been  a 
popular explanation in wisdom circles for innocent suffering.  In the later wisdom books, 
both  Ben  Sira  and  the  Wisdom  of  Solomon  note  that  the  illegitimate  children  of  an 
adulteress will suffer for their mother’s sins without regard for the merits of the children   19 
(Sir.  23:24-25;  Wis.  3:16,  4:3).  The  collective  impact  of  the  sinner’s  actions  on  his 
household is confirmed by archaeological, anthropological, and sociological studies that 
suggest that the Israelite household included several generations of a family alive at the 
same  time.42    Furthermore,  the  authorial  voice  of  the  Hebrew  Bible  is  by  no  means 
monolithic, and this fact is quite prominent in the diversity of perspectives preserved in 
Israel’s wisdom literature.    
In addition to wisdom statements directly related to collective accountability, the 
role of wisdom instruction in the rearing of children is also relevant.  The interpreter who 
produced  the  Targum  Onkelos  to  Exodus  20:4-6  avoided  the  theological  problem  of 
innocent children suffering for the sins of their fathers  by describing the children as 
“rebellious” and continuing “to sin after their fathers.”43  This solution to the theological 
problem of collective punishment may have an analogy in wisdom literature.  Several 
texts from non-wisdom books of the Hebrew Bible with wisdom affinities, as well as 
from the New Testament, suggest a widespread notion that like begets like.44 Is this 
concept also present in the Hebrew biblical wisdom tradition and does it play any role in 
Israel’s wisdom literature’s understanding of the origins of good and wicked children?  If 
so,  this  would  suggest  that  wicked  parents  who  deserve  punishment  produce  wicked 
children who also deserve punishment; righteous parents who deserve reward produce 
righteous children who also deserve reward.  Collective accountability does not create a 
theological problem in this scenario.  So the following question must be addressed:  Does 
                                                        
42 See Lawrence E. Stager, “The Archaeology of the Family in Ancient Israel,” Bulletin of the American 
Schools of Oriental Research no. 260 (1985): 260. 
 
43 Targum Onkelos to Exodus 20:4-6.  Bernard M. Levinson, “The Case for Revision and Interpolation 
Within the Biblical Legal Corpora,” Theory and Method in Biblical and Cuneiform Law (1994): 57. 
 
44 Ezek. 16:44; Luke 6:43; Matt 7:17-18; and Jas 3:11-12. Cf. Deut 32:32.  Note the contrast with Jer. 2:21.   20 
Israel’s wisdom literature, like some ancient adages, hold that righteous parents beget 
righteous children while wicked parents beget wicked children?  Given the nature of 
much of wisdom literature as instruction intended to help the pupil avoid sin and act 
righteously, a related question arises:  What is the power of wisdom instruction to help 
the child of the wicked avoid the consequences of his parents’ sins? Can anyone who 
avails himself of the instruction found in wisdom literature avoid punishment because of 
the sins of others? 
  According to the worldview of wisdom literature, instruction and discipline have 
the power to teach children how to avoid sin (Prov. 10:17, 13:24, 14:26, 15:5, 22:6, 
23:13-14, 29:15-17; Sir. 3:1-13).   Yet children, despite the discipline and instructions 
provided to them, do not necessarily reap the rewards of wisdom simply because it is 
available.    For  example,  in  Proverbs  5:7-14  the  sage  warns  the  child  to  heed  his 
instructions lest one day he should wind up saying, “Oh, how I hated discipline, and my 
heart despised reproof!  I did not listen to the voice of my teachers or incline my ear to 
my instructors.  Now I am at the point of utter ruin in the public assembly” (Prov. 5:12-
14).  Wisdom protects only those who embrace it.  Indeed, “A fool despises a parent’s 
instruction, but the one who heeds admonition is prudent” (Prov. 15:5).  Although parents 
may offer instruction to their child, if the child does not heed it, he will be a fool, and “A 
stupid child is ruin to a father” (Prov. 19:13a, cf. 17:25, 19:26).  Evidently, Israel’s sages 
recognized that good parents could produce bad children, who would bring shame and 
suffering upon their parents, a reversal of the usual direction of collective, or here more 
specifically, intergenerational punishment (cf. Deut. 24:16; Ezek. 18).     21 
Although Qoheleth does not worry about his progeny bringing shame upon him 
during his lifetime, he also grapples with this issue:  “I hate all my toil in which I had 
toiled under the sun, seeing that I must leave it to those who come after me—and who 
knows whether they will be wise or foolish?  Yet they will be master of all for which I 
toiled and used my wisdom under the sun.  This also is vanity” (Qoh. 2:18-19).  Thus 
Qoheleth also, like Proverbs, acknowledges that, despite a parent’s best efforts, a good 
person can produce a bad child.  In fact, some people appear to be foolish or wicked by 
nature.  For example, Ben Sira notes that some are so innately foolish that it is useless to 
provide wisdom instruction:  “Whoever teaches a fool is like one who glues potsherds 
together, or who rouses a sleeper from deep slumber” (Sir. 22:9; cf. Prov. 9:7-8 and 15:5, 
noted above).  Although Genesis 9:22-27 attributes the lowly status of the Canaanites to 
their sinful ancestor Ham, Ben Sira attributes their condition to creation (Sir. 33:10-12).  
This raises the possibility that, in addition to their use of collective accountability, the 
sages also use predestination as an explanation for the fates that befall the children of the 
righteous and of the wicked.  Proverbs 16:4 suggests that the wicked are a divine creation 
that fulfills a particular purpose (cf. Sir. 33:10-12).  Wisdom instruction promises to 
protect those who heed it (Prov. 6:20-24), but if the fool by his very nature does not 
follow wise advice (for example, Prov. 12:15, 13:1, 15:5,12), it holds no promise for the 
one born foolish, only for the one born righteous or wise.  The righteous, of course, is 
inclined to heed instructions, but association with wicked individuals can still lead him 
astray (for example, Prov. 1:10, 6:27-28, and the threats posed by association with the 
strange woman in 2:16-19; 5:3-6; 6:24-26; 7:5; 9:13-18).  The existence of an alternative 
explanation for the fates that befall the children of the righteous and the wicked raises the   22 
question of what factors compel the sages to choose one explanation over another in any 
given situation.   
Jeremiah and Ezekiel both use wisdom, namely a proverb, to challenge the notion 
that  God  punished  the  generation  of  the  Babylonian  exile  for  their  ancestors’  sins.  
Ezekiel 18 delivers an oracle on the issue of collective responsibility that appears first to  
overturn  the  theological  concept  and  then  to  provide  examples  of  a  righteous  parent 
producing an unrighteous child who in turn begets a righteous child.  For Ezekiel, one’s 
own  nature  can  differ  from  that  of  his  parent  or  child,  and  so  the  individual  is  not 
accountable for the sins of another.  Ezekiel’s treatment of this topic is relevant to the 
discussion  of  collective  accountability in  wisdom  literature  because,  as  I  have  noted, 
Ezekiel (cf. Jer. 31; note also Jer. 32:18-19) refers to what appears to be a traditional 
wisdom proverb in order to refute the doctrine of collective accountability expressed in it:  
“The parents have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge” (Ezek. 
18:2, Jer. 31:29).  What is the relationship between this proverb and Israel’s wisdom 
literature?  Do Ezekiel and Jeremiah use this proverb, a product of human wisdom, in 
order to avoid contradicting a more sacred text (i.e., the Decalogue), as Bernard Levinson 
has argued,45 or does their use of the proverb reflect an underlying connection between 
the  concept  of  collective  responsibility  and  traditional  wisdom?    If  this  proverb  did 
originate  in  wisdom  circles,  does  the  wisdom  tradition  eventually  reject  the  notion 
expressed in the proverb, just as the two prophets appear to?  Each prophet’s use of the 
proverb and position on collective accountability is complex and will be explored more in 
depth in Chapter 7. 
                                                        
45 Bernard M. Levinson, Legal Revision and Religious Renewal in Ancient Israel (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 87.   23 
  Apart  from  Jeremiah  and  Ezekiel’s  use  of  this  proverb,  another  formulaic 
expression of YHWH’s propensity to visit the sins of the father upon the sons occurs in 
Exodus 34:6-7 and is reiterated in the Decalogue (Exod. 20; Deut. 5).  Although this 
passage is quoted in various ways in many places in the Bible, none of the wisdom books 
quotes  it  directly.    Nevertheless,  some  scholars  have  posited  a  connection  between 
Exodus 34:6-7 and the wisdom tradition because of overlapping language and shared 
values.46  Whether this formula is a product of the wisdom tradition or not, the contrast 
between the statement that YHWH visits the sins of the fathers upon the sons with the 
secular proverb known from Jeremiah and Ezekiel raises the issue of God’s perceived 
role in collective accountability.   Do the various wisdom statements that relate to the 
topic of collective accountability envision God as rewarding the good and punishing the 
bad, or are the consequences simply the natural result of one’s actions?47   
  In  summary,  this  dissertation  will  investigate  the  question,  what  does  Israel’s 
wisdom literature say about collective accountability vis-à-vis individual accountability?  
How do credos and proverbs about collective accountability known from non-wisdom 
literature  relate  to  the  wisdom  tradition?    Does  Israel’s  wisdom  literature’s  view  of 
                                                        
46 E.g., Dentan, “The Literary Affinities of Exodus XXXIV 6f,” 48. 
 
47 A useful starting point for this question will be the study of Klaus Koch, which posits a view of divine 
retribution in Israel’s wisdom literature, and in the Hebrew Bible more generally, that God does not inflict 
punishment himself but rather acts as a midwife to the automatic act-consequence model that is built into 
the fabric of the universe. This will be discussed in Chapter 2.  Klaus Koch, “Gibt es ein Vergeltungsdogma 
im Alten Testament?,” Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 52 (1955): 1–42.  Translated in part as Klaus 
Koch,  “Is  There  a  Doctrine  of  Retribution  in  the  Old  Testament?,”  in  Theodicy  in  the  Old  Testament 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), 64.  
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collective accountability reflect any diachronic changes?  If so, what might account for 
these changes?48 
 
V.  Outline 
  The  purpose  of  this  dissertation  is  to  consider  the  comments  on  collective 
accountability in the wisdom books in a systematic way.  In order to accomplish this, 
each of the next five chapters will focus on the presence of collective accountability in 
the five major wisdom books in canonical order, Proverbs (Chapter 2), Job (Chapter 3), 
Qoheleth (Chapter 4), Ben Sira (Chapter 5), and Wisdom of Solomon (Chapter 6).  Each 
chapter  will  proceed  by  first  examining  each  respective  book’s  statements  about 
collective punishments, then its statements about collective reward, and, if relevant, any 
statements that seem to reject collective accountability.  Next, each of these chapters will 
consider the roles of divine determinism and wisdom instruction in influencing the moral 
character of individuals in order to determine whether or not wisdom authors understood 
collective accountability to apply only in cases in which the offspring conduct themselves 
as their parents do.   
  The penultimate chapter (Chapter 7) will investigate two formulaic statements 
about  collective  accountability  found  outside  of  Israel’s  wisdom  literature  but  with 
proposed origins in the realm of wisdom.  The first half of this chapter will explore the 
divine attribute formula found in Exodus 34:6-7 and its reuse throughout the Hebrew 
Bible and in Israel’s wisdom books.  The second half will investigate the nature of the 
                                                        
48  Especially  important  to  consider  in  this  regard  will  be  the  rise  of  eschatological  judgment  and  its 
influence of notions of retribution in Israel’s wisdom literature, especially in the Wisdom of Solomon.  
Samuel  L.  Adams,  Wisdom  in  Transition:  Act  and  Consequence  in  Second  Temple  Instructions, 
Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2008), 6.   25 
sour grapes proverb quoted by both Jeremiah and Ezekiel to determine whether or not it 
aligns with conclusions drawn from the previous five chapters about the understanding of 
collective accountability in Israel’s wisdom books.  The final chapter  (Chapter 8) will 
synthesize  the  results  of  the  previous  chapters  in  order  to  understand  the  nature  and 
function of collective accountability in Israel’s wisdom tradition.  This conclusion will 
trace the developmental trajectory that emerges within Israel’s wisdom tradition on the 

















Chapter Two:  Collective Accountability in the Book of Proverbs 
 
I.  Introduction 
  As  discussed  in  the  introduction,  collective  accountability  involves  holding  a 
group, whether it be the generations of a family or the members of some other collective, 
responsible for the actions of an individual.  The purpose of this chapter is to investigate 
this phenomenon in the book of Proverbs.  The discussion of collective accountability in 
the book of Proverbs will begin with an examination of the verses relating to collective 
punishment (section II) and those pertaining to collective reward (section III).  Next it 
will examine the efficacy of wisdom instruction for helping children to reap rewards and 
avoid punishment in order to determine, as discussed in the introduction, if Israel’s sages 
regarded  the  children  of  the  wicked  as  ineluctably  wicked  themselves  and  thereby 
deserving of intergenerational punishment (section IV).  The chapter will conclude with a 
summary of its findings (section V). 
 
II.  Collective Punishment in Proverbs 
Proverbs 3:33 
In the book of Proverbs, several statements promise negative consequences for the 
“house” (be®t◊) of the individual who commits sins. A good example of this occurs in 
Proverbs 3:33: “The curse of YHWH is on the house (b§b⋲e®t) of the wicked, but he blesses 
the abode (u®n§we®) of the righteous.” This passage contrasts the punishment of the wicked 
with  the  reward  of  the  righteous.    In  both  cases,  the  divine  response  appears  to  be   27 
collective.  To demonstrate this conclusively, it is necessary to understand the ancient 
Israelite concept of the “house” (bayit◊/be®t◊).  
Working  with  the  ideal  type  that  Max  Weber  identified  as  patrimonialism, 
Lawrence  Stager  has  pioneered  the  modern  understanding  of  the  Israelite  house.49  
Building upon Weber’s model, Stager envisions Iron Age Israelite society as a series of 
nested households, the largest being that of YHWH (be®t◊ yhwh) and the most basic being 
that  of  the  father  (be®t◊-}aœb⋲),  which  can  refer  either  to  a  nuclear  or  extended  family 
depending on context.50  The house of the father is known both from the archaeological 
record of four-room houses in the Israelite and Judean highlands throughout the Iron Age 
and beyond and also from the biblical text.  Archaeologically, the house of the father 
likely included a compound of several four-room homes that shared a common courtyard.  
These multiple family compounds allowed the nuclear family, which likely consisted of 
two parents and two children occupying a single four-room house, to adapt to changing 
life circumstances, such as parents dying or children marrying and becoming parents 
themselves, and to keep the larger family group, the lineage, in close proximity.51 In 
addition to the term “house” (bayit◊/be®t◊) being used to describe the physical structure 
                                                        
49 Stager, “The Archaeology of the Family in Ancient Israel,” 25. 
 
50 Lawrence E. Stager, “The Patrimonial Kingdom of Solomon,” in Symbiosis, Symbolism, and the Power 
of  the  Past:  Canaan,  Ancient  Israel,  and  Their  Neighbors  from  the  Late  Bronze  Age  Through  Roman 
Palaestina,  ed.  William  G.  Dever  and  Seymour  Gitin  (Winona  Lake,  IN:  Eisenbrauns,  2003),  70–71.   
More recently, Stager’s student David Schloen has built a case for patrimonialism in ancient Israel based on 
archaeological and anthropological evidence.  J. David Schloen, The House of the Father as Fact and 
Symbol: Patrimonialism in Ugarit and the Ancient Near East, Studies in the Archaeology and History of 
the Levant (Winona Lake, Ind: Eisenbrauns, 2001).  Schloen’s argument refutes Mario Liverani’s proposal 
of a Marxist two-sector model in reconstructing the socioeconomic history of Ugarit.  Henri Cazelles et al., 
“Supplément Au Dictionnaire De La Bible,” in Ras Shamra (Ugarit Ou Ougarit), vol. 9 (Paris: Letouzey & 
Ané, 1979), 1123–1466.  
 
51 Stager, “The Archaeology of the Family in Ancient Israel,” 18–20.   28 
within which the nuclear family resided, the Hebrew term (bayit◊/be®t◊ or be®t◊-}aœb) can also 
refer to the family itself.  The identification of Achan, whose story will be discussed in 
greater  detail  below,  as  the  guilty  party  in  the  theft  of  devoted  objects  from  Jericho 
demonstrates this semantic range for bayit◊ quite well (Josh. 7:14-18).  The family, not the 
physical structure of a house, is brought near so that Joshua can determine the guilty 
individual. 
As the above discussion makes clear, a curse on the house of an individual results 
in  a  curse  on  the  individual’s  entire  nuclear  family,  and  possibly  even  the  extended 
family residing within the be®t◊-}aœb compound.52  The same would seem to be true for the 
family of the righteous individual who receives a blessing.  Here, however, the sage uses 
not the familiar term bayit◊ to describe the family of the righteous, but rather the term 
naœweh, which is often found in poetry and associated with pastoralism.  Although the 
vocabulary differs, naœweh seems to function as a semantic equivalent to bayit◊ and all of 
its associations with the family.  While the pastoral associations of the term naœweh53 
might ostensibly suggest a dwelling place for a lone shepherd, and thus not hold any 
implications  for  the  shepherd’s  family,  its  usage  in  Prov.  3:33  in  parallel  with  bayit◊ 
implies that the sage envisions the family of a righteous individual experiencing benefits 
analogous to the consequences that the family of the wicked experiences.54  The intended 
contrast between the fate of the righteous and the wicked would be lost if naœweh, “abode” 
                                                        
52 Lennart Boström, The God of the Sages: The Portrayal of God in the Book of Proverbs (Stockholm: 
Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1990), 220. 
 
53  M.  Delcor,  “Quelques  cas  de  survivances  du  vocabulaire  nomade  en  Hébreu  biblique:  Leur 
signification,” Vetus Testamentum 25, no. 2 (1975): 319, doi:10.2307/1516948. 
 
54 R. N Whybray, Proverbs, New Century Bible Commentary (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans, 1994), 73.   29 
were interpreted to lack the familial associations that accompany the term bayit◊, “house.”  
The term naœweh, “abode,” parallels bayit◊, “house,” and }oœhel, “tent,” in other biblical 
texts,  which  suggests  that  the  term  should  be  affiliated  with  family  life  and  not  the 
solitude of a shepherd.55   
On  the  whole,  Proverbs  3:33  is  quite  general.    It  does  not  offer  collective 
punishment  and  reward  for  any  specific  actions  but  rather  for  one’s  general  moral 
disposition.  The sage likely intends this passage to function pedagogically; the student 
learns that his moral character has consequences that extend beyond his own experiences.  
Not only does it affect YHWH’s relationship with the individual, as Proverbs 3:34 makes 
clear, but it also affects YHWH’s relationship with his entire family, the individuals upon 
whom his posterity depends. 
Proverbs 15:27 
The notion of an individual bringing trouble upon his house appears again in 
Proverbs 15:27: “The one who is greedy for profit troubles ({oœk⋲eœr) his house, but the one 
who  hates  bribes  will  live.”    Several  important  issues  arise  from  this  verse  and  its 
relevance to the topic of collective responsibility.  These include the sage’s choice of the 
root  {-k-r—which  has  connections  to  one  of  the  Bible’s  most  famous  examples  of 
collective  punishment,  that  of  Achan  in  Joshua  7—the  contrast  between  collective 
punishment and individual reward, and the issue of divine causality.  
The  sage  describes  the  consequence  that  will  befall  the  house  of  one  who  is 
greedy for profit with the root {-k-r, “to trouble.”  A study of this root in the Hebrew 
                                                        
55 Helmer Ringgren, “Naweh,” ed. Helmer Ringgren, trans. David E. Green, Theological Dictionary of the 
Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 2:275.   30 
Bible more generally is instructive for understanding this proverb in particular (the use of 
the root in Proverbs will be considered below in connection with Proverbs 11:29 and 
15:6).  With respect to the issue of collective punishment, the most important occurrence 
of this root is in 1 Chronicles 2:7, which describes Achar ({aœk⋲aœr) as “the one troubling 
({o®k⋲eœr)  Israel  when  he  transgressed  the  ban.”    This  personal  name  likely  reflects  an 
attempt to create wordplay between the name of Achan, the villain known from Joshua 7, 
and the effects of his sinful behavior.56  In Joshua 7, the wordplay is between the name of 
the valley where Achan’s punishment is executed, Achor ({aœk⋲o®r), and the effects of his 
sin.57  The verbal form of the root {-k-r, “to trouble,” occurs repeatedly throughout the 
tale.  In declaring the conquered city of Jericho under the ban, Joshua warns the Israelites 
against taking any spoils home from battle.  The result of disobedience, Joshua notes, is 
that Israel’s camp would become like an object placed under the ban, and this would 
“trouble” (wa{∞k⋲artem) it (Josh. 6:18).  Despite this warning, Achan steals some of the 
devoted spoils and hides them in his tent.  After Israel’s army suffers a loss at Ai, Achan 
is identified by lot as responsible for the defeat, he confesses to his transgression and 
describes the great value of the stolen goods (Josh. 7:21).  As Achan and his family await 
execution in the valley of Achor ({aœk⋲o®r) for the pater familias’ crime, Joshua asks him, 
                                                        
56  Richard  S.  Hess,  “Achan  and  Achor:  Names  and  Wordplay  in  Joshua  7.,”  vol.  14,  Hebrew  Annual 
Review (Columbus: Melton Center for Jewish Studies, 1994), 94.  The author of Proverbs would not have 
needed to know Chronicles in order to be familiar with this wordplay.  It is possible that the nickname 
Achar for Achan predates Proverbs.  The Hebrew Vorlage to the LXX appears to have used Achar instead 
of Achan in Joshua 7.  
 
57 Note, however, that the personal name Achan ({aœk⋲aœn), the wordplay Achar ({aœk⋲aœr), and the toponym 
Achor ({aœk⋲o®r) derive from different roots.  Achan’s name derives from the root {-k-n, possibly meaning “be 
curved,” which is semantically unrelated to {-k-r. The root {-k-r appears to be a homonym for the separate 
semantic categories of I) “push back,” II) “make turbid,” and III) “be fertile.”  The toponym likely has an 
etymological link to meaning III.  R. Mosis, “’Ākar,” ed. Helmer Ringgren, Theological Dictionary of the 
Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 8:68–69.   31 
“Why have you troubled ({∞k⋲artaœnu®) us?  YHWH is troubling (ya{k•rk⋲aœ) you this very 
day” (Josh. 7:25).  The following verse (7:26) offers a folk etymology for the name of the 
valley of Achor ({aœk⋲o®r).   
As the above summary makes clear, the root {-k-r, “to trouble,” lies at the heart of 
one of the most famous biblical examples of collective punishment.58  In this context, the 
root appears to have close affinities to the concept of collective accountability.  The 
actions of the individual, Achan, have stirred up trouble for the collective, Israel, and as a 
consequence YHWH stirs up trouble not only for the individual, Achan, but also for a 
collective, his entire family.  The sage’s choice of this particular root may be an allusion 
to the individual who stirred up trouble for his family through his greed for war spoils 
devoted to destruction. 
Apart from the Achan narrative, other uses of the root {-k-r, “to trouble,” outside 
of Proverbs also connote collective punishment.  When Israel was in the grips of a famine 
caused by a drought that Elijah had prophesied, Ahab confronts the prophet after his long 
absence, “When Ahab saw Elijah, Ahab said to him, ‘Is it you, you troubler ({oœk⋲eœr) of 
Israel?’” (1Kgs. 18:17).  Presumably, Ahab blames the prophet for the prophecy he had 
delivered, which was now causing hardship for all Israelites, including Ahab.  Elijah 
replies to Ahab, “I have not troubled ({aœk⋲artˆî) Israel, but you and the house of your father 
                                                        
58 The story is remarkable not only for its instances of collective accountability (the defeat of Israel’s army 
at Ai as punishment for Achan’s theft and the punishment of Achan’s entire family for this same sin), but 
also for the degree to which it involves individual accountability.  Although Joshua warns that theft of 
devoted objects will result in Israel becoming a devoted object herself, YHWH informs Joshua that he will 
relent from this proposed punishment if the devoted objects are destroyed.  In order to destroy the stolen 
goods, the guilty individual is identified first by tribe, then clan, then lineage, and finally individually.  
Although Achan’s family suffers for his sin, the punishment is restricted only to this individual family (and 
those who unwittingly went to war against Ai without the knowledge that YHWH would not fight for 
Israel) rather than to all of Israel.  Stager, “The Archaeology of the Family in Ancient Israel,” 22.   32 
have because you forsook the commandments of YHWH and you went after the Baals” 
(1Kgs. 18:18).  Elijah accuses Ahab and his family of stirring up trouble for Israel by 
provoking YHWH’s wrath and his punishment of all Israelites with drought and famine 
for the sins of their leaders (1Kgs. 16:33-17:1).
59 
The  root  {-k-r  appears  in  another  familiar  account  of  collective  punishment, 
although in this case humans, without any direction from YHWH, inflict the punishment.  
The liaison between Shechem and Dinah in Genesis 34 results in Simeon and Levi’s 
cunning attack on all the male inhabitants of Shechem (Gen. 34:25).  When Jacob learns 
of his sons’ actions, he immediately notes that he and his family will reap what Simeon 
and Levi have sown, “‘You have troubled ({∞k⋲artem) me by making me abhorrent among 
the inhabitants of the land, the Canaanites and the Perizzites.  I am few in number, and 
they will gather themselves against me and strike me.  I shall be destroyed, I and my 
house’” (Gen. 34:30).  Although the consequences that Jacob fears will be inflicted by 
humans,  the  associations  between  the  root  {-k-r,  “to  trouble,”  and  the  notion  of  a 
collective suffering for the actions of another seem clear. 
Given the earlier examination of the semantic range of bayit◊, “house,” and the 
historico-literary associations of the root {-k-r,
60 Proverbs 15:27 likely has in mind a 
situation in which the larger family unit suffers because of the sinful actions of one of its 
members.  The archaeological record of Iron Age Israel, which demonstrates that the 
                                                        
59  This  would  appear  to  be  a  case  of  leader  punishment.    Kaminsky,  Corporate  Responsibility  in  the 
Hebrew Bible, 111.  Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, reprint ed:154. 
 
60 In addition to the root’s connection to accounts of collective punishment, the sage’s use of the qal active 
participle may suggest that {oœk⋲eœr “functions as a kind of technical term or title characterizing the personal 
nature of the subject rather than the name of that subject’s action.”  Almost half the appearances of this root 
in the Hebrew Bible are qal active participles, a fact that suggests that the term should be understood as an 
appellative.  Mosis, “ ’Ākar,” 70.   33 
nuclear  family  shared  a  small  house  within  a  compound  of  homes  that  housed  the 
extended family, also suggests that trouble brought on one’s house would likely affect all 
those living in the small house and possibly the extended family as well.  As in Proverbs 
3:33, the use of bayit◊, “house,” in 15:27 seems to suggest collective punishment.  This 
passage also contrasts the negative consequences of wickedness with the positive rewards 
of righteousness.  However, unlike 3:33, in which both the punishment and the reward 
are collective, only the punishment is collective in this verse.  Whereas 3:33 deals with 
the very general categories of “the wicked” and “the righteous,” 15:27 has more specific 
crimes and merits in mind.   
The  crime  that  results  in  collective  accountability  involves  being  “greedy  for 
(unjust) profit” (bo®sΩeœa{ baœsΩa{).  This expression, or its positive variant, “hating (unjust) 
profit”  (síoœneœ}  b⋲esΩa{),  occurs  elsewhere  in  Proverbs  and  in  the  Hebrew  Bible  more 
generally.61  Three verses in Proverbs, including 15:27, refer to the individual who either 
is greedy for profit (bo®sΩeœa{ baœsΩa{) or hates (unjust) profit (síoœneœ} b⋲esΩa{).  Proverbs 1:15-19 
offers advice to the child who will be enticed by sinners to join them in gaining riches 
through illegal activities (Prov. 1:10-14):  “My son, do no walk in their way; withhold 
your foot from their path for their feet run to evil and they hurry to shed blood…yet they 
lie in wait for their own blood; they set an ambush for their own lives!  Thus is the path 
of all who are greedy for profit (bo®sΩeœa{ baœsΩa{); it takes away the life of its possessors.”  
The sage discourages his pupil from associating with sinners who are greedy for profit 
because their crime results in poetic justice; although they think they will gain riches for 
                                                        
61 Outside of Proverbs, the expressions “greedy for profit” and “hating (unjust) profit” occur most often 
among the prophets (Cf. Jer. 6:13, 8:10; Eze. 22:27; Hab. 2:9).  
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themselves by plundering others, they in fact damage their own well being.  This picture 
of retribution appears to be individual.  Rather than bringing negative consequences upon 
the entire family, the sinner’s crimes result in him suffering the same fate he intended to 
inflict on others.   
Proverbs  28:16  deals  with  the  one  who  hates  unjust  profit  (síoœneœ}  b⋲esΩa{):    “A 
prince  lacking  understanding  causes  much  oppression;  one  hating  (unjust)  profit  will 
have a long life.”  Although this verse approaches the issue of unjust gain from the 
opposite angle, like Proverbs 1:19 it envisions individual consequences.  However, the 
view of Proverbs 28:16, that the one who hates unjust profit will live a long time accords 
well with Proverbs 15:27b, “the one who hates bribes will live.”  Bribes qualify as a type 
of  unjust  gain,  and  both  28:16  and  15:27  are  in  agreement  that  the  reward  for  the 
individual who eschews such things is individual, not collective, in nature.   
Why the punishment and reward for either coveting or eschewing unjust profit 
should emphasize individual, not collective accountability, is not entirely clear.  The legal 
concept of hating unjust profit (síoœneœ} b⋲esΩa{) appears in YHWH’s command to Moses, via 
his father-in-law Jethro, to create a judicial system over which “trustworthy men hating 
(unjust) profit” (Exod. 18:21) preside.  Hating unjust profit appears to be a qualification 
for office, rather than a good deed that deserves reward.  This may perhaps shed some 
light on the distinction that the sage makes between the collective punishment that this 
crime deserves and the individual reward that obedience produces.  
The  final  major  issue  associated  with  Proverbs  15:27  is  the  issue  of  agency.  
Whereas 3:33 makes explicit that YHWH’s curse is on the house of the wicked and that it 
is YHWH who blesses the abode of the righteous, 15:27 does not attribute to YHWH the   35 
consequences  that  befall  the  individual  greedy  for  gain.    Does  the  sage  envision  the 
trouble  brought  upon  the  greedy  person’s  home  as  divine  punishment  or  the  natural 
consequence of such an action?   
The debate concerning this question more generally began in earnest with Klaus 
Koch’s  important  1955  article,  “Is  There  a  Doctrine  of  Retribution  in  the  Old 
Testament?”
62  As the title suggests, Koch’s article called into question the then widely-
held position that punishment for sin is divinely administered in the Hebrew Bible’s 
worldview.  According to Koch, this view has been most firmly entrenched in the study 
of  ancient  Israel’s  wisdom  literature.
63    Koch  argues  that  YHWH  does  not,  in  fact, 
administer retribution against sinners on the basis of juridical standards, but rather he acts 
“somewhat  like  a  ‘midwife  who  assists  at  a  birth’  by  facilitating  the  completion  of 
something which previous human action has already set in motion.”
64  Koch envisions a 
universe, or sphere of influence, that has automatic, unalterable consequences built into 
its very fabric.  YHWH may set these consequences into motion, hurry them along, delay 
them, or bring them to completion, but he himself does not judge, either to punish or to 
reward. 
Although  Koch’s  argument  has  reshaped  the  modern  understanding  of  divine 
retribution as often impersonal and automatic,
65 scholars have raised numerous objections 
to  Koch’s  theory.    For  example,  many  commentators  observe  that  his  definition  of 
                                                        
62  Originally  published  in  German  as  Koch,  “Gibt  es  ein  Vergeltungsdogma  Im  Alten  Testament?”.  
Published in English as Koch, “Is There a Doctrine of Retribution in the Old Testament?”. 
 
63 Koch, “Is There a Doctrine of Retribution in the Old Testament?,” 58. 
 
64 Ibid., 61. 
 
65 See Chapter 7 for further discussion of the merits of Koch’s thesis.   36 
retribution as requiring a direct juridical role based upon an established legal standard is 
far  too  narrow  and  thus  makes  his  conclusion  that  divine  retribution  does  not  exist 
anywhere in the Hebrew Bible appear exaggerated.
66  Nevertheless, his conclusions have 
challenged many biblical scholars’ views on punishment and reward. For example, P. D. 
Miller’s study of sin and judgment in prophetic literature yields the conclusion “that a 
number of passages in which the correspondence of sin and judgment is effected suggest 
in various ways that the judgment is found in the consequence that is worked out of the 
sinful deed.”
67  Whether the text explicitly attributes the judgment to YHWH or not, 
“God is seen as the one who brings about the consequence.”
68  YHWH built into his 
creation the act-consequence connection
69 that underlies such passages, even if they do 
not attribute the consequences to him directly.  The tension between the notion of divine 
retribution  and  the  built-in  act-consequence  model  dissipates  when  one  considers  the 
Israelite concept of YHWH as a god who acts in history.  Although Israel’s enemies may 
appear  to  be  inflicting  punishment  on  her,  the  biblical  text  makes  clear  that  YHWH 
controls  the  actions  of  these  enemies,  and  thus  the  fate  of  Israel.
70      Miller  cites 
Deuteronomy 32:21ff as an example of a text that holds in tension divine retribution and 
                                                        
66 Adams, Wisdom in Transition, 3.  Kaminsky, Corporate Responsibility in the Hebrew Bible, 27–28.  
Patrick D. Miller, Sin and Judgment in the Prophets: A Stylistic and Theological Analysis (Chico, CA: 
Scholars Press, 1982), 135–137.  Boström, The God of the Sages, 95. 
 




69 Lennart Boström prefers the term “character-consequence relationship” because often Proverbs denotes 
punishments not for specific actions but rather for an individual’s general character.  Boström, The God of 
the Sages, 90. 
 
70 For example, see Isaiah 10:5-11.   37 
the act-consequence model.  Israel’s sin against YHWH will result in a similar affliction 
of Israel (32:21), but at the hands of human enemies, whom YHWH controls (32:27).
71   
In addition to direct statements of divine retribution and the military punishment 
used in Deuteronomy 32:21ff, the Hebrew Bible also uses social and natural punishment 
to indicate the correspondence between action and consequence.72  As Michael Fox has 
noted, however, Proverbs’ view of YHWH as the creator of a justly ruled universe73 also 
demands that divine impetus be seen in these cases as well:  “God’s judgment subsumes 
natural causality rather than the other way around.”
74   
In the specific case of being greedy for profit in Proverbs 15:27, certain biblical 
accounts of people being greedy for unjust gain and God’s role in punishing them may be 
instructive. For example, the prophet Jeremiah describes the many offenses for which the 
city of Jerusalem must be punished (hop⋲qad⋲, Jer. 6:6; cf. 6:15):  “For from the least to the 
greatest of them, everyone is greedy for profit (bo®sΩeœa{ baœsΩa{)” (Jer. 6:13a, cf. 8:10).  For 
this offense (among others), the prophet promises punishment for the entire city and all of 
its residents (Jer. 6:11-12).  Although the collective will suffer punishment, Jeremiah 
6:13a  makes  clear  that  every  member  of  the  collective  is  guilty  and  deserving  of 
punishment,  and  thus  the  punishment  for  being  greedy  for  profit  is  individual.  
Nevertheless, Jeremiah also makes clear that YHWH is responsible for the impending 
judgment.   
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The sale of Joseph to slave traders by his brothers offers another useful example. 
Although  this  example  uses  a  different  expression  from  “the  one  greedy  for  profit” 
(bo®sΩeœa{ baœsΩa{), Judah’s question, “what profit (ma-besΩa{) is it if we kill our brother and 
conceal his blood?” (Gen. 37:26), indicates that his brothers, who agree to his plan, are 
indeed “greedy for profit” (bo®sΩeœa{ baœsΩa{).  Although Joseph’s brothers do not attribute the 
famine that afflicts their homeland following the sale of Joseph into slavery to divine 
retribution, Joseph makes clear to his brothers that YHWH orchestrated the consequences 
of their malicious actions to have a positive impact on those that they aimed to harm, 
namely their father Jacob and brother Joseph, who were rewarded with wealth, progeny, 
and elevated status in a foreign court.  As this example makes clear, even when humans 
do not recognize YHWH’s presence, he does in fact play an active role in thwarting the 
sinful actions of the wrongdoer. 
None of the occurrences of the concept of “unjust profit,” (b⋲esΩa{) in Proverbs 
directly  attributes  the  consequences  to  YHWH.  Lennart  Boström  concludes  from  his 
study  of  God’s  role  in  retribution  in  Proverbs  that  perhaps  presenting  a  consistent 
position on this issue was less important to Israel’s sages than it is to modern interpreters.  
Rather, Proverbs recognized that the consequences for one’s behavior came to fruition 
through a variety of means, which could include human, societal, and divine agency.
75   
Proverbs 11:17 
  The root {-k-r, “to trouble,” also appears in Proverbs 11:17:  “A man of kindness 
rewards himself, but a cruel man troubles (w§{oœk⋲eœr) his flesh.”  Given the parallelism 
between the two halves of the verse, the effects of the cruel man’s behavior ostensibly 
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appear to result in individual negative consequences for himself.  However, “his flesh” 
(sû§}eœro®) can refer not only to his own flesh, but also to his blood relatives.  The use of this 
root ({-k-r) in Proverbs 11:29 and 15:27 in connection with the family (bayit◊) suggests 
that the sage intends “his flesh” (sû§}eœro®) to mean simultaneously both the individual who 
acts cruelly and his family.
76  In other words, the character of the cruel individual brings 
negative consequences not only upon himself, but also upon his family. 
  The sage’s words of wisdom in 11:17 are somewhat general.  They refer not to 
specific actions but rather to one’s character.  The incongruence between the reward for 
good character, which is individual, and the punishment for bad, which appears to be 
both individual and collective, perhaps lies in the nature of the character traits addressed.  
Kindness and cruelty are attributes that apply to an individual’s relationship with others.  
A kind person is concerned for others, often even at his own expense.  His reward for 
such kindness is that he personally will benefit despite his selfless intentions.  A cruel 
person intends to inflict harm on others, but the result is that he harms himself and his 
own posterity. 
Proverbs 17:13 
As has already become evident from some of the examples examined above, sin 
often results in the sinner suffering in a manner similar to the wrong he committed.  The 
wrongs committed by an individual can result in those same transgressions being inflicted 
upon the group associated with that individual.  YHWH troubling (ya{k•rk⋲aœ) Achan’s 
family as retribution for Achan’s troubling ({∞k⋲artaœnu®) of Israel is an excellent example of 
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this (Josh. 7:25).  Proverbs 17:13 recognizes this pattern:  “As for the one returning evil 
for good, evil will not depart from his house.”  Lex talionis, or the notion that a criminal’s 
punishment should inflict pain and loss that is commensurate with the crime committed, 
underlies the legal system not only of Israel, but also much of the ancient Near East.
77  
Although modern sensibilities often object to the biblical expression of lex talionis, “life 
for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth…” (Exod. 21:23-25; Lev. 24:19-21; Deut. 19:16-21), 
the underlying principle suggests that the punishment should fit the crime.  Thus, this 
legal principle prevents, for example, a debtor from being executed for failure to repay 
his loans.  For the evildoer in Proverbs 17:13 to experience evil as punishment for the 
evil he inflicted on others is fair according to the principles of lex talionis.  However, the 
sage does not condemn the sinner alone; he suggests that evil will afflict the sinner’s 
entire family.  In this manner, the sinner’s punishment is worse than the evil he inflicted 
on another.   
The rejection of lex talionis here in favor of a more vindictive form of punishment 
has a parallel in Psalm 109.  The psalmist complains about his enemies:  “In return for 
my love, they accuse me, even though I am in prayer.  Thus they return to me evil instead 
of good and hatred instead of love” (Ps. 109:4-5).  The psalmist continues with some of 
the most poignant curses found anywhere in the Bible.  Rather than merely wishing for 
his enemies to suffer as they have made him suffer, the psalmist asks YHWH to extend 
their  punishments  to  their  children  (Ps.  109:9-15).
78    In  contrast  to  the  emotionally 
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charged words of Psalm 109, however, Proverbs 17:13 does not appear to be motivated 
by a desire to see one’s enemies suffer.  Two possibilities present themselves as possible 
explanations for the sage’s divergence from the principle of lex talionis.  Either the sage 
is observing a pattern of human behavior and consequence that is familiar to him, or he is 
offering a didactic warning that the evil one reaps will be worse than the evil one has 
sown.    As  evidence  for  the  former,  one  need  only  look  at  the  previously  discussed 
examples, like Genesis 34 in which the actions of two individuals (first Shechem and 
Dinah,  then  Simeon  and  Levi)  result  in  the  punishment  of  a  larger  group  (first  the 
inhabitants of Shechem, then Jacob and his family).  
As in Proverbs 15:27, the sage makes no direct comment concerning the agent 
behind the collective retribution described in 17:13.
79  Although YHWH may redirect the 
sinner’s  actions  so  that  the  sinner  and  his  family  suffer  its  consequences,  it  is  the 
individual who starts the chain of events and has the power to prevent the evil that will 
afflict his family.  Regardless of whether YHWH is the direct agent behind the retribution 
described in Proverbs 17:13, the individual, armed with the knowledge that both he and 
his  family  will  bear  the  consequences  of  his  evil  actions,  can  avoid  setting  the  act-
consequence process into motion.  In this respect, the verse may function pedagogically 
to discourage bad behavior. 
Proverbs 13:22 
  The thwarting of the sinner’s intentions with ensuing wider consequences for the 
sinner’s family occurs again in Proverbs 13:22:  “The good leaves an inheritance for the 
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sons of his sons, but the wealth of the sinner is stored up for the righteous.”
80  Although 
the sinner, like all individuals in ancient Israel, intends to leave an inheritance to his sons 
and thus protect his name and heritage,
81 his offspring will not inherit the riches that he 
has  acquired,  perhaps  unjustly.    Rather,  the  righteous  will,  through  unexplained 
mechanisms, gain the sinner’s wealth.   
  Many of the details of this verse are vague.  The crime of the sinner is unknown.  
The verse does not specify the manner in which his wealth is transferred to the righteous.  
Given this vagueness, the verse does not appear to be an observation of the sage’s lived 
reality but rather another pedagogical warning of the far-reaching consequences of the 
individual’s actions.  Proverbs 28:8 suggests the same transfer of wealth from wrongdoer 
to righteous individual:  “One increasing his wealth through interest and usury gathers it 
for one who is kind to the poor.”  This verse differs from 13:22, however, in that it does 
not suggest that the transfer will affect the wrongdoer’s offspring.   
  Outside of Proverbs, the notion that the assets of wrongdoers are forfeited to the 
children of the righteous occurs both in Job 27:13-17, which will be discussed in the 
section on Job, and in the Egyptian wisdom instructions of Amenemope.  According to 
Amenemope’s teachings, if a man encroaches on the fields of another, “His property will 
be taken from his children, and his belongings will be given to another” (Ch. 6; 8.7-8 [cf. 
AEL 2.152]).  Amenemope’s instruction makes clear that the crime in question is the 
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illegal  acquisition  of  land,  the  inheritance  of  another  man  that  he  will  leave  to  his 
children.  In Proverbs 13:22, this point is unclear.  The sinner’s crime is unknown and the 
treasure that he will lose to the righteous is not necessarily land.  The generalized nature 
of the sage’s warning would seem to support a pedagogical function for the mention of 
the wrongdoer’s effects on his children. 
Proverbs 11:29 
  The root {-k-r, which has recurred several times in the above discussion, also 
occurs in connection with the family in Proverbs 11:29:  “The one who troubles ({o®k⋲eœr) 
his house (be®t◊o®) will inherit wind, and the foolish one will be a servant to the wise of 
heart.”    In  this  context,  however,  the  trouble  brought  upon  one’s  family  is  not  the 
punishment  for  sinful  or  foolish  behavior  but  is  rather  the  cause  of  a  negative 
consequence,  inheriting  the  wind  (cf.  Prov.  30:4b).    Fox  connects  this  verse  with 
Proverbs 17:2:
82  “A wise slave will rule over a son causing shame, and in the midst of 
brothers he will share an inheritance.”  If the one troubling ({o®k⋲eœr) his house (be®t◊o®) is a 
brother hoping for more inheritance than he is due, the consequence of his actions is that 
his inheritance will be reversed; instead of receiving more, he will receive nothing (Prov. 
11:29a) and one who should have received no inheritance will gain (Prov. 17:2).   
  This  passage  does  not  directly  advocate  collective  accountability.    It 
acknowledges the ability of an individual through his own actions to create trouble for his 
family, but the consequences envisioned thwart the wicked individual’s intentions and 
result  in  the  family  members  whom  he  attempted  to  wrong  reaping  the  wicked 
individual’s forfeited share of the inheritance.  Although the passage does not mention 
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the wrongdoer’s progeny, they presumably suffer from their father’s exclusion from the 
family inheritance.  If he receives only wind as his allotment, the inheritance that he can 
pass on to his own sons will be only the wealth that he can amass during his own lifetime 
through his own work. 
Proverbs 12:4 
  Several passages in Proverbs focus on the wife and the effects that she has on her 
husband and family.  Because of the ode to the wife of valor in Proverbs 31:10-21, which 
will be discussed in the next section on collective reward, a great many of these passages 
focus more on the rewards that she brings her family.  A couple of passages, however, 
suggest that a wife’s husband and family can suffer for her misdeeds.  Proverbs 12:4 
recognizes both of these aspects of a wife’s contribution to her marriage:  “A wife of 
valor is the crown of her husband, but the one bringing shame is like rottenness in his 
bones.”  While a good wife can bring her husband pride that is externally visible, a bad 
wife causes him not only shame, which is presumably public as well, but also internal 
destruction.
83  The mechanism of punishment is not an external force but something that 
corrupts from within, unseen and unperceived, until it eventually destroys the husband.   
Proverbs 14:1b 
  The personification of wisdom and folly as women in Proverbs 14:1 also suggests 
that a woman can positively or adversely affect her family through her actions:  “Wisdom 
builds her house (baœn§t◊a® b⋲e®t◊a®h), but Folly tears hers down with her own hands.”  As in 
previous verses, the term bayit◊, “house,” here refers not to the physical structure but 
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rather to the family.
84  In addition to the fact that an individual likely was not able to tear 
down the physical structure of a house by herself, the usage of house in connection with 
Wisdom in other proverbs suggests that the sage is referring to Wisdom’s family and 
household economy.
85  Proverbs 24:3-4, 31:15, 21, 27 all suggest that the house to which 
a woman attends is her family and that she plays a crucial role in its economic prosperity.  
Mismanagement of this responsibility would result in unpleasant consequences for her 
entire family.  If, like these other passages, this passage deals with financial well-being, 
then the negative consequences that a woman brings upon her family through her own 
folly are not divine retribution but the natural, observed result of such actions.  This 
observation  of  wisdom  literature  is  not  limited  to  the  paterfamilias.    Both  men  and 
women  could  behave  in  a  manner  that  brought  negative  consequences  upon  their 
children.
86   
Proverbs 13:20b 
  Although  the  examples  discussed  so  far  are  generally  instances  of 
transgenerational  punishment,  Proverbs  13:20  hints  at  intragenerational  collective 
accountability:  “The one who walks with the wise will become wise, but the companion 
of fools will suffer harm.”  The suffering of fools is contagious for those who keep 
company with them.
87  The text is brief and does not specify its precise meaning.  It 
seems  unlikely,  however,  that  the  suffering  envisioned  is  divinely  inflicted.    More 
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probable is the possibility that association with fools leads to foolish behavior, which 
produces suffering.  The first half of the verse seems to express the same notion with 
respect to the wise.  It does not, by contrast, mention the rewards gained through the 
wisdom acquired by spending time with the wise.   
 
III.  Collective Reward in Proverbs  
  Many of the passages discussed in the previous section offer insight into both 
collective punishment and collective reward.  Some of those will be reconsidered here for 
their comments on collective reward.  Still more passages occur in Proverbs that deal 
only with collective reward without presenting any contrast to collective punishment.  
Those will be considered in this section as well. 
Proverbs 3:33 
  As discussed above, the term naœweh, “abode,” in poetic parallelism with bayit◊, 
“house,” in Proverbs 3:33 likely suggests that the term carries the same connotations as 
bayit◊ in this context.  YHWH does not bless the structure so much as he blesses the 
family unit residing within that structure.  The family of the righteous benefits from the 
righteous individual’s good character.   
Proverbs 13:22 
  In Proverbs 13:22, the righteous benefit not only from collective reward, but also 
from the collective punishment of the sinner and his would-be heirs: “The good leaves an 
inheritance for the sons of his sons, but the wealth of the sinner is stored up for the 
righteous.” The children of the righteous benefit from their father’s own good deeds, and   47 
the  righteous  individual  comes  into  possession  of  the  sinner’s  savings.    Again,  the 
mechanism by which this occurs is unclear. 
Proverbs 15:6 
  In  addition  to  its  use  in  connection  with  collective  responsibility  in  Proverbs 
11:17  and  15:27,  the  root  {-k-r  also  appears  in  Proverbs  15:6:    “In  the  house  of  the 
righteous there is great treasure, but the produce of the wicked is troubled ({-k-r).”  The 
two halves of the proverb are not antithetical.  Rather than stating that the wicked have no 
treasure, the verse permits the possibility that the wicked have treasure but notes that it is 
“troubled” ({-k-r).  Given the associations between the root {-k-r and the family discussed 
above, the sage is likely implying that the family that occupies the house of the righteous 
is not troubled by its fortunes.
88   
Proverbs 21:20 
  “Precious treasure and oil are in the abode (binwe®) of the wise, but the foolish 
man devours it.” Following the LXX, many translators emend the MT’s “and oil are in” 
(waœsûemen) to “dwells in” (yisûkoœn), which heightens the contrast between the permanent 
residence  of  wealth  in  the  house  of  the  wise  with  the  fool’s  hasty  consumption  of 
resources.
89  Although the sage may indeed have in mind the physical structure of a 
dwelling, the issue raised, namely that of safeguarding one’s inheritance, affects those 
who dwell in that structure with the wise man, his family.  The wise man is careful with 
his assets, and those assets remain to him and his heirs.  The fool devours his resources 
and leaves not only nothing for himself, but also nothing for his heirs. 
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Proverbs 14:26 
  “In the fear of YHWH one has strong confidence, and one’s children will have 
refuge” (Prov. 14:26).  Fox describes the second colon as an apparent non sequitur, but 
nevertheless  one  that  gains  meaning  from  the  metaphorical  use  of  mib⋲t√ahΩ,  “trust, 
confidence,” to denote a stronghold or fortress, into which an individual brings his family 
in the event of peril.
90  On the functional level, the individual who fears YHWH abides 
by his laws and teachings, which provide for the instruction of one’s children in those 
same laws and teachings (e.g. Deut. 6:1-2).  In this respect, the children of the righteous 
will  have  refuge  in  the  same  fear  of  YHWH  in  which  their  father  found  strong 
confidence.  The collective reward for fearing YHWH, then, appears to be a practical 
observation of reality; the individual who strictly adheres to the teachings of Yahwism 
will teach his children to do the same, and they will benefit from this instruction in the 
same manner that their father did, namely through a sense of security. 
Proverbs 20:7 
  Like Proverbs 13:22, 20:7 suggests that the children of the righteous individual 
will benefit from their father’s good behavior:  “The righteous walks about with integrity; 
happy are his children after him!”  The sage does not specify the manner in which the 
righteous individual’s children receive this blessing.  One possibility is that the father has 
imparted his righteous ways to his children, who, consequently, enjoy a happy existence 
because of the virtue they gained through good parenting.  If YHWH himself bestows 
this blessing upon the children because of the righteous ways of their father, the issue of 
merit becomes pertinent.  Should YHWH reward the children of the righteous if they 
                                                        
90 Ibid., 2:582.   49 
should not turn out to be righteous themselves? This issue will be considered more in 
depth in the section below on the role of wisdom instruction for the righteous and wicked 
in Proverbs. 
Proverbs 11:21b 
  “Hand  to  hand,
91  the  wicked  will  not  go  unpunished,  but  the  seed
92  of  the 
righteous will escape” (Prov. 11:21). According to this passage, the seed, or offspring, of 
the  righteous  will  not  succumb  to  the  calamities  and  punishments  that  threaten  the 
wicked.    The  nature  of  the  fate  that  the  children  of  the  righteous  escape  is  unclear.  
Likewise, the specific characteristics that merit this reward and the role of YHWH are not 
mentioned. 
  Although the first colon does not deal with the issue of collective accountability, 
several commentators
93 have pointed out that the phrase “will not go unpunished” (loœ}-
yinnaœqeh) draws on terminology familiar from the divine attribute formula in Exodus 
34:6-7.  The relationship between this formula and Israel’s wisdom literature will be 
explored in greater detail in Chapter 7.  According to Van Leeuwen, the allusion to God’s 
justice may suggest that the sage who penned this verse, and others like it (see Prov. 6:29; 
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16:5;  17:5;  19:5,  9;  28:20)  drew  his  insight  not  from  his  lived  experiences  and 
observations but rather from traditional notions of God’s character.
94 
Proverbs 14:1a 
  The  statement  that  “Wisdom  builds  her  house  (bayit◊),”  like  other  passages 
containing  the  term  bayit◊,  “house,”  suggests  that  the  wise  woman  provides  enduring 
goodness for her family.  The expression “to build a house” in connection with a female 
subject also occurs in Ruth 4:11, a passage in which the townspeople act as witnesses to 
Boaz’s agreement to fulfill the obligations of the levirate marriage for Ruth.  The people 
bless Ruth as she joins Boaz’s family:  “May YHWH make the woman entering your 
house like Rachel and like Leah, who together built the house of Israel” (Ruth 4:11).  In 
addition  to  producing  numerous  offspring,  Rachel  and  Leah  also  helped  to  build  the 
house of Israel by contributing to the family economy.  The woman who builds her house 
in Proverbs 14:1a produces the children who will benefit from the collective reward that 
she brings upon the house. 
Proverbs 31:10-31 
  The  praise  of  the  virtuous  wife  (}eœsûet◊-hΩayil)  in  Proverbs  31:10-31  contains 
numerous praises of the beneficial role that a good wife can play for her family.   That 
she  is  “more  precious  than  jewels”  (v.  10)  may  again  refer  to  the  woman’s  role  in 
managing the family economy.  Verses 11 and 12 both focus on the advantages that she 
brings to her husband, namely “gain” and “good.”  Not only does she provide benefits for 
her husband explicitly, but she is also praised for securing food (v. 15) and clothing (v. 
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21) for her family.  She accomplishes such things by avoiding idleness (v. 27) and her 
family appreciates her contribution to their prosperity (v. 28).   
  Given  the  rather  practical  nature  of  the  activities  for  which  the  virtuous  wife 
receives praise, the collective reward in which her family basks is more likely a general 
observation than a religious belief that YHWH rewards the family that is managed by an 
industrious wife.  The author of the poem mentions the virtuous wife’s fear of YHWH (v. 
30), but the divine is otherwise not mentioned as the source of the benefits that befall the 
family of the virtuous wife. 
 
IV.  The Role of Wisdom Instruction for the Righteous and the Wicked in Proverbs 
  As already noted, the interpreter who produced the Targum Onkelos to Exodus 
20:4-6 avoided the theological problem of innocent children suffering for the sins of their 
fathers  by  describing  the  children  as  “rebellious”  and  continuing  “to  sin  after  their 
fathers.”
95  Does this solution to the theological problem of collective punishment have an 
analogy  in  wisdom  literature?    Several  texts  with  wisdom  affinities  from  the  New 
Testament suggest a widespread notion that like begets like or that people reap what they 
sow.
96  Is this concept present in the Hebrew biblical wisdom tradition and does it play 
any role in Israel’s wisdom literature’s understanding of the origins of good and wicked 
children?  If so, this would suggest that wicked parents who deserve punishment produce 
wicked children who also deserve punishment; righteous parents who deserve reward 
produce righteous children who also deserve reward.  Collective accountability does not 
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create  a  theological  problem  in  this  scenario.    So  the  following  question  must  be 
addressed:    Does  Israel’s  wisdom  literature,  like  the  New  Testament  passages  just 
mentioned, hold that righteous parents beget righteous children while wicked parents 
beget wicked children?  Given the nature of much of wisdom literature as instruction 
intended to help the pupil avoid sin and act righteously, a related question arises:  What is 
the power of wisdom instruction to help the child of the wicked avoid the consequences 
of his parents’ sins?  Can anyone who avails himself of the instruction found in wisdom 
literature avoid punishment for the sins of others? 
  According to the worldview of wisdom literature, instruction and discipline have 
the power to teach children to avoid sin (e.g. Prov. 10:17, 13:24, 14:26, 15:5, 22:6, 23:13-
14, 29:15-17).  Yet children, despite the discipline and instructions provided to them, do 
not necessarily reap the rewards of wisdom simply because it is available.
97  For example, 
in Proverbs 5:7-14, the sage warns the child to heed his instructions lest one day he 
should wind up saying, “How I hated discipline, and my heart despised reproof!  I did not 
listen to the voice of my teachers nor did I incline my ear to my instructors.  Now I am in 
the midst of every distress in the assembly and congregation” (Prov. 5:12-14).  As this 
statement indicates, wisdom only protects those who embrace it. The individual who has 
access to wisdom teachings but does not make use of them will suffer.
98  Indeed, “A fool 
despises the instruction of his father, but the one who heeds reproof is prudent” (Prov. 
                                                        
97 Little explicit evidence for educational accessibility in ancient Israel exists, but a good case can be made 
that schooling outside of the home was not widely available.  Most education in ancient Israel was likely 
family-based, and the use of family terminology in biblical wisdom literature likely reflects this.  David 
McLain Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart: Origins of Scripture and Literature (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 129–131.  James L Crenshaw, Education in Ancient Israel: Across the Deadening 
Silence, 1st ed., The Anchor Bible Reference Library (New York: Doubleday, 1998), 86–108. 
 
98 Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 129.   53 
15:5).  Although good parents offer wisdom instruction to their children, if a child does 
not heed it, he will be a fool.  Israel’s wisdom literature is acutely aware of the problems 
that a foolish child can cause:  “A foolish son is a calamity to his father” (Prov. 19:13a); 
“A foolish son is a grief to his father and bitterness to her who bore him” (Prov. 17:25); 
“The one who ruins the father and chases away the mother is a son causing shame and 
bringing reproach” (Prov. 19:26); “A wise son gladdens his father, but a foolish son is a 
mother’s  grief”  (Prov.  1:1);  “Be  wise,  my  son,  and  gladden  my  heart  so  that  I  may 
respond  to  the  one  reproaching  me”  (Prov.  27:11).    The  foolish  child  can  cause  his 
parents  suffering,  including  both  mental  anguish  and  physical  harm.    The  wise  child 
brings his parents pride and happiness.   
Although this is a reversal of the usual direction of transgenerational punishment, 
in which the children suffer for the sins of their parents, this situation is not without 
precedence.  Deuteronomy 24:16 prohibits not only the capital punishment of children for 
the crimes of their parents, but also the capital punishment of parents for the crimes of 
their children.
99  That this law code prohibits such a practice suggests that it was indeed a 
common conception that children could bring bad legal consequences upon their parents.  
That the parents should be put to death by a civil court may indeed be hyperbolic,
100 but 
the  concern  expressed  in  Deuteronomy  21:18-21  (cf.  Exod.  21:15;  Lev.  20:9;  Deut. 
27:16; Prov. 20:20) to execute a stubborn and rebellious son suggests children could 
cause trouble for their parents so that the death of the child was preferable to the parents 
                                                        
99 Ezekiel 18 also deals with the case of a righteous parent producing a sinful offspring.  A sinful father can 
produce a righteous son who in turn produces a sinful son.  The apple can, in fact, fall far from the tree.  In 
such cases, Ezekiel advocates individual, rather than collective, accountability. 
 
100 Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation, 341. 
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enduring the consequences of their child’s actions.101  Proverbs 28:7 perhaps relies on the 
Deuteronomic law of the stubborn and rebellious son:102  “A wise son keeps the law, but 
the one keeping company with gluttons (zo®l§lˆîm) shames his father.”  The term zo®leœl, 
“glutton,” also appears in Deuteronomy 21:20, in which the parents of the stubborn and 
rebellious son make formal charges against their son to the town elders:  “And they will 
say to the elders of his town, ‘This son of ours is stubborn and rebellious.  He does not 
obey us.  He is a glutton (zo®leœl) and a drunkard.”  In light of the charges leveled directly 
against the stubborn and rebellious son in Deut. 21:20, the phrasing of Prov. 28:7 seems 
peculiar.  The sage does not warn that a glutton causes his father shame but rather that the 
companion of gluttons humiliates his father.  Is the son guilty of gluttony himself through 
mere association with gluttons?  Or has the sage recognized a pattern of human behavior 
whereby individuals tend to engage in the same behavior, good or bad, of their peers?103  
The son’s culpability is unclear, but evidently his friends’ poor character can bring shame 
upon the son’s father, who is responsible for raising a wise son who keeps the law (Prov. 
28:7a).   
  On  the  basis  of  the  wisdom  passages  examined  above,  it  would  appear  that 
Proverbs allows for the possibility that a good parent can produce a bad child.  Yet the 
                                                        
101  The  mention  in  Deut.  21:21  that  “all  Israel  will  hear  and  be  afraid”  suggests  that  this  punishment 
functioned pedagogically to deter children from shunning discipline.  
 
102 Clifford, Proverbs, 244. 
 
103 A similar notion may underlie the warnings against associating with the outsider woman in Prov. 1-9.  
Joseph Blenkinsopp has proposed that the historical context for the denunciation of the outsider woman 
may have been a postexilic community struggling with problems arising from exogamy.  Association with 
people who do not hold the same beliefs, customs, values, and interests as one’s own family and culture 
threatens the enculturation process for which purpose education likely functioned in ancient Israel.  Joseph 
Blenkinsopp, “The Social Context of the ‘Outsider Woman’ in Proverbs 1-9,” Biblica 72, no. 4 (1991): 
472–473.  Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 130–131.   55 
parents’  role  in  producing  good  offspring  appears  to  be  crucial  according  to  other 
passages:   
 
“The one withholding his rod hates his son, but the one loving him is diligent  
with discipline” (Prov. 13:24).   
 
“Discipline your son, for there is hope; don’t set your heart on killing him” (Prov 
19:18).   
 
“Train youth according to his way, and even when he is old, he will not turn from 
it” (Prov. 22:6).   
 
Do not withhold discipline from youth; if you strike him with a rod, he will not 
die.  If you strike him with a rod, you will save his life from Sheol” (Prov 23:13-
14).   
 
“The  rod  and  reproof  give  wisdom,  but  a  neglected  child  shames  his 
mother…Discipline your son and he will give you rest; he will give your heart 
delight” (Prov. 29:15, 17). 
 
These passages would seem to suggest that good parents are those who abide by the oft-
repeated instructions to discipline their children.  The very model that the good parent is 
to follow is that of YHWH himself:  “My son, do not reject the discipline of YHWH or 
be grieved by his reproof, for YHWH reproves the one he loves, as a father the son in 
whom he delights” (Prov. 3:11-12).  How then does a good parent produce a child that 
causes shame (Prov. 19:26) or ruin (Prov. 19:13a) or “A generation [that] curses its father 
and does not bless its mother” (Prov. 30:11)?  Proverbs 19:17 even seems to offer a 
measure  of  guarantee  that  the  parent  who  properly  disciplines  his  child  will  not  be 
disappointed.  Does this suggest that the parents who produce foolish children were not 
diligent enough with their discipline and therefore share in the culpability for the shame 
and ruin that their children will bring upon them?  Is the suffering brought back on the 
parent by the child who does not listen to reproof the product of YHWH turning the   56 
consequences of the sin (failure to discipline harshly enough) back on the sinner (the 
negligent parents)?  Are the foolish children who bring their parents grief, bitterness 
(Prov. 17:25), shame (Prov. 19:26), and calamity (Prov. 19:13a) the product of parents 
who did not properly rear their children (Prov. 29:15)?  Do such foolish children deserve 
the suffering that their foolishness, caused by their parents’ failure to discipline them, has 
caused them? 
  To judge from the threat in Proverbs 20:20 that the lamp of the child who curses 
his parents will be extinguished, it would appear that the sage holds the individual, in this 
case the foolish child who has rejected the wisdom instruction not to curse his parents, 
responsible, even though it appears possible elsewhere that the child’s failings may be the 
result of improper parenting.  The issue of free will, however, complicates the issue.  If 
YHWH created and controls the universe, to what extent is he responsible for the nature 
of  those,  including  the  foolish  and  the  wicked,  who  exist  within  it?    According  to 
Proverbs 16:4, “YHWH has made everything for its purpose, even the wicked for the day 
of  trouble.”    Are  the  wicked  and  the  foolish  predestined  for  their  wickedness  and 
foolishness?  If this is so, does wisdom instruction have the power to save them from this 
fate?  
  To answer these questions, it is first necessary to consider the interpretation of 
Proverbs 16:4 and the larger unit within which it occurs, 16:1-9, which R. N. Whybray 
describes as a “theological compendium” that has “deliberately been given the central 
place in the book [of Proverbs].”
104  Verses 1, 3, and 9 all suggest that YHWH has 
ultimate control over human plans: 
                                                        
104 Whybray, Proverbs, 329.   57 
  “The plans of the mind belong to mortals, but the answer of the tongue is from  
YHWH” (Proverbs 16:1). 
 
  “Commit your work to YHWH, and your plans will be established” (Proverbs  
16:3). 
 
  “The human mind plans the way, but YHWH directs the steps” (Proverbs 16:9). 
 
The exact nature of these human plans is not explicit.
105  Does the sage mean to suggest 
that  God  will  thwart  a  fool  devising  a  wicked  plan?
106    Or  is  it  merely  a  statement 
suggesting  that  all  human  endeavors  require  divine  guidance?
107    If  the  former 
interpretation is correct, why do innocent people suffer at the hands of the wicked at all?  
Why does YHWH not thwart their plans before they harm another person?  If the latter 
interpretation is correct, does this mean that YHWH helps the wicked individual who 
plots murder or some other action that causes harm to others?   
  The statement in Proverbs 16:4 that YHWH created the wicked for its purpose is 
difficult to translate.  The expression translated as “for its purpose” (lamma{∞ne®hu®)
108 
involves an unusual rendering of the noun ma{∞neh, which more often means “answer.”    
In this vein, William McKane interprets the verse as “Yahweh has made everything in 
relation to what answers to it,” or, in other words, a counterpart.
109  This implies, for 
McKane, that YHWH created a “self-contained, self-regulating order rather than theodicy 
                                                        
105 Boström describes the plans in 16:1, 9 as “neutral,” in contrast to a similar wisdom saying in  The 
Instruction of Ptahhotep, maxim 6.  Boström, The God of the Sages, 183.  
 
106 Cf. Von Rad’s interpretation of Gen. 50:20 as an example of wisdom in the Joseph narrative that is 
parallel to Prov. 16:9.  Von Rad, “Josephgeschichte Und Altere Chokma.”  Fox notes that this notion is not 
limited to wisdom literature.  Fox, “Wisdom in the Joseph Story,” 36. 
 
107 Whybray, Proverbs, 242. 
 
108 Alternatively, “for his (= YHWH’s) purpose.” 
 
109 McKane, Proverbs, 497.   58 
in the strict sense.”
110  Many interpreters prefer to translate ma{∞neh as “purpose” on the 
basis  of  Arabic  usage  and  the  Hebrew  expression  l§ma{an,  “for  the  purpose  of.”
111  
Although McKane’s interpretation removes the issue of predestination from the verse, 
Fox’s  more  traditional  translation  renders  an  interpretation  that  is  suggestive  of 
something akin to predestination:  “the present proverb says that the evildoer (as a type) 
was created just to give God’s grim judgments something to do, to keep them busy, as it 
were.”
112  Boström proposes that this verse was penned in response to the problem of 
theodicy.    Although  the  verse  offers  no  conclusive  answer  to  the  problem,  the  sage 
grappled with the issue.  He argues that the passage does not offer a solution to the 
origins of wickedness in predestination by the world’s creator but rather reassures its 
audience that YHWH created a suitable punishment for those who are wicked.
113 
  Proverbs 20:24 contrasts YHWH’s control of human activity with the inability of 
humans to understand that activity:  “The steps of man are from YHWH; how can man 
understand his own way?”  Although the first line also appears in Psalm 37:23 in a 
positive  context  that  suggests  that  YHWH  offers  humans  protection,  the  negative 
question following it here likely suggests that the sage considered the task in question 
impossible.
114  If humans cannot understand their own ways, which this verse claims 
originate from YHWH rather than from humans themselves, can they make use of the 




111 Whybray, Proverbs, 241. 
 
112 Fox, Proverbs, 2009, 2:611. 
 
113 Boström, The God of the Sages, 61, 148.  Cf. Clifford, Proverbs, 158. 
 
114 Whybray, Proverbs, 301.   59 
generally based on the premise that actions produce consequences and one should act 
according to the consequences that one hopes to produce.  However, if humans cannot 
understand their own ways, and perhaps also the consequences that they entail, how can 
wisdom help them?  As Fox observes, despite the determinism expressed in the verse, 
most of Proverbs attributes free will to humans, so the statement is perhaps better read as 
a recognition of human limits and of the need for faith in YHWH.
115 
  As noted above, Proverbs claims that discipline and reproof offer the instructor 
the tools necessary to produce a righteous and wise child.  Yet, Proverbs 9:7-9 suggests 
that  a  class  of  people  exists  for  whom  instruction  is  futile:    “Whoever  disciplines  a 
scoffer receives abuse; whoever rebukes the wicked gets hurt.  Do not rebuke a scoffer 
lest he hate you; rebuke the wise and he will love you.  Give instruction to the wise, and 
he will become wiser still; teach the righteous and he will gain in learning.”  Some 
commentators interpret verse 7 to mean that not only can the wisdom instructor not teach 
a  scoffer,  but  also  that  his  efforts  will  result  in  the  instructor  acquiring  some  of  the 
scoffer’s disgrace.
116  While this latter assertion may be an unnecessary interpretation of a 
difficult text,
117 the verses understood as a whole seem to suggest that only the righteous 
benefit from wisdom.  The scoffer, by his very nature, rejects discipline and rebuke, 
which are crucial pedagogical tools for learning wisdom.118   
                                                        
115 Fox, Proverbs, 2009, 2:675. 
 
116 Clifford, Proverbs, 106.  
 
117 Whybray rejects this position based on the difficult reading and the probable need for emendation.  
Whybray, Proverbs, 145–146. 
 
118 Fox, Proverbs, 2009, 1:307.   60 
  Given  the  biological  relationship  between  most  teachers  and  pupils  in  ancient 
Israel, David Carr argues, “A key goal of such (largely) family-based education was the 
cultural reproduction of the parent/teacher:  enculturating a son (and some daughters) to 
play a similar sociocultural role to that of the parent (or pseudoparent).”
119  In some cases, 
this education may have involved the learning of a trade, like writing, but most often the 
nature of the instruction was much broader.
120  The lessons learned from one’s parents 
taught the student to appreciate, respect, and sustain the culture and beliefs of his parents.  
In this manner, wisdom instruction, like the later Jewish documents known as ethical 
wills, offered the teacher an opportunity for immortality.
121  This type of immortality 
depends on the individual’s descendants not doing anything to jeopardize the prosperity 
or  longevity  of  the  family  lineage.    Accordingly,  the  concern  to  avoid  behavior  that 
resulted in collective retribution for one’s family and to embrace actions that garnered 
transgenerational rewards was an important one.  With this goal of enculturation of the 
son in mind, it seems likely that the sages who produced Proverbs generally felt that their 
instructions could steer a pupil on the right course.   However, the book’s advice is not so 
disconnected from reality that it does not recognize the possibility of exceptions to the 
general rule. 
 
V.  Summary of Findings in Proverbs  
                                                        




121 Crenshaw, Education in Ancient Israel, 3.  Judah Goldin, Studies in Midrash and Related Literature, ed. 
Barry  L  Eichler  and  Jeffrey  H  Tigay,  1st  ed.,  JPS  Scholar  of  Distinction  Series  (Philadelphia:  Jewish 
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    Several  trends  have  emerged  from  the  preceding  discussion  of  collective 
accountability in Proverbs.  For both collective punishment and reward, many of the 
relevant  statements  deal  with  the  “house/abode”  or  “family”  of  the  wrongdoer  or 
righteous individual.
122  Some passages refer to the effect of one’s actions on his children 
or grandchildren, and a few note that a child’s behavior can have consequences for his 
parents.  On the whole, collective accountability in the book of Proverbs appears to be 
transgenerational.   
  Under the rubric of collective punishment, the sin or crime for which one’s family 
suffers is often quite vague.  In some cases it is a specific character trait (Prov. 11:17), 
rather than a particular action, but it many cases it is a general attribute, like wickedness 
(Prov. 3:33) or sinfulness (Prov. 13:22).  Similarly, the punishment is also usually quite 
general, such as an unspecified curse (Prov. 3:33) or the troubling of one’s house (Prov. 
15:27).    Some  of  the  more  specific  punishments  suggest  the  loss  of  wealth  or  an 
inheritance  (Prov.  11:29,  13:22).    In  most  cases,  YHWH’s  role  in  administering  the 
negative consequences for the family of the individual wrongdoer is not explicit, with 
Prov. 3:33 being the only exception.  Only by recognizing the sage’s understanding of the 
universe and everything that occurs within it as the result of YHWH’s creative actions 
can one attribute the bad consequences that befall the family of sinners to the divine will.  
That  YHWH’s  role  is  only  explicitly  mentioned  on  one  occasion  speaks  to  the 
prominence of the act-consequence connection in Proverbs and wisdom literature more 
generally.    Although  YHWH  ultimately  lies  behind  the  design  of  the  universe  that 
                                                        
122 For example, Prov. 3:33; 14:1; 15:27; 17:13; 21:20.   62 
automatically  brings  consequences  upon  individuals  for  their  actions,  the  text  rarely 
attributes intergenerational punishment to YHWH directly. 
As many scholars have pointed out in their studies of collective accountability in 
the  Hebrew  Bible  more  generally,  the  types  of  crimes  that  merit  intergenerational 
punishment are limited to those that involve infidelity to the covenant between the people 
of Israel and YHWH (Deut. 5:9-10).
123  The types of misdeeds and character traits that 
result in negative consequences for the wrongdoer’s family in Israel’s biblical wisdom 
tradition are not examples of treason against YHWH.  One instance, that of “being greedy 
for unjust profit,” bo®sΩeœa{ baœsΩa{ (Prov. 15:27), does involve the divine punishment of an 
entire community in Jeremiah 6:13, but in that context, every individual is personally 
guilty; the group suffers for the sins of every member, not those of an individual or a 
smaller subset.  Proverbs 17:13 forewarns that evil will not depart from the house of the 
one returning evil for good.  A parallel to this situation occurs in Psalm 109:  “They 
reward me evil for good, and hatred for my love.”  The psalmist goes on to ask that the 
family of his enemies be punished for their iniquitous requital:  “May the iniquity of his 
father be remembered before YHWH and do not let the sin of his mother be wiped out” 
(Psa. 109:14).  Whether the psalmist’s plea for divine assistance in seeking revenge upon 
his enemies was answered is unknown.  The psalm’s inclusion in the canon may suggest 
that the wider community accepted that returning evil for good merited transgenerational 
punishment, but most of the narrative material relating to this issue agrees in reserving 
such  a  severe  punishment  for  the  gravest  crimes,  those  committed  against  YHWH 
himself.   
                                                        
123 Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation, 344.  Levinson, “The Human Voice,” 47.   63 
Many  of  the  observations  made  about  collective  punishment  in  Proverbs  also 
apply to collective reward.  The rewards are often quite general (Prov. 3:33, 14:26).  In 
several cases, the rewards appear to be monetary (Prov. 13:22, 15:6, 21:20).  This is 
especially true in the case of the contribution of the virtuous wife (}eœsûet◊-hΩayil) to her 
family’s economy in Proverbs 31:10-31.  The characteristics and deeds being rewarded 
are perhaps even more vague than they are for the misdeeds that are punished.  Often the 
reward is for general character traits like being righteous (Prov. 3:33, 13:22, 15:6, 20:7), 
good (Prov. 13:22), or wise (Prov. 14:1, 21:20).  Most of the verses do not directly 
attribute the good fortunes of the righteous to YHWH himself.   
Proverbs generally holds that wisdom instruction, combined with discipline, has 
the power to produce good children who can avoid sin and punishment (Prov. 13:24, 
19:18,  22:6,  23:13-14,  29:15,  17).    Nevertheless,  some  statements  suggest  that  some 
people exist who cannot be reached through wisdom and discipline (Prov. 9:7-9) or who 
turn out rebellious despite their parents’ efforts to raise them according to the law.  Such 
children bring shame upon otherwise good parents, who are consequently deemed bad 
parents in the eyes of their peers (Prov. 27:11).  Although several statements may grapple 
with the issues of theodicy and origins of bad children (Prov. 16:4), no answer is reached 
and the book on the whole tends to hold the individual accountable for his own behavior 
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Chapter Three: Collective Accountability in the Book of Job 
 
I.  Introduction   
According to Halpern, “Job’s dilemma draws its locomotion from the dissonance, 
then, between rigid reality and the even more rigid theory of individual retribution; he, 
and  he  personally,  must  have  sinned.    Job,  and  Ecclesiastes,  puncture  the  theory  of 
individual retribution; against the old, supple idea of corporate responsibility, their lances 
would splinter harmlessly.”
124  Despite the rise of the individual and the general shift 
from collective to individual accountability in ancient Israel, Job’s suffering has a large 
social dimension to it.
125  A major component of his distress is the fact that his condition 
has alienated his friends and family (Job 19:13-22).  Although his prominence in the 
community once earned him the respect, admiration, and acclaim of all his community’s 
members,  from  its  orphans  to  its  rulers  (Job  29),  he  now  suffers  not  only  from  the 
rejection of his friends and family, but also from the mockery of even the lowliest of his 
community (Job 30:1-15).  Job’s complaint against God begins in earnest only when he 
personally experiences physical suffering (cf. the pious sufferer’s reactions in Job 1:18-
22 and 2:3-3:26), but his suffering is unbearable not so much because of the physical pain 
that he must endure as an individual but because of the ostracism that it ultimately causes 
him. 
  The discussion of collective accountability in the book of Job will begin with an 
examination  of  the  verses  relating  to  collective  punishment  (section  II)  and  those 
                                                        
124 Halpern, “Jerusalem and the Lineages,” 15. 
 
125 In addition to the social dimension to Job’s suffering, every human action for good or evil, according to 
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pertaining to collective reward (section III).  It will then consider examples in which the 
book rejects collective punishment (section IV), examine the role of wisdom instruction 
for helping children to reap rewards and avoid punishment (section V), and, finally, offer 
a summary of the findings (section VI). 
 
II.  Collective Punishment in Job 
Prologue 
The prologue to Job’s dialogue with his comforters raises several issues related to 
collective punishment.
126  The first issue arises in Job 1:4-5 with the notice that “His sons 
used to prepare feasts in one another’s houses in turn, and they would send and call for 
their three sisters to eat and to drink with them.  When the feast days concluded, Job 
would send and sanctify them and rise early in the morning and offer burnt offerings 
({oœlo®t) according to the number of them all; for Job said, ‘Perhaps my children have 
sinned and have cursed God in their hearts.’  Job did thus every day.”  For an individual 
who, as Halpern argues, wholly accepts the notion of individual retribution, one must 
question why Job engages in such precautionary activities.  Whom does Job hope to 
                                                        
126 Although the prose prologue and epilogue most likely originate from a source different from that of the 
poetic dialogue, they constitute a “didactic wisdom tale.”  Although other didactic wisdom tales will not be 
considered for the purposes of this study, the prose narratives accompanying Job will be for a couple of 
reasons.  Firstly, although the dissonances between the narrative framework and the poetic dialogues are at 
times jarring (cf. Job 42:3 and 42:7), without the prose, the dialogue begins in media res.  Secondly, that 
the author or redactor of the final work saw fit to leave the two different genres side by side suggests that 
modern distinctions between genres were likely less meaningful to ancient readers.  Consequently, both the 
prose and poetic portions of the book of Job will be considered with respect to the issue of collective 
accountability.  Although they do not necessarily represent the viewpoints of the same author (the same is 
true for the poem on Wisdom in Job 28 and Elihu’s speech), they do present perspectives held by the 
ancient  Israelite  scribes  and  sages  who  collated  the  final  book,  and  their  insights  are  pertinent  to 
understanding Israel’s wisdom tradition.  It must also be remembered that the speeches of Job’s friends 
represent a different viewpoint from that of Job.  The book as a whole presents a wide array of opinions 
from  various  sources,  all  of  which  are  constructive  for  understanding  collective  accountability  in  the 
diverse category of Israelite literature known as wisdom.  Carol A. Newsom, “Job,” ed. Lindsay Jones, 
Encyclopedia of Religion (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005), 4931.   Carol Ann Newsom, The 
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protect by vicariously offering sacrifices for his children?  Does he offer these sacrifices 
to  protect  his  children  from  suffering  the  consequences  of  a  very  serious,  albeit 
hypothetical, crime?  Or does he have more selfish, individual motives?  Does he hope to 
ensure their welfare, and thus preserve the longevity of his own lineage?  Or does he 
hope to avoid the shame that having raised a blasphemous child would have brought upon 
such a preeminent parent (Job 29)? 
The text does not offer any more information about Job’s motives beyond what is 
quoted above.  The author of the prologue uses verse 5 to convey that Job’s piety was 
beyond reproach.
127  Although the author’s intent in providing the notice about Job’s 
sacrificial activities seems clear, discerning Job’s purpose in offering these preemptive 
sacrifices may still be a worthwhile endeavor.  Although Job hails from the land of Uz, 
likely in the Transjordanian nation of Edom,
128 and does not operate with the normative 
Israelite cult, a comparison of Job’s sacrificial measures to other ancient cultic practices, 
especially those familiar to the intended audience of the book, is in order. Would an 
ancient Israelite audience have understood Job’s habitual practice of vicariously offering 
sacrifices for his children to have been effective and, if so, for what? 
Although some evidence may suggest that burnt offerings ({oœlo®t◊) functioned as an 
atonement ritual very early in the Israelite cult, this evidence is in part based on the verse 
in  question  (Job  1:5).  Leviticus  1:4  may  confirm  their  atoning  function,  but  these 
offerings were more frequently associated with the activities of gift giving and drawing 
the deity’s attention to the cult.  Whatever Job’s precise motive, it is clear that these latter 
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two functions of the burnt offering are not it.
129  Clines proposes that because the tale is 
set outside Israel, the term for burnt offerings, {oœlo®t◊, does not refer to the sacrifice known 
from  the  Priestly  law  code  that  governed  the  Jerusalem  cult  but  rather  to  a  general 
sacrifice.
130  This may explain the aberrant usage of whole burnt offerings, {oœlo®t◊, to atone 
for sins, but the ability of any type of sacrifice, within the Jerusalem cult or that of 
neighboring Edom,
131 to absolve an individual of a grave sin like blasphemy is, as will be 
seen, nebulous. 
The author of the prologue offers the reader one small insight into Job’s thought 
process.  Job worries that his children may have cursed God in their hearts.  Blasphemy 
was a serious crime and its first occurrence in ancient Israel resulted in a proclamation 
from YHWH that the individual guilty of such a crime would bear his own sin (Lev. 
24:10-15).    The  prescribed  punishment  was  death  by  stoning  in  which  the  entire 
community  participated  (Lev.  24:14,  16).    The  text  makes  no  mention  of  sacrificial 
offerings as an effective method of atonement for this grievous sin.  The death of the 
sinner appears to be the only method capable of purging the contagious effects of the sin 
from the community and the land. 
Even if sacrificial offerings could atone for blasphemy, it is unclear that Job’s 
vicarious offerings would be effective for his children.  A recurring theme elsewhere in 
the Hebrew Bible, including wisdom literature, is the impotence of sacrifices without 
underlying sincere sentiments (Psa. 51:17-19; Prov. 15:8, 21:3, 21:27; Qoh. 4:17; Isa. 
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29:13).  However, if Job’s concern is to shield himself and the rest of his family from the 
collective consequences of the accidental sin of one child, evidence does exist for the use 
of cultic practices to prevent a community from suffering from the contagious effects of 
unintentional  sins  or  sins  committed  by  a  member  whose  identity  is  unknown  (for 
example, the use of the red heifer in Deuteronomy 21 and the scapegoat in Leviticus 16). 
That the hypothetical curse is not spoken aloud, but rather said “in their hearts,” 
places even greater emphasis on Job’s efforts to maintain piety.
132  Blaspheming God 
silently would not likely result in punishment by one’s community because human law 
codes cannot punish individuals for thoughts that never materialize as either words or 
actions.    It  is  possible  that  the  ancient  Israelite  conception  of  YHWH  as  omniscient 
would have resulted in the unrepentant blasphemer suffering divine retribution of some 
sort, like impoverishment, infertility, illness, or death.  In light of this, Job’s actions 
would seem to suggest that he is not concerned about the shame and suffering that his 
children’s sinful thoughts may cause him (a la Prov. 10:1, 17:25, 19:13a, 19:26, 27:11), 
but rather concerned either strictly for the well-being of his children or perhaps also for 
the longevity of his lineage, which depends upon the welfare of his children.  However, 
given the narrator’s careful distinction in Job 2:10 that “Job did not sin with his lips” (cf. 
1:22), it is also possible that individuals were thought to incur guilt only from malicious 
words and actions, not thoughts.
133 
Job’s reaction to the death of his children while they feasted in one of his sons’ 
homes (Job 1:18-19) may favor the interpretation that Job offers vicarious sacrifices out 
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of concern for his children’s welfare:  “Job rose, tore his robe, shaved his head, and fell to 
the ground and worshipped.  He said, ‘Naked I came forth from the womb of my mother 
and naked I shall return there; YHWH has given and YHWH has taken away; may the 
name of YHWH be blessed.  In all this Job did not sin or charge God with wrongdoing’” 
(Job  1:20-22).    Job’s  response  conveys  his  sorrow  at  the  loss  of  his  children.  Job’s 
attitude makes clear that he attributes the loss of his children to divine judgment, but, as 
the narrator makes clear, his actions are conventional mourning customs and his act of 
prostration indicates that he does not hold God culpable.
134 God’s judgment is fair.  Job’s 
acceptance of this judgment, however, focuses not on what his children did to deserve 
this punishment but rather on himself;
135 Job entered the world without possessions and 
children and he will leave it in the same manner.  Job does not question whether he 
himself has done something to deserve such calamity but rather observes that his scale is 
balanced.  He is unconcerned with the scale of justice for his children. 
As  the  Satan  had  predicted,  only  personal  affliction  can  prompt  Job  to  curse 
YHWH.  Job’s complaint about YHWH’s justice does not begin until Job personally 
suffers.  YHWH’s original bargain with the Satan demanded that only Job’s possessions, 
which include his family, but not the righteous man personally, be affected (Job 1:12).  
After Job passes this initial test, the Satan implores YHWH to allow him more power, 
“‘Skin for skin!  All that a man has he will give for his life.  But send forth your hand and 
strike his bone and his flesh, and he will curse you to your face’” (Job 2:4-5).  YHWH 
consents to the physical affliction of Job but demands that his life be spared (Job 2:6).  
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The Satan promptly afflicts Job with boils, and the prologue concludes with Job suffering 
for  seven  days  while  his  comforters  watch  in  distress  (Job  2:7-13).    Although  the 
conclusion of the prose prologue suggests that Job accepts his suffering (Job 2:10), the 
dialogues  begin  with  Job  cursing  the  day  he  was  born  (Job  3:1).
136    The  Satan  was 
correct; the loss of his family did not anger Job as much as personal affliction did.   
This observation should not have surprised the ancient Israelite reader because of 
the understanding of YHWH’s use of intergenerational punishment as an act of mercy.  
Although  the  punishment  of  children  for  the  sins  of  their  parents  eventually  elicits 
complaints from the suffering progeny (i.e. Lam. 5:7), several narratives suggest that this 
divine practice is a manifestation of YHWH’s mercy upon the sinful parent.  The divine 
attribute formula in Exodus 34:6-7 (“YHWH, YHWH, a God merciful and gracious, slow 
to anger, and abounding in steadfast love and faithfulness, keeping steadfast love to the 
thousandth  generation,  bearing  iniquity  and  transgression  and  sin,  yet  by  no  means 
clearing the guilty, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the sons and the sons’ sons to 
the third and fourth generation”) appears to reflect the tension between YHWH’s justice 
and mercy.   
However, the reuse of this formula elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible may suggest 
that it was at one time understood to point entirely to YHWH’s mercy.  Although the 
punishment of children for the sins of their parents does not seem merciful from the 
perspective of the suffering children, from the sinner’s point of view, the dispersion of his 
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punishment over several generations of children reduces his own suffering.137  In some 
cases, it may even have prevented the death of the sinner, which in turn enables the 
continuance of his line, even though the next several generations will suffer for a crime 
they did not commit.   
  Numbers 14 offers compelling evidence for this interpretation.  After the Israelite 
spies bring back an unfavorable report of the land that YHWH has promised them, the 
congregation complains that they would have preferred death in Egypt to their journey 
through the wilderness (Num. 13:31-14:4).  The rebellion angers YHWH, who informs 
Moses that he will smite the entire population with pestilence and spare only Moses 
(Num. 14:12).  Moses pleads with YHWH not to kill the entire group altogether; in 
addition to his logic that such an action would reflect poorly on YHWH among the other 
nations who know of him, Moses also reminds YHWH of the divine attribute formula:  
“‘YHWH  is  slow  to  anger  and  abounding  in  steadfast  love,  bearing  iniquity  and 
transgression, yet by no means clearing the guilty, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon 
the  sons  to  the  third  and  fourth  generation’”  (Num.  14:18).
138    From  the  context  of 
Moses’  prayer,  he  is  clearly  asking  for  mercy,  which  suggests  that  he  understands 
YHWH’s use of delayed punishment,
139 or slowly doling out punishment to the family of 
the sinner, to be an act of mercy, not justice.
140 
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Further  confirmation  of  this  interpretation  appears  in  the  account  of  King 
Hezekiah  allowing  Babylonian  envoys  to  inspect  his  treasury  and  storehouses.    As 
punishment for the otherwise righteous king’s sin, the prophet Isaiah warns him:  “‘Days 
are coming when all that is in your house and that your fathers have stored up until this 
day will be carried to Babylon; nothing will be left, says YHWH.  Some of your sons 
who are born to you will be taken away; they will be eunuchs in the palace of the king of 
Babylon’” (2 Kgs. 20:17-18).  When Isaiah informs the king that his children will endure 
punishment because of him, Hezekiah responds, “‘The word of YHWH that you have 
spoken is good.’ And he said, ‘Why not, if there will be peace and security in my days?’” 
(2 Kgs. 20:19).  As Hezekiah’s reaction makes clear, he considers YHWH’s punishment 
of his descendants to be merciful since he himself will not suffer any great hardship.
141 
Following  King  Ahab’s  participation  in  Jezebel’s  scheme  to  usurp  Naboth’s 
vineyard  without  regard  for  his  objections  and  legal  rights,  Elijah  delivers  YHWH’s 
judgment to bring evil upon both the king and queen; but the king repents:  “When Ahab 
heard those words, he tore his garments and put sackcloth over his flesh; he fasted, lay in 
the sackcloth, and went about dejectedly” (1 Kgs. 21:27).  Moved by Ahab’s display of 
repentance, YHWH mercifully lessens his judgment in a prophecy to Elijah:  “‘Have you 
seen how Ahab has humbled himself before me?  Because he has humbled himself before 
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me, I will not bring evil in his days, but in the days of his son I will bring evil upon his 
house’” (1 Kgs. 21:29). 
As these examples demonstrate, the Satan’s observation that losing his property 
and children has not adequately tested Job’s devotion to YHWH seems to reflect human 
nature accurately.  YHWH’s original agreement in Job 1:12 that the Satan could touch 
everything that Job possesses but not Job personally is an act of mercy by YHWH.
142  
Even though neither Job nor his children appear to be deserving of divine judgment, the 
act of inflicting harm on Job’s children as part of a test of their father functions as an act 
of divine mercy for YHWH’s beloved and faithful servant Job. 
Job 4:10-11 
Most commentators suggest that Job 4:7-11, part of the speech of Job’s comforter 
Eliphaz, affirms the notion of individual retribution.
143 Indeed, verses 7-9 would seem to 
suggest just this:  “Remember now, who that was innocent has perished?  Or where were 
the upright cut off?  As I have seen, the ones plowing iniquity and the ones sowing 
trouble will reap it.  By the breath of God they perish, and by the blast of his nostril they 
are  consumed.”    Without  much  argument,  these  lines  clearly  indicate  an  operational 
concept of individual retribution.   
Verses 10-11 are a bit more ambiguous.  Gordis regards these verses as hinting at 
collective retribution:
144  “The roar of the lion, the voice of the lion, and the teeth of the 
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young lions are broken.  The lion perishes without prey, and the whelps of the lioness are 
scattered.”  The passage depicts the suffering of multiple generations of lions, perhaps 
parents and their offspring. They refer to the animal kingdom rather than the human 
realm,
145 and verse 11 may merely observe a common occurrence in the animal kingdom 
that was less customary in ancient Israelite society:  an animal’s young males, unlike 
human young who remain within the family compound even into adulthood,
146 eventually 
find their own territory and live independently of their progenitors.  In the natural world, 
young male lions, however, which are the subject of these verses, do not separate from 
their mother unless tragedy strikes.  The punishment of the parents results in the suffering 
of their offspring. 
  Although one must grant, as Gordis does, that 4:10-11 contains only a hint of 
collective  accountability  in  its  depiction  of  family-wide  animal  suffering,  Eliphaz’s 
juxtaposition  of  these  verses  with  the  preceding  ones,  which  advocate  individual 
accountability, invites their interpretation in the context of the tension between collective 
and individual accountability.  Although some commentators regard these verses as an 
insertion  on  the  basis  of  syntax  and  context,
147  Roberts  has  observed  that  analogies 
between the wicked and lions are frequent in the psalms (for example, Ps. 7:3 [2]; 17:12; 
22:14 [13], 22 [21]; 34:11 [10]; 35:17; 58:7 [6]), and the abrupt use of animal imagery, 
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both in vv. 10-11 and in Psalm 34:11, suggests a well-known literary motif.
148  In short, 
just  as  lions  and  their  young  suffer  from  calamity,  so  too  do  the  wicked  and  their 
offspring.  The juxtaposition of vv. 10-11 with vv. 7-9 seems to suggest that the suffering 
of the offspring of the wicked is the result of retribution or the consequences of the 
wicked individual’s activities. 
Kaminsky  has  shown  that  although  the  notion  of  individual  accountability 
enjoyed increased emphasis following the trauma of the Babylonian exile, the notion of 
collective accountability did not disappear.
149  Eliphaz’s speech would seem to indicate 
that  he  simultaneously  believes  both  individual  and  collective  retribution  are 
operational.
150  The problems with such a belief system might bother him if he were the 
righteous child of a sinful individual, but such is not the case and he does not need to 
confront the issue head-on. Exceptions to the rule can generally be explained with ideas 
like the human inability to avoid sin, the beneficial nature of suffering, or the mirage of 
the wicked’s prosperity, which will prove to be temporary.
151  In the case of the lions 
depicted  in  vv.  10-11,  they  need  not  constitute  an  exception  to  Eliphaz’s  rhetorical 
question in v. 7.  The lion’s offspring are not humans and do not possess qualities like 
innocence or righteousness.  On account of this, the suffering of the lion cubs, which are 
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wild animals and not innocent children, was unlikely to force Eliphaz to confront the 
injustice of collective punishment.   
Eliphaz  does  not  consider  collective  punishment  from  the  perspective  of  the 
innocent  sufferer,  and,  consequently,  he  is  able  to  see  value  both  in  individual 
punishment as an explanation for Job’s troubles and in collective punishment as a tool for 
reassuring the righteous of the magnitude of the wicked’s suffering.  Eliphaz perceives no 
tension between individual accountability in 4:7-9 and collective accountability in 4:10-
11 because of his narrow perspective that ignores the concept of innocent suffering, one 
of Job’s chief complaints.  
Job 5:3-5 
  Eliphaz counsels Job that the fool will eventually suffer a just fate:  “I have seen a 
fool taking root, but I (saw) his dwelling suddenly cursed.
152  His children are far from 
salvation; they are crushed in the gate and there is no one to deliver them.  His harvest the 
hungry will eat; he (that is, the hungry) will take it (even) to the thorns.  The thirsty pants 
for their wealth” (Job 5:3-5).
153  Although the text is difficult, it expresses the conviction 
that the family of the individual who is foolish will suffer for his folly.
154  This is evident 
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not only in the general proclamation that the fool’s dwelling (naœweh)
155 is cursed, but also 
in the ensuing list of calamities that will trouble his children:  the children of the fool 
suffer  injustice  and  have  no  defender  in  legal  and  commercial  matters;  their  father’s 
harvest and the wealth his children should have inherited from him are consumed by 
others, rather than by his family.  The image of the children of the wicked in hunger 
because they have lost their father’s harvest contrasts starkly with the portrayal of the 
children of the righteous in Psalm 37:
156  “I was a youth, and now I have grown old, but I 
have not seen the righteous forsaken or his seed seeking bread.  Daily he shows favor and 
lends, and his seed becomes a blessing” (Ps. 37:25-26). 
  Although the Masoretic Text reads “I cursed” (waœ}eqqo®b⋲) in verse 3 and is the 
lectio difficilior, the Greek use of an impersonal passive verb (ebroœtheœ) makes more sense 
in the context of Eliphaz’s argument that human suffering is the consequence of human 
activity that sets into motion the act-consequence model.
157  This observation is important 
to understanding the role of YHWH in the execution of justice.  Eliphaz’s point is not 
that he personally cursed the home of the fool and caused the suffering of the fool and his 
family,  but  rather  that  the  fool’s  own  folly  produced  his  suffering  and  that  of  his 
family.
158    This  is  the  result  of  the  act-consequence  model  woven  into  the  divinely 
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created  fabric  of  the  universe.    By  this  theory,  Job’s  suffering  is  the  result  of  some 
wrongdoing, and neither YHWH nor any other lesser deity to whom Job might appeal 
(Job 5:1) can alter the course of the sin-consequence nexus once human activity has set it 
into motion.   
  Clines  speculates  that  the  suffering  of  the  fool’s  children  results  from  their 
father’s death, although the text does not make this explicit.
159 Clines considers Job 5:3-5 
to be an illustration of verse 2:
160  “Surely anger kills the fool, and jealousy slays the 
simple.”  On this reading, one expects the fool depicted in verses 3-5 to die because of his 
folly.  While the death of the pater familias could certainly devastate a family financially 
and socially, the widow and orphan who suffer from such a loss are protected by laws 
governing  social  justice  for  segments  of  society  that  could  not  adequately  fend  for 
themselves  (i.e.,  Exod.  22:21;  Deut.  24:17-21,  27:19).    A  description  of  orphaned 
children being denied justice and losing their only source of sustenance, the family farm, 
to other indigents, seems unlikely based on traditional Israelite values.
161  Although the 
situation  depicted  in  Job  5:4  resembles  the  psalmist’s  request  in  Psalm  109  that  his 
enemies’ orphaned children not receive the charity prescribed by Israelite law (Ps. 109:9-
15), Psalm 109 is an especially egregious example of human vindictiveness that seeks the 
overturning of tradition.  Although 5:2 indicates that the foolish father suffers death for 
his folly, it seems more likely that the fool’s children suffer punishment for their father’s 
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sins rather than because of his absence through death.
162  Instead of benefitting from the 
protections afforded to orphans (Deut. 24:17), they lose their access to the human justice 
system (Job 5:4).  Instead of receiving the gleanings of more fortunate families’ crops 
(Deut. 24:19-21), the needy consume theirs (Job 5:5).  The father’s death initiates the 
suffering that will befall his children, but the punishment appears to be the failure of the 
Israelite welfare system to protect his orphans.  In short, Eliphaz assures Job that the 
sinful father will not benefit from Israel’s welfare laws to ensure the longevity of his line.   
Job 8:22 
Bildad, another of Job’s three comforters, reassures Job, “‘See, God will not reject 
a blameless person, nor will he take the hand of wrongdoers’” (Job 8:20).  As evidence of 
this, Bildad tells Job that “Those who hate you will be clothed with shame, and the tent of 
the wicked will be no more” (Job 8:22).  Like the “house” (bayit◊) and “dwelling” (naœweh) 
that can designate both a physical structure as well as the family unit in Proverbs, “tent” 
(}oœhel) takes on the same function in the book of Job (Job 5:24-25, 11:14, 12:6, 15:34, 
18:6, 18:14-19, 20:26, 22:23, 29:4-5).  Bildad, then, appears to ascribe to the doctrine of 
collective  accountability.
163    The  tent  of  the  wicked,  and  its  associations  with  the 
household, will disappear.  The sage offers no indication that the wicked’s family are 
guilty of any wrongdoing.  The wicked individual’s home and lineage are impermanent.  
Because of the misdeeds of their parents, the children of the wicked will not successfully 
pass on their heritage.  Bildad implies, indirectly, that God orchestrates this scenario (v. 
20). 
                                                        
162 Gordis, The Book of Job, 52. 
 
163 Gordis, “Corporate Personality in Job,” 54.  Gordis, The Book of God and Man, 135–156.   80 
Clines proposes that “those who hate you” may refer to the conventional figures 
depicted as enemies and evildoers in the Psalms.
164  The destructive fate that lies in store 
for the tent of the wicked in Job contrasts with the activities that occur within the “tents 
of the righteous” (Ps. 118:15) in Psalm 118; rather than experiencing divinely caused 
trauma to the entire household, the tents of the righteous are filled with victory songs that 
praise YHWH.  The joy and laughter with which Bildad promises God will fill Job’s 
mouth (Job 8:21) are reminiscent of those same sounds in the tents of the righteous in 
Psalm 118. 
Job 15:28-35  
  Eliphaz passes on to Job the wisdom that sages of old have passed down to him 
concerning the wicked:   
15:28  He
165 will live
166 in desolate cities, 
in houses in which no one should dwell, 
    which are destined to become heaps of ruins;  
15:29  he will not be rich, and his wealth will not endure, 
    nor will his gain stretch out over the land;  
15:30  he will not escape from darkness; 
    his branch will wither in the flame, 
  and his blossom
167  will be swept away by the wind. 
15:31  Let him not trust in emptiness, deceiving himself; 
    for his branch
168 will be his recompense.  
                                                        
164 Clines, Job 1-20, 211. 
 
165 This passage oscillates between third masculine singular and plural endings.  I have leveled all pronouns 
to third masculine singular for the sake of clarity. 
 
166  Although  the  prefixed  verb  here  is  a  waw-consecutive,  which  usually  indicates  a  past  tense,  my 
translation uses the future tense in order to fit the context more appropriately.   
167 My translation follows the Vorlage to the LXX, which translates pˆîw, “his mouth” as autou to anthos, 
“his flower.” Presumably the Greek translator was reading the graphically similar pirhΩo® “his flower, his 
blossom,” which is elsewhere used to translate perahΩ, “flower, blossom” (Isa. 5:24; 18:5).  S. R Driver, A 
Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Job: Together with a New Translation, vol. 2 (New 
York: Scribner, 1921), 101. 
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15:32  It will wither
169 before its time, 
    and his branch will not be green.  
15:33 He will shake off his unripe grape, like the vine, 
    and cast off his blossom, like the olive tree.  
15:34  For the congregation of the godless is barren, 
    and fire consumes the tents of bribery.  
15:35  They conceive (haœro) trouble and bear (w§yaœloœd) iniquity,
170 
  and their womb (u®b⋲it√naœm) prepares deceit. (Job 15:28-35) 
 
The house of the wicked lies in a desolate city, an inhospitable place in which humans do 
not generally reside.  Here, according to Eliphaz, is where the wicked individual will 
raise his family.  His children may face the many perils associated with inhabited places 
in other parts of the Bible, like wild animals and demons (Isa 13:19-22; 34:8-15; Jer. 
50:39-40; 51:37-44),
171 on account of their relationship to their father.  The wicked’s 
house, perched on a ruined city, will itself become a heap of ruins.  The destruction that 
befalls his home will not likely spare his offspring, as the plant imagery makes clear.
172  
Although Eliphaz mentions the destruction of the wicked’s home in v. 28, he notes again 
in v. 34 that the wicked’s “tents of bribery” will burn, presumably with his offspring 
inside.
173    The  family  of  the  wicked  appears  unlikely  to  escape  suffering  for  its 
                                                        
168  This  translation  follows  Dhorme  in  reading  z§mo®raœt◊o,  “his  branch,”  for  t◊§mu®raœt◊o®,  “his  exchange, 
recompense.”  Edouard Dhorme, A Commentary on the Book of Job (London: Nelson, 1967), 224. Clines, 
Job 1-20, 344. 
 
169 This reading emends the Masoretic Text from timmaœleœ}, “it will be paid in full,” to timmaœl, “it will 
wither,” on the basis of the LXX’s phthareœsetai. Dhorme, A Commentary on the Book of Job, 224. Pope, 
Job, 132.  Clines, Job 1-20, 344. 
 
170 The verbs in this line are both infinitive absolutes.  
 
171 Newsom, “The Book of Job,” 1994, 452. 
 
172 Norman C. Habel, The Book of Job: A Commentary (London: SCM Press, 1985), 260. 
 
173 Clines, Job 1-20, 364. 
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patriarch’s sins.  Using the language of childbearing, Eliphaz hints at the possibility that 
the children of the wicked are wicked themselves (v. 35).
174   
Job 17:5 
  In  his  response  to  Eliphaz’s  second  discourse,  Job  proclaims,    “The  one  who 
denounces (yaggˆîd⋲) friends for an (additional) portion (l§hΩeœleq), the eyes of his sons will 
fail” (Job 17:5). The text is difficult.  Literally, it reads, “For a portion he tells/declares 
friends, and the eyes of his sons will fail.”  Although none of the Hebrew words is rare, a 
literal  translation  does  not  yield  a  meaningful  English  sentence.    “For  a  portion”  is 
difficult because of its ambiguity.  I have inserted the word “extra” in order to indicate 
that the subject is intent on gaining an advantage through his activity.
175  This fits the 
context established in the previous verse, in which Job describes his comforter’s negative 
activity and its resulting negative consequences.  The next difficulty arises in making 
sense of the unusual expression to yaggˆîd⋲ reœ{ˆîm, “tell/declare friends,” in which reœ{ˆîm, 
“friends” is the direct object of the verb yaggˆîd, “tell, declare.”  This expression occurs 
nowhere else in Hebrew, and this verb does not generally take a human direct object in 
either Hebrew or English, so a literal translation is impossible.  Because the context 
seems to call for a description of the comforter’s negative activities, I have translated 
yaggˆîd⋲, “tell/declare,” with a verb of speaking that is capable of taking a human direct 
and carries a negative connotation, namely, “denounce.”  The interpretation followed in 
the translation above, namely that the individual in question informs against friends so as 
to  gain  a  share  of  their  property,  is  followed  by  numerous  scholars  and  important 
                                                        
174 Ibid., 363. 
 
175 Some translations make this same interpretation by using the word “reward” instead of “portion.”  Pope, 
Job, 119, 121.   83 
translations  (for  example,  see  the  NRSV),
176  but  commentators  have  proposed  other 
translations, which will be considered below. 
Because  the  phrase  yaggˆîd⋲  reœ{ˆîm,  “tell/declare  friends”  is  not  meaningful  in 
Hebrew or English, Gordis has proposed understanding the verse as a once common 
proverbial saying that does not translate into English literally, “He invites friends to a 
feast, While his own children’s eyes fail with longing (for food).”
177  Although certainly a 
creative solution, I do not believe it is faithful to the original text as we have it.  Gordis 
favors his translation because of shortcomings that he perceives in the interpretation that I 
have proposed above.  These objections include (1) the unusually elliptical use of hΩeœleq 
(“portion”), (2) Job’s objections elsewhere to Eliphaz and Bildad’s support of collective 
punishment as explanations for suffering, and (3) the lack of indication that Job’s friends 
intend to enrich themselves through him. His objections to the interpretation favored 
above can be at least partially addressed.   
 (1) Gordis’ interpretation offers no improvement over mine with respect to the 
charge that it does not hew closely enough to the meaning of hΩeœleq, “portion.” Gordis’ 
interpretation also introduces unattested meanings (“feast” and “invites,” respectively) for 
hΩeœleq,  which  normally  means  “portion,”  and  yaggˆîd⋲,  which  normally  means  “to  tell, 
declare.” The translation of both these words is problematic in my proposal as well, but 
no straightforward translation of this verse has enabled commentators to make sense of it, 
so any translation would likely involve applying otherwise unattested meanings for these 
                                                        
176 For example, Ibid., 121.  S. R Driver, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Job: 
Together with a New Translation, vol. 1 (New York: Scribner, 1921), 151–152.  
 
177 Such a proverb criticizes a parent who engages in festivities and hosting others while not meeting the 
needs of his own family.  Gordis, The Book of Job, 182.   84 
words.  It does not make sense to discount a translation on this basis alone when the 
proposed alternative can do no better.  
(2) Although Gordis argues that Eliphaz and Bildad favor collective punishment 
as an explanation for Job’s suffering, which the sufferer himself rejects (21:19-21), the 
comforters argue in favor of individual retribution on other occasions (for example, 4:7-
9; 8:4; etc.).  They are not entirely consistent, and perhaps the reader should not expect 
Job to be consistent either.  In Job 29:4-5, the pious sufferer reflects on the collective 
reward that his children enjoyed; if he accepts collective reward, it seems possible that he 
might  also,  at  times,  accept  collective  punishment.    The  consistency  of  any  one 
individual’s  position  on  collective  accountability  cannot  determine  whether  this 
interpretation  is  impossible.    Furthermore,  Job’s  objection  to  intergenerational 
punishment  in  21:19-21  may  not  be  to  the  entire  concept  but  rather  to  the  specific 
application of the concept whereby only the children suffer without the sinner himself 
sharing in the suffering caused by his sin.
178  In other words, Job’s rejection of collective 
punishment is not as certain as Gordis asserts.  He objects strongly to sinners avoiding 
punishment, but he does not protest innocent children suffering for the sins of their father. 
(3) Finally, Job suggests in both 6:26-7 and 13:7-11 that his friends are capable of 
telling  falsehoods,  and  6:27  suggests  that  he  feels  they  would  forsake  friendship  for 
monetary  considerations.
179    In  light  of  this,  my  translation  of  17:5,  ““The  one  who 
denounces (yaggˆîd⋲) friends for an (additional) portion (l§hΩeœleq), the eyes of his sons will 
fail,” could be an appropriate criticism of Job’s comforters. 
                                                        
178 Kaminsky, Corporate Responsibility in the Hebrew Bible, 136–137. 
 
179 Habel, The Book of Job, 277.  Pope, Job, 121.   85 
   None of the proposed interpretations is entirely certain, and Alter even admits in 
his  translation  that  it  “is  no  more  than  a  guess.”
180    Nevertheless,  based  on  the  best 
conjectures that are possible from the available evidence, Job appears to suggest that one 
who betrays his friends brings punishment upon his children.  Job’s declaration reads like 
an impromptu curse.  Much like the psalmist in Psalm 109:9-15, Job seems to draw upon 
a familiar concept, the punishment of children for the sins of their parents, to curse his 
enemies.  There is no indication that Job has the power to see this curse through to 
fruition or that YHWH will grant his imprecation.  Accordingly, Pope translates the verb 
tik⋲lena® as “should fail” (italics added for emphasis).
181 
The exact nature of this punishment is relatively specific; their eyes will fail.  The 
explanation for this may lie in the fact that Job’s speech is dotted with references to his 
eyes and their biological functions:   
“My  face  is  red  from  weeping,  and  deep  darkness  is  upon  my  eyelids”  (Job 
16:16). 
 
“My friends scorn me; my eyes pours out tears to God” (16:20).
182  
 
“Surely there are mockers around me, and my eye dwells on their antagonism” 
(17:2).  
 
“My eye has grown dim from grief, and all my members are like a shadow” 
(17:7).   
 
Job’s  eyes  act  as  a  symbol  of  his  suffering,  and  the  righteous  sufferer  wishes  such 
suffering  on  the  offspring  of  his  false  friends.    While  this  may  not  inform  our 
                                                        
180 The Wisdom Books, 75.  Driver and Gray describe the verse as “hopelessly corrupt.”  Driver, Book of 
Job, Vol. 1, 1:151. 
 
181 Pope, Job, 119. 
 
182 Commentators generally recognize this verse as difficult.  Regardless of what interpretation one follows, 
it is clear that Job refers to his eye in a context of distress.    86 
understanding of divine collective punishment, Job’s understanding of the phenomenon 
of collective punishment seems vindictive, not merciful, in this case.  This accords well 
with the sentiments expressed in Psalm 109:9-15. 
Job 18:15-21   
  In Bildad’s second speech, the comforter assures Job that the wicked will not 
ultimately prosper:   
(15) “Fire dwells in his tent;
183 sulfur is scattered over his dwelling.  (16) His 
roots dry up below, and his branch withers above.  (17) His memory perishes 
from the earth, and he has no name abroad.  (18) They thrust him from light into 
darkness, and from the world they make him flee.  (19) He has no offspring or 
posterity among his people, and there is no survivor in his sojourning places.  (20) 
At his fate184 earlier ages are appalled and later generations seize with horror.185  
(21) Surely these are the dwellings of the unjust, and this is the place of the one 
who does not know God” (Job 18:15-21; cf. Job 18:6).   
 
Bildad’s  confidence  in  the  ultimate  retribution  that  the  wicked  will  suffer  includes 
consequences for the wicked individual’s family.  His tent and dwelling place will both 
be afflicted with fire and brimstone, and the light will be extinguished in the tent of the 
wicked  (18:6);  subsequently,  the  family  that  shares  these  homes  with  him  will  also 
endure hardship.  Verses 16-19 seem to insinuate that his offspring will suffer death in 
                                                        
183 Dahood argues, on the basis of Ugaritic parallels, that the consonantal Hebrew text is correct but that the 
vocalization should be changed from mibb§lˆî-lo® y§zoœreh, “[In his tent there is] nothing for him, [brimstone] 
is scattered [on his dwelling],”  to mabbeœl lˆîzoœreh, “Fire [is set in his tent, indeed sulfur] is strewn [on his 
dwelling].”   The revocalized term mabbeœl, then, is the “Hebrew equivalent of Accadian nablu, Ethiopic 
nabal and nabalbaœl and Ugaritic plural nblat “fire, flames”, while the final lo® may be attached to the 
following verb as a lamedh of emphasis.”  Mitchell Joseph Dahood, “Some Northwest-Semitic Words in 
Job,” Biblica 38 (1957): 312–313.  Gordis proposes mabbu®l, “flood (of fire),” as an emendation for mibb§lˆî-
lo®.  Gordis, The Book of Job, 193. 
 
184 For the translation “fate” for yo®mo®, literally, “his day,” see Cf. 1 Sam. 26:10; Jer. 1:27; Ezek. 21:29; Ps. 
37:13. 
 
185 Although }ahΩ∞roœnˆîm w§qad⋲moœnˆîm could also refer to men of the West and men of the East, Bildad’s 
focus  on  the  generations  suggests  that  the  temporal  translation  “predecessors  and  descendants”  is 
preferable.  Gordis, The Book of Job, 194.   87 
order to punish the wicked individual; he will die with no remembrance or posterity.
186  
For  the  wicked  to  transform  into  the  stump  envisioned  in  verse  16,  his  family  must 
perish.  This type of suffering by the family of the wrongdoer differs from the merciful 
use of collective punishment.  Although the children still suffer for their father’s sins, 
their  deaths  are  meant  to  cause  him  suffering,  not  to  alleviate  his  or  to  prevent  the 
extinguishing of his line. 
Job 20:10, 26, 28 
  Zophar, Job’s third comforter, responds to Job’s complaint about his utter social 
isolation  in  chapter  19  by  arguing  that  the  ostensible  success  of  the  wicked  is  only 
temporary.  With the passage of enough time, both the wicked and their unfortunate 
offspring will eventually suffer:
187  “His sons must redress the poor, and his hands will 
return his wealth” (Job 20:10).  The sinner’s children will be forced to compensate those 
wronged by their father (i.e. the poor whom he crushes in 20:19).  Although Gordis 
argues that “his hands” (yaœd⋲aœyw) metaphorically refers to the wrongdoer’s children,
188 it 
seems more likely, based on grammatical considerations,
189 that the wicked will suffer 
the consequences in his own lifetime and his children will continue to repay the debt of 
his wickedness even if it leads to their own impoverishment. The desire for a patriarch to 
amass secure wealth that could be passed on to his children as an inheritance appears 
throughout the Hebrew Bible (for example, Ruth 4:6; Prov. 19:14; note, however, the 
                                                        
186 Newsom, “The Book of Job,” 1994, 470. 
 
187 Dentan, “The Literary Affinities of Exodus XXXIV 6f,” 49, n.1. 
 
188 Gordis, The Book of Job, 215–216. 
 
189 The grammatical evidence favors this reading.  The wicked’s sons are plural, but the possessive pronoun 
in the phrases “his hands” and “his wealth” is singular.   88 
exception in Eccl. 2:18-21).
190  For a father to know that his children would inherit no 
lasting wealth would likely act as a punishment of the father; the lack of an inheritance 
would also be a punishment of his children. 
The  wicked  man’s  greed  is  so  great  that  “There  is  no  remnant  after  he  eats; 
therefore his prosperity will not endure” (Job 20:21).  Zophar’s observation is likely 
gleaned from lived experience.  The pater familias who consumes his family’s resources 
in their entirety leaves his offspring in a poor position to continue the family’s line and 
prosperity.  However, Zophar envisions not only the natural consequences of financial 
recklessness  as  harming  the  wicked’s  offspring,  but  also  divine  punishment:    “Total 
darkness is stored up for his treasures; a fire not blown (by human activity)
191 will devour 
him; the survivor in his tent will suffer evil” (Job 20:26).  The divine retribution that 
spills over onto the wicked individual’s family continues in verse 28:  “The possession of 
his house will be carried away,
192 torrents on the day of his anger.”  As these verses make 
clear, divinely inflicted natural disasters will rob the wicked individual of his possessions, 
cause his own destruction, and subject his household to great suffering.
193  For Job’s 
comforter, the wicked’s children share the consequences of their father’s misdeeds, and 
this fact is evidence of a justly ruled universe. 
Job 27:14-15 
                                                        
190 Newsom, “The Book of Job,” 1994, 484. 
 
191 Pope considers this poetic term (}eœsû loœ}-nuppaœhΩ) to be lightning, a phenomenon attributed to God (Job 
1:16; II Kings 1:12).  Pope, Job, 140. 
 
192 Habel revocalizes yigel, “will be carried away” as yaœgoœl, from g-l-l, “roll away:”  “A flood will wash 
away his household, Torrents on the day of God’s wrath.”  This emendation is not necessary, but does 
emphasize the element of natural disaster present in the preceding verses.  Habel, The Book of Job, 311–
312. 
 
193 Ibid., 319.   89 
  Job 27:8-23 presents arguments consistent with those of Job’s comforters, and the 
great difficulty of attributing them to Job himself, as the Masoretic Text appears to do, 
has prompted most commentators to consider them as part of Zophar’s missing final 
speech.
194  Zophar claims that a sinister fate awaits the children of wrongdoers:  “If his 
sons are many, it is for the sword; and his offspring lack food.  Those surviving him are 
buried  by  death,  and  his  widows  do  not  weep”  (Job  27:14-15).  Zophar  continues  to 
explain that the wicked’s stockpiles of riches will eventually fall into the hands of the 
righteous (27:16-17, 19), not his children who would normally expect to inherit their 
father’s wealth.  Like the impermanence of his possessions, the wicked man’s house is 
“like a nest, like the booth that a guard makes” (27:18).  The wicked man’s house and 
household alike are temporary; they will not last more than a short time.  If a member of 
his household should happen to survive a little longer than expected according to the 
rules of retributive justice, his life will soon be extinguished (27:15).  Zophar explains 
that the presence of many children, usually a sign of divine favor, is in fact the opposite 
since  those  children  will  die  unpleasant  deaths  (27:14).    The  transgenerational 
punishment of violent death and impoverishment is, according to Zophar, the punishment 
due to the wicked, whom the comforter describes as ruthless (27:13).  His crimes, then, 
are likely offenses perpetrated against his community.  This contrasts with collective 
punishment elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible; collective punishment is generally applicable 
only  for  grievous  covenantal  violations  committed  directly  against  YHWH  himself 
(treason, blasphemy, idolatry, etc.).
195 
                                                        
194 Pope, Job, 172.  The Wisdom Books, 111.  Gordis and Habel regard only vv. 13-23 as part of Zophar’s 
lost speech.  Habel, The Book of Job, 385.  Gordis, The Book of Job, 294. 
195 Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation, 344. 
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Job 31:8 
  Job’s  soliloquy  in  chapter  31  presents  a  catalogue  of  sins  that  he  has  not 
committed.  As Gordis has pointed out, most of the crimes named are not egregious or 
even the type that necessarily merit punishment in the legal system.  They are almost 
exclusively  ethical  concerns  relating  to  the  treatment  of  his  fellow  humans.
196    Job 
swears, “‘If my step has turned away from the path, or my heart has followed my eyes, or 
a blemish has clung to my hands, then let me sow and another
197 eat; and let my offspring 
be uprooted’” (Job 31:7-8).  Job’s self-imprecation calls for his children to be cut off.  
Some commentators prefer to translate “my offspring” (sΩe}§sΩaœ}ay®) as “my produce” in 
parallel with the first half of the verse.
198  Although Job has no remaining offspring upon 
whom YHWH could enforce the consequences of this oath,
199 the same noun is used on 
three other occasions elsewhere in the book of Job to refer to offspring, not crops (Job 
5:25; 21:8; 27:14). 
  Thus, if Job indeed intends to offer up his offspring as collateral in this oath, one 
must  observe  that  the  crime  committed,  namely,  coveting  and  perhaps  stealing  the 
property of another, is not one that generally merits so strong a punishment as collective 
                                                        
196 Gordis, The Book of Job, 339. 
 
197 This individual, by contrast with the rest of the verse, must be an outsider to the family. 
 
198 Gordis, The Book of Job, 346. 
 
199 This appears to be true regardless of whether the dialogues are read within the context of the prose 
framework.  Outside of the prologue and epilogue, several poetic references still make clear that Job is 
bereft of children (for example, Job 8:4; 29:5)  
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retribution elsewhere in the Bible.
200  Such punishment is generally reserved, as noted 
above, for crimes committed directly against God, like apostasy.   
 
III.  Collective Reward in Job 
  Collective  reward  is  not  nearly  so  abundant  in  the  book  of  Job  as  collective 
punishment.    Unearned  rewards  are  far  less  likely  to  elicit  cries  of  injustice  than 
unmerited punishment (although Jonah 4 presents one notable exception to this). Indeed, 
Job’s efforts to atone for his children’s hypothetical, accidental sinful thoughts in 1:15 
may  suggest  that  the  righteous  sufferer  known  from  the  prologue  would  himself  be 
comfortable with his children benefitting from their father’s righteousness.  
Job 5:24-25 
One hint of collective reward occurs in Job 5:24-25:  “You shall know that your 
tent (}oh•lek⋲) is safe, and you will inspect your dwelling (naœw§k⋲aœ) and miss nothing.  You 
shall know that your descendants will be many and your offspring like the grass of the 
earth.”  These verses are part of a larger unit that begins with v. 17:  “Happy is the man 
whom God reproves; don’t reject the discipline of the Almighty.”  Thus, the righteous 
individual  who  accepts  God’s  rebuke  and  benefits  from  divine  discipline  (5:17)  will 
enjoy a life in which he easily conquers troubles.  Not only will his offspring, who reside 
in  his  tent,  be  safe  during  the  righteous  individual’s  lifetime  (5:24),  this  benevolent 
protection will continue into the lifetimes of his descendants, who will multiply with 
great abundance, a sign of persistent divine favor.  Job will later offer a counterargument 
                                                        
200 Gordis hypothesizes that Job has in mind movable property rather than land, since it is described as 
something that can cleave to the hand.  Gordis, The Book of Job, 245.   92 
to this by suggesting that it is the wicked, not the righteous, who enjoy such rewards (Job 
21:7-13).  
Job 22:28-30   
  The  best  evidence  for  collective  reward  in  the  book  of  Job  may  appear  in 
Eliphaz’s last speech.  Eliphaz counsels Job to submit to God so that he may find peace 
and divine favor once again (Job 22:21).  However, Job’s acquiescence to God will not 
only benefit him personally, but also the wicked:  “You will decide a matter and it will 
stand  for  you;  over  your  ways  light  shines.    When  they  are  abased,  you  command 
pride.
201  And he saves the humble.  He will deliver even him who is not innocent
202 and 
he will escape on account of the cleanness of your hands” (Job 22:28-30).  These lines 
are admittedly difficult, but many commentators follow Gordis in understanding them as 
a  promise  that  repentance  will  lead  to  Job’s  restoration.




202 Clines rejects Gordis’s translation and interpretation of this passage and prefers instead the translation, 
“He delivers the innocent, and by the cleanness of your hands you will be delivered.”  His major objection 
to Gordis’ proposal stems from Gordis’ rendering of a rare negative particle in the expression }ˆî-naœqˆî, “not 
innocent.”  The particle occurs in only one other place in the Hebrew Bible, in the personal name Ichabod 
(}ˆî-k⋲aœb⋲o®d⋲), for which the following folk etymology is offered: “The glory has departed from Israel” (1 Sam. 
4:21), i.e., “No glory.” Folk etymologies do not, of course, always reflect the historical linguistic origins of 
a name.  James Barr, “The Symbolism of Names in the Old Testament,” Bulletin of the John Rylands 
University  Library  of  Manchester  52  (70  1969):  16.    Nevertheless,  names  do  often  preserve  archaic 
morphological  and  semantic  features  of  a  language.    Scott  C.  Layton,  Archaic  Features  of  Canaanite 
Personal Names in the Hebrew Bible (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1990).  The negative particle in }ˆî-naœqˆî, 
“not  innocent”  is  also  attested  in  Ethiopic,  Phoenician,  rabbinic  Hebrew,  and  possibly  in  the  Lachish 
ostracon 2.6.  As further evidence that the expression refers to a guilty (“not innocent”) individual rather 
than an innocent one, one must note that “innocent” does not make sense in context.  Why should the 
cleanness of Job’s hands have any bearing on the fate of an innocent third party?  It is unclear why Job’s 
intercession would be necessary for innocent individuals or why they would need to escape, presumably 
from  a  sinister  fate.    Clines  himself  admits  that  the  term  appears  to  mean  guilty,  not  innocent,  as  he 
translates it, but attributes the problem with his translation to the reasoning of the speaker, Eliphaz.  David 
J. A Clines, Job 21-37, Word Biblical Commentary v. 18A (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 2006), 
547, n. 30, 567–569. 
 
203 Gordis, The Book of God and Man.  Gordis, “Corporate Personality in Job.”  Gordis, The Book of Job, 
251–252.  Pope, Job, 152–153.  Habel, The Book of Job, 343–344.   93 
righteousness that like the heroes Noah and Danel, known from Ezekiel 14:14, 20, his 
merit can redeem the unrighteous.
204   
  In Ezekiel 14, the prophet denies that the righteousness of Noah, Danel, and Job 
could save a people as faithless as Israel.  Ezekiel is careful to clarify that the merits of 
these great men would save neither the community (v. 14) nor their own offspring (v. 
20).
205    The  underlying  assumption,  which  Ezekiel  denies,  is  like  that  of  Eliphaz’s 
argument:    the  merits  of  great  men  can  bestow  collective  rewards  upon  both  their 
communities  and  their  descendants  (horizontally/intragenerationally  and 
vertically/transgenerationally, respectively).  This same assumption underlies Abraham’s 
bargain with YHWH to spare the population of Sodom and Gomorrah for the sake of its 
righteous individuals in Genesis 18:17-33.
206  YHWH concedes that he will not destroy 
the entire city for the sake of ten righteous individuals (v. 32), but readers, ancient
207 and 
modern
208 alike, often wonder why Abraham, who has already five times successfully 
negotiated the necessary number of righteous individuals down from fifty to ten, does not 
                                                        
204  In  rabbinic  tradition,  the  righteous  possessed  the  ability  to  intercede  on  behalf  of  less  righteous 
individuals so that they might experience YHWH’s mercy instead of his justice.  Genesis Rabba 33:3; 
Talmud Babli Tractate Sukka 14a.  Urbach, The Sages, 495. 
 
205 Weiss, The Story of Job’s Beginning, 16, n. 1. 
 
206 Pope, Job, 152. 
 
207 For example, Josephus argues that ten would have sufficed to save the city, but not a single righteous 
individual existed (Antiquities I.199).  Rabbinic tradition suggests that a minyan was required (Midrash 
Rabbah Bereshit XLIX 13).  Cf. Nahum M Sarna, Genesis = Be-Reshit: The Traditional Hebrew Text with 
the New JPS Translation, 1st ed, JPS Torah Commentary (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989), 
134.  Claus  Westermann,  Genesis:  A  Commentary,  trans.  John  Scullion  (Minneapolis:  Augsburg  Pub. 
House,  1984),  292.    According  to  some interpretive  traditions  (Bereshit  Rabbah  50.9,  Pirke  de  Rabbi 
Eliezer 25, Jerome, on Gen., 19.14), Lot and his wife had four daughters, with two of them being married 
and the other two betrothed, so that Lot, his wife, daughters, and (future) sons-in-law numbered ten total.  
Louis Ginzberg, Legends of the Jews, vol. 1, 2nd ed., [2003 ed.] ed., JPS classic reissues (Philadelphia: 
Jewish Publication Society, 2003), 213-214, n. 177. 
 
208 Joseph Blenkinsopp, “Abraham and the Righteous of Sodom,” Journal of Jewish Studies 33 (1982): 123.    94 
take his quest for justice
209 further, all the way down to a single individual.  The answer 
perhaps lies in the fame and merit of the righteous individuals.  For an individual as 
righteous and famous as Noah, Danel, or Job, perhaps YHWH would have spared the 
entire city.
210  But for a single righteous individual like Lot, whose righteousness is not 
without  folly,
211  YHWH  will  not  employ  horizontal  reward.    Rather,  he  saves  the 
righteous individual and his family through intergenerational reward (Gen. 19:12).  In Job 
22:28-30, the collective reward that Eliphaz envisions appears to be horizontal, especially 
given that Job lacks any offspring who could benefit from intergenerational merit at this 
point in the plot.
212   
Job 29:4-5 
  When Job, afflicted with disease and plagued by great suffering, reflects back on 
his life prior to YHWH’s agreement to allow the Satan to test him, he reckons his family 
as the recipients of collective reward:  “When I was in the days of my autumn, when the 
counsel






210 Note that Jeremiah 5:1 and Ezekiel 22:30 suggest that a single righteous individual could save the city.  
Ibid.,  129.    In  rabbinic  traditions,  the  continued  existence  of  the  world  depends  upon  the  presence  of 
righteous men.  Some sages thought thirty righteous individuals were necessary, while others put the quota 
as low as a single righteous individual.  The merit of the fathers (zechut avot), as it is known in rabbinic 
tradition, functioned not only intergenerationally, but also intragenerationally.  The rabbis asserted that 
proximity to the righteous imparted favor to the neighbors of the righteous.  Urbach, The Sages, 489–491, 
494. 
 
211 See Gen. 19:8, 16-20, 30-35. 
 
212 Gordis, “Corporate Personality in Job,” 55.  Gordis, The Book of Job, 251. 
 
213  The  most  common  meaning  for  so®d⋲  in  the  Hebrew  Bible  is  “counsel.”    Nevertheless,  some 
commentators have understood this Hebrew term to be a form of the root y-s-d, “found, establish,” which 
would indicate that God established Job’s house/household.  Pope, Job, 185.  The meaning “protection,” 
associated with the root s-d-d, which is known to mean “guard, tend” in Akkadian, has also been connected   95 
surrounded me” (Job 29:4-5).  Job associates his time as a recipient of divine favor with 
his children.  His children basked in their father’s divine favor.  Not only did they reside 
in a tent blessed with divine friendship and free from disaster,
214 but they also enjoyed an 
abundance of milk and oil (v. 6).  Job remembers this situation positively and does not 
consider it evidence of divine injustice.   
Epilogue 
  Job’s submission not only results in his own elevation to a higher status, but it 
also benefits Eliphaz and his fellow comforters.
215  In the prose epilogue immediately 
following Job’s concession (Job 42:6),  
( 7) YHWH said to Eliphaz the Temanite, ‘My wrath is kindled against you and  
against your two friends for you did not speak of me what is right as my servant 
Job did.  (8) Now therefore take seven bulls and seven rams, and go to my servant 
Job, and offer up for yourselves a burnt offering; and my servant Job will pray for 
you, for I will accept his prayer not to deal with you according to your folly; for 
you did not speak of me what is right, as my servant Job did.’  (9) So Eliphaz the 
Temanite and Bildad the Shuhite and Zophar the Naamathite went and did what 
YHWH had told them; and YHWH accepted Job’s prayer.  (10) And YHWH 
restored the fortunes of Job when he had prayed for his friends; and YHWH gave 
Job twice as much as he had before (Job 42:7-10). 
 
Just  as  Eliphaz  had  predicted  in  Job  22:28-30,  YHWH  restored  Job’s  fortunes  and 
allowed the abundance of his righteousness to offset the wrongdoings of others.  Job’s 
friends,  who  wrongfully  accused  him  of  sinful  behavior,  eventually  benefit  from  the 
                                                        
to so®d⋲ in this verse.  Naphtali H. Tur-Sinai, The Book of Job : A New Commentary (Jerusalem: Kiryath 
Sepher, 1957), 410.  I have opted to follow the most common meaning, which still allows the reader to 
appreciate the positive sense of Job’s reminiscence.  Habel, The Book of Job, 483. 
 
214 Clines, Job 21-37, 983. 
 
215 Gordis, “Corporate Personality in Job,” 55.  Habel, The Book of Job, 344. 
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righteous sufferer’s good deeds,
216 but Job’s request that God make known to him his 
sins (Job 13:23) remains unanswered.  Job does not object to YHWH’s act of mercy for 
his friends.  Although Job is not labeled a prophet, he intercedes for his friends in a 
manner similar to the intercessions of Israel’s earliest prophets, Abraham and Moses (see, 
for example, Gen. 18-20; Exod. 32-34; Numb. 14, etc.).  The precise connection between 
intercession  and  collective  accountability  is  a  topic  that  merits  more  study.  
Unfortunately, such a digression would take this discussion too far afield of the present 
topic, namely, the use of collective accountability in biblical wisdom literature.  Job’s 
intercession for his friend may not be a strong case of collective reward, if it is one at all, 
but I have included it in my discussion because the two concepts, namely collective 
reward and intercession, appear to share some degree of conceptual overlap.  I hope that 
future studies can clarify better the nature of their connection. 
 
IV.  Rejection of Collective Punishment in Job  
Job 8:4   
  Bildad the Shuhite enters the dialogue with Job by suggesting that Job’s foregoing 
speech is “wind” (ru®ahΩ) ) and that God does not pervert justice (Job 8:2-3).
217  Logically, 
                                                        
216 Gordis suggests that the notion of the righteous suffering individual bringing collective reward upon his 
companions is a transfer from the notion of the suffering servant, presumably representing the collective 
Israel, found in Second Isaiah.  While the suggestion is intriguing, he has not adequately explained the 
process by which he envisions the vicarious suffering of a collective being transferred to the suffering of 
the  individual.    Job’s  individual  suffering  perhaps  enables  him  to  clear  others  of  iniquity  as  Eliphaz 
suggests, but there is a confusion of interrelated ideas (vicarious suffering, righteous suffering, collective 
accountability, etc.) that must first be disentangled.  Gordis, “Corporate Personality in Job,” 54.  Gordis, 
The Book of God and Man, 154. 
 
217 Bildad’s question in 8:3 (“Does God pervert justice (misûpaœt√)?  Or does Shaddai pervert righteousness?”) 
echoes  Abraham’s  in  Genesis  18:25  (Shall  not  the  judge  of  all  the  earth  do  justice  (misûpaœt√)?”).  
Nevertheless, Abraham and Bildad have different understandings of what justice is.  While the former   97 
then, if Job’s children suffered a grim fate, this must be the result of justly administered 
divine  retribution  for  their  sins:    “Indeed  your  children  sinned  against  him,  and  he 
delivered  them  into  the  power  of  their  transgression”  (Job  8:4).    Bildad’s  opening 
response appears to address an unspoken complaint by Job that the loss of his children 
was an unmerited punishment for so righteous a man as himself.   Job nowhere states this 
opinion directly and will later express the opposite sentiment, namely that individuals 
should suffer according to their own sins rather than seeing their punishment passed on to 
their  offspring,  but  his  argument  is  based  on  the  premise  that  intergenerational 
punishment is operational (Job 21:19-21).  Bildad refutes an argument that Job has not 
directly stated or defended, but which lies in the background as a possible explanation for 
the deaths of Job’s children.  The deaths of Job’s children are prominent factors in his 
suffering, so Bildad sets out to clarify their significance; although their deaths are tragic 
and inflict suffering on their father, Job should not interpret them as a punishment of 
himself, but rather of his children. 
  Curiously,  within  the  same  dialogue,  Bildad  speaks  of  the  households  of  the 
wicked perishing (vv. 15 and 22).  This would appear to be another example of the 
simultaneous affirmation of both individual and collective accountability. 
Job 12:6a 
Part  of  Job’s  complaint  about  divine  justice  is  that  the  wicked  often  prosper 
contrary to conventional wisdom and religious beliefs.  Job even suggests that rather than 
inheriting collective punishment for the sins of their father, the children of the wicked 
rest comfortably and securely without worry of retribution:  “The tents of marauders are 
                                                        
expects justice to involve the sparing of the wicked for the sake of the righteous, the latter understands 
justice to be administered individually.   98 
at  peace”  (Job  12:6a).    Although  those  who  destroy  homes  and  villages  and  pillage 
valuables should live a life in fear of the law, these brigands and their families instead 
enjoy  the  bounty  of  thievery  without  threat  of  retribution,  according  to  Job’s 
observations.      
Job 21:7-9, 19-21 
  Job denies his comforters’ claims that the wicked eventually suffer a just fate.  
Rather  than  losing  their  property,  watching  their  children  suffer,  and  experiencing 
destruction  themselves,  the  wicked  attain  old  age  while  acquiring  wealth  and  power:  
“Why do the wicked live on, reach old age, and also grow strong with power?  Their seed 
is established before them with them, and their offspring are before their eyes.  Their 
houses are safe from fear, and no rod of God is upon them” (Job 21:7-9).
218  Despite the 
picture of well being for the offspring of the wicked that Job has painted, he still seems to 
acknowledge the divine practice of intergenerational punishment.  Job protests against the 
conventional wisdom of his comforters that God punishes the children for the iniquity of 
their father:  “(You say),
219 ‘God stores up his iniquity for his sons.’  Let it be paid back 
                                                        
218 This depiction inverts Eliphaz’s description of the fate of the righteous in 5:23-26. 
 
219 E. Talstra has cautioned against inserting quotation marks into the text without grammatical markers to 
support the translation.  Yet, Talstra’s resulting interpretation lacks coherence.  He translates Job 21:19 
thus:  “Eloah even preserves the wicked’s wealth for his sons.  Repay him should He (He should repay 
him).”  Talstra argues that }o®no® should be translated as “his wealth” from  }o®n, “wealth, strength” rather 
than as “his evil/retribution” from }aœwen, “evil, inequity.”  His preference for the former is based upon a 
study of }aœwen in the book of Job, which suggests that the word only refers to the activities of the wicked 
and not to those of God.  For Talstra, the problem with interpreting }o®no® as “his iniquity” is that the 
translation suggests that God himself stores up punishment or retribution, a divine activity for which the 
noun }aœwen is not otherwise used in Job.  However, the usage of }o®no in Job 21:19 appears comparable to 
that of {aœwoœn in Exodus 34:7 to express the concept of intergenerational punishment.  It does not appear to 
be  a  theological  impossibility  that  God  can  store  up  punishment  or  iniquity  as  retribution.    Although 
Talstra’s translation makes sense of one difficult verse, it makes the final term of verse 19 and the next two 
verses difficult to understand.  Talstra omits w§yeœd⋲aœ{ from his translation of verse 19.  As Talstra’s primary 
interest concerns only the question of “virtual quotations,” he does not provide his own translation of Job 
21:20-21,  so  it  is  unclear  how  he  makes  sense  of  these  verses.    He  has  avoided  adding  a  statement   99 
to him so that he may know it.  Let his eyes see his cup (kˆîd⋲o®),
220 and let him drink from 
the wrath of Shaddai.  For what is his delight in his house after him when the number of 
his months is cut off?” (Job 21:19-21).
221 
  Job’s quotation of his comforters here does not occur anywhere in the preceding 
speeches of the comforters in exactly this form, but already all three of his comforters 
have  suggested  that  the  household  of  the  wicked  will  suffer  because  of  its  familial 
association  (Job  5:3-5;  8:22;  18:19;  20:10,  26,  28).    However,  Job’s  accusation  is 
imprecise in another respect.  Job quotes his friends as suggesting that God stores up the 
iniquity of the father for his children alone, when in fact each of his friends suggests that 
both father and children will suffer for the father’s misdeeds.
222  How do these conflicting 
perceptions  of  the  mechanics  of  collective  retribution  compare  with  the  concept  of 
intergenerational punishment found elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible?  Both sides in Job 
have evidence to support their positions.  For example, in the case of Achan in Joshua 7, 
Achan dies alongside his household.  However, as noted in the above discussion of the 
Job prologue, several examples of collective punishment bring negative consequences for 
only the children of the sinner (1 Kgs. 21:27-29; 2 Kgs. 20:17-19; cf. 2 Sam. 12:13-14).  
                                                        
indicating a shift in speakers at the cost of ignoring the end of the verse and rendering the subsequent 
verses incomprehensible.  E. Talstra, “Dialogue in Job 21:  ‘Virtual Quotations’ or Text Grammatical 
Markers?,” in The Book of Job, ed. W. A. M. Beuken, BETL 114 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1994), 
339–340. 
 
220 “Cup” (kˆîd⋲o®) is a hapax legomenon.  Dahood proposes the meaning “cup, goblet” based on Aramaic, 
Syriac, Akkadian, and Ugaritic roots that are similar.  Dahood, “Some NWS Words in Job,” 316. 
 
221 Job’s complaint that the sinner’s children bear his punishment actually conflicts with his depiction of the 
sinner’s safe, prosperous, and happy children in Job 21:8-12. 
 
222  Newsom,  “The  Book  of  Job,”  1994,  493.  Georg  Fohrer,  Das  Buch  Hiob,  Kommentar  Zum  Alten 
Testament Bd. 16 (Guetersloher Verlaghaus Gerd Mohn, 1963), 344.     100 
Neither the divine attribute formula (Exodus 34:6-7) nor the Decalogue (Exod. 20:4-6; 
Deut. 5:8-10) mentions whether the sinner suffers consequences for his crime.
223 
As  explained  above,  YHWH’s  punishment  of  children  instead  of  their  sinful 
father represents an act of mercy.  Indeed, from the perspective of the sinner, this is quite 
merciful.    But  from  the  perspective  of  the  righteous  sufferer,  God’s  mercy  is 
inappropriate.  Job’s complaint that the sinner does not experience the consequences of 
his actions echoes that of the prophet Jonah after YHWH spares the repentant city of 
Nineveh,  “But  this  seemed  very  evil
224  to  Jonah,  and  he  grew  angry.    He  prayed  to 
YHWH and said, ‘O YHWH! Is this not what I said while I was still in my own country?  
On account of this I fled to Tarshish at the start; for I knew that you are a gracious and 
merciful  God,  slow  to  anger,  and  abounding  in  steadfast  love,  and  relenting  from 
punishing.  And now, O YHWH, take away my life from me, for it is better for me to die 
than to live” (Jonah 4:1-3).  Jonah paraphrases portions of the divine attribute formula 
(Exod. 34:6-7), but does not mention the portion that describes YHWH as mercifully 
punishing  the  children  of  sinners.    Like  Job,  then,  Jonah  finds  death  preferable  to 
enduring  an  existence  in  which  the  wicked  benefit  from  YHWH’s  mercy.    Jonah’s 
unhappiness, like that of Job’s, ultimately derives from his own self-righteousness.  If Job 
were not in fact free of guilt, he might be quite thankful that YHWH had killed his 
children rather than their sinful father, but perspective is a crucial factor that contributes 
to the attitude one takes toward the issue of collective accountability. 
                                                        
223 Levinson, “The Human Voice,” 47. 
 
224  Most  translations  smooth  over  the  awkwardness  of  this  phrase  by  using  terms  like  “was  very 
displeasing” (NRSV), but I think “seemed very evil” more adequately conveys the sense of injustice that 
Jonah perceives in YHWH’s act of mercy for the wicked, which is a point that I hope to emphasize in this 
discussion.   101 
Job’s poignant question, “For what is his delight in his house after him when the 
number of his months is cut off?” (Job 21:21), hints at the potential for human abuse in 
such a system of punishment.  An episode from 2 Kings demonstrates Job’s point well:  
King Hezekiah’s response to Isaiah upon hearing the prophecy that YHWH would spare 
the reigning king but cause his children to suffer after him:  “‘The word of YHWH that 
you have spoken is good.’ And he said, ‘Why not, if there will be peace and security in 
my days?’” (2 Kgs. 20:19).  Just as Job has suggested, the spared sinner Hezekiah does 
not seem to be overly concerned about the fate of the family that succeeds him.  Despite 
Hezekiah’s positive reaction to the suffering of his progeny, the Hebrew Bible elsewhere 
abounds  with  concern  for  preserving  one’s  family  line.    An  abundance  of  children, 
especially sons, is interpreted as a sign of divine favor, and the desire to continue the 
family lineage motivates laws, like that of the levirate marriage (Gen. 38:8-10; Deut. 
25:5-6), and drives plots, like the tales of Abraham, Rachel, Ruth, etc.  
Both  textual  and  archaeological  evidence  suggests  that  the  dead  were  in  fact 
believed not only to have concern for their descendants but also to possess influence in 
the realm of the living. Textually, Saul’s encounter with the spirit of Samuel through the 
Witch of Endor (1 Sam. 28) demonstrates an expectation on the part of the living (Saul) 
that the dead (Samuel) have both an interest in the living and the power to influence 
events in the realm of the living.
 225  On the archaeological and anthropological level, the 
recently deceased Samuel’s malevolent response to Saul’s petition is not unexpected.
226  
Comparing the secondary mortuary practices of other cultures with those of ancient Israel 
                                                        
225 Osborne, “Secondary Mortuary Practice,” 13–14.  Brichto, “Kin, Cult, Land and Afterlife,” 48. 
 
226 For a comprehensive discussion of this evidence in ancient Judah, including the use of bench tombs with 
food vessels, secondary bone repositories, and texts that depict bones as powerful (for example, 2 Kings 
23:16-18), see Osborne, “Secondary Mortuary Practice,” 6,13–14.     102 
explains Samuel’s malevolence. During the stage in which the corpse of an ancestor 
undergoes  decomposition  after  its  initial  burial,  his  influence  over  the  lives  of  his 
descendants was believed to be harmful.  However, following the ancestor’s final burial, 
his influence was generally considered beneficial.
227   
Job himself even notes that part of the wicked’s prosperity includes his ability to 
see his children grow and prosper (Job 21:8-12, but contrast with 14:21-22).  In one 
instance, the father of a punished offspring does not consider the death of his son on 
account of his own crime to be an act of mercy.  After Nathan prophesies that David and 
Bathsheba’s illicitly conceived son will die as punishment for his parents’ crime, the king 
fasts and prays until the child dies.  He explains his behavior to his servants:  “‘While the 
child was still alive, I fasted and wept for I thought, ‘Who knows?  YHWH may be 
gracious to me, and the child may live’” (2 Sam. 12:22).  For David, divine mercy would 
have meant sparing the child altogether. 
Although  the  desire  to  protect  one’s  progeny  and  secure  the  family  line  runs 
strong in ancient Israel, Job’s observation that death eliminates this concern is attested 
elsewhere.  Another sage, Qoheleth, remarks, “The living know that they will die, but the 
dead do not know anything; they no longer have wages and their memory is forgotten.  
Their love and their hate and their jealousy have already perished; they no longer have a 
portion in all that is done under the sun” (Eccl. 9:5-6).  Job also argues that the death of a 
father terminates his concern for his progeny, and with this argument Job intends to 
                                                        
227  The  episodes  depicted  in  2  Kgs.  23;16-18  and  1  Kgs  13:1-6  demonstrate  the  benevolent  forces 
associated  with  humans,  which  are  representative  of  the  deceased  individual’s  spirit  following  the 
secondary burial process.  Ibid., 14. 
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demonstrate the importance of the sinner suffering personally.
228  This idea also occurs in 
his speech in 14:21-22:  “His sons are honored, but he [the dead] does not know it; they 
are brought low, but he does not perceive it.  He feels pain only for his own flesh, and his 
soul mourns only for himself.”  Job speaks here of mortals in general, but his point is 
ultimately  the  same:  neither  the  wicked  nor  the  righteous  know  anything  of  their 
offspring’s fate after their own deaths, so intergenerational punishment or reward neither 
harms nor benefits them.   
Job’s issue here, considered within the larger framework of the canonical version 
of the book, reflects back on his habit of offering vicarious sacrifices for the possible 
unspoken blasphemy of his children (Job 1:5).  While his actions likely protected himself 
from the potential devastation of losing an heir, they also shielded his children from 
seeing their destruction with their own eyes.  Job’s plea, namely that sinners suffer the 
consequences of their actions themselves, gets at the heart of the Satan’s second bargain 
with YHWH (Job 2:4-5):  the human instinct for self-preservation will cause a man to 
sacrifice all that he has, including his own family, to save his own life.    
According to Kaminsky, Job’s comments about collective accountability in 21:19-
21 are not a rejection of the concept but rather a qualification.  The righteous sufferer 
objects to the possibility that a sinner might completely escape punishment himself while 
his children suffer.
229  Based on his plea for collective punishment in 17:5, Job does not 
seem to take issue with children suffering alongside their wicked father for his sins; 
rather, he objects to the children suffering instead of their father (cf. 14:22).  However, to 
                                                        
228 Newsom, “The Book of Job,” 1994, 493. 
 
229 Kaminsky, Corporate Responsibility in the Hebrew Bible, 136–137.   104 
be fair to Job’s comforters, none has suggested that the latter situation will be the case.  
Rather, they each suggest a threefold course of punishment comparable to that which Job 
experiences himself:  loss of property, suffering of family, and personal suffering (for 
example, Job 15:28-35). 
 
V.  The Role of Wisdom Instruction for the Righteous and the Wicked in Job   
  Israel’s wisdom literature is diverse.  As mentioned in the introduction, the book 
of Job complicates any effort to define the category of biblical wisdom literature,230 but 
the form and content of Job compare easily with wisdom texts known from elsewhere in 
the  ancient  Near  East.    Although  the  book  is  not  primarily  composed  of  sayings, 
proverbs, maxims, and instructions, its purpose is nevertheless, like all wisdom literature, 
“the formation of character.”231  Because of its dialogical format and plot concerns, Job’s 
code of ethics does not appear as the instructions of a father to his son, but the text makes 
clear what society considers wise and righteous and what it considers foolish and wicked 
(for example, the catalogue of virtues in Job 31).
232  What do the authors of Job consider 
to be the human capacity for attaining wisdom and righteousness?  Can the quest for 
wisdom save the child of the wicked from collective punishment?  Do wicked parents 
produce only wicked children and righteous parents only righteous children?  
  Despite  Job’s  claims  of  relative  righteousness  compared  to  the  depth  of  his 
suffering, his comforters argue that his suffering is not without cause.  Job is human and, 
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accordingly, incapable of leading a virtuous life completely free of sin.  Eliphaz questions 
Job, “Can a man be righteous before God?  Can a man be pure before his maker?” (Job 
4:17).  The comforter argues, “For iniquity does not come from dust, nor does trouble 
sprout from the ground; but man is born to trouble just as sparks
233 fly upward” (Job 5:6-
7, cf. 14:1).  According to this line of reasoning, Job owes his suffering to his sinful 
human condition.  Zophar likewise chastises Job for his claims of innocence, but takes his 
claim even further:  “Know then that God overlooks some of your iniquities” (Job 11:6c). 
Job is not only deserving of judgment, but God has also mercifully punished him less 
than he deserves! 
  Does the sinful nature of humanity in general justify the suffering of the children 
of the wicked or the suffering of the individual at issue?  Do peccadilloes on the part of 
the sufferer validate the punishment brought down upon them?  Job does not suffer for 
his father’s sin, but like the innocent children of the wicked, he suffers unjustly.  In the 
eyes  of  Job’s  companions,  it  would  appear  that  any  suffering  is  merited  because  of 
humanity’s sinful nature and inability to avoid transgression.  This would appear to be the 
case even when the severity of the suffering far outweighs any sin committed through the 
inevitability of human wrongdoing.  Job, of course, disagrees with his friends and their 
appeal to traditional wisdom.  But with respect to the specific issue of intergenerational 
punishment, he does not seem to find the suffering of innocent children to be particularly 
unjust.  Rather, he appears to be bothered by the fact that the sinful parent of those 
innocent children may have escaped suffering entirely (Job 21:19-21).  Like Jonah, he 
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sees injustice in YHWH being merciful to the wicked so that they do not suffer the 
consequences of their own sins. 
  How  can  wisdom  instruction  and  discipline  help  the  wise  to  avoid  suffering?  
Although  often  regarded  as  an  insertion,  the  conclusions  of  Job  28,  a  poem  on  the 
location of wisdom, ring true with the rest of the book:  mortals lack easy access to 
wisdom (Job 28:13), which resides with God (Job 28:23) and is the fear of YHWH (Job 
28:28).  Although Job’s comforters attribute some wisdom to the aged sages of tradition 
(15:7-10, 18-19; cf. 8:8-10; 12:12; 32:4), Elihu dispels this notion:  “I said, ‘Let age 
speak, and may a multitude of years reveal wisdom.’  However, truly it is the spirit in a 
man, the breath of Shaddai, that produces understanding.  It is not the old that are wise or 
the elders who understand justice” (Job 32:7-9).  As Elihu later acknowledges:  “If he 
should take back his heart to himself, and gather to himself his spirit and his breath, all 
flesh would perish together, and man would return to dust” (Job 34:14-15).  God is the 
source of humanity’s ephemeral existence and also of its limited wisdom.  Eliphaz argues 
that God puts no trust in his angels and servants, and even less so in humans (Job 4:18-
19), and when those ephemeral beings die, they are devoid of wisdom (4:21).   
For Job, God is the ultimate source of wisdom.  Those on earth who have wisdom 
have gained it from God:  “With him [God] are wisdom and strength; he has counsel and 
understanding…He leads counselors away barefoot and makes fools of judges…He turns 
aside the lips of those who are trusted and takes away the discernment of the elders…He 
turns aside the mind of the leaders of the people of the earth and makes them wander in 
chaos without a path.  They grope in the dark without light; he makes them stagger like a 
drunkard” (Job 12:13, 17, 20, 24-25).   Although human wisdom is greater than that of   107 
animals  (Job  35:11-13),  who  cannot  even  properly  raise  their  young  because  of  the 
paucity of wisdom that God has shared with them (Job 39:16-17), it pales in comparison 
with divine wisdom.  Does God share wisdom with everyone?  Do the children of the 
wicked have access to it? 
Elihu, who concedes to Job that wisdom lies with God and not with the aged, 
argues that God uses dreams to warn humans and to discipline them against bad behavior 
(Job  33:12-24).  As  Elihu  argues,  human  nature  may  limit  mankind’s  ability  to  be 
completely righteous (34:14-15), but by being attuned to one’s dreams, communications 
from God, discipline can be gained and retribution avoided.  But are these methods of 
revelation effective for everyone? 
Zophar states, “a stupid person will get understanding when a wild ass is born a 
man”  (Job  11:12).    In  other  words,  for  a  certain  class  of  humans,  understanding  is 
unattainable.  How then can individuals belonging to this group avoid sin?  Are they born 
wicked like their parents?  Job himself alludes to a class of people who appear by birth to 
be sinister.  This allusion appears in chapter 30, in which Job laments that although he 
once enjoyed the height of prominence in his community, he is now derided by sons 
“whose fathers I would have rejected to set with the dogs of my flock” (Job 30:1).  This 
“senseless, disreputable brood”
234 is shunned by society (Job 30:5-8).  This sinful group 
appears to beget sinful offspring.  These scourges of society would have opportunities for 
wisdom instruction limited to divine revelation in their dreams.   
  The following verse is put into the mouth of Job:  “Who can bring a clean thing 
out of an unclean?  No one.  Since his days are decided and the number of his months 
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known to you, and you have made the statutes that he cannot pass over, look away from 
them and desist; let him enjoy his day like a hireling” (Job 14:4-6).  The first line is often 
regarded as misplaced or a marginal notation transferred into the text itself.
235  However, 
the sentiment expressed—that is, namely, the immutable nature of an object or being—is 
ancient  and  accords  well  with  other  wisdom  sayings  suggesting  that  like  begets  like 
(Ezek. 16:44; Luke 6:43; Matt. 7:17-18; Jas. 3:11-12; Deut. 32:32).  In this case, Job 
would appear to be referring to all humans, not any one particular class predetermined for 
wickedness.  As the book of Job makes clear, a wide gulf divides divine wisdom from 
human wisdom.  Although a chasm exists also between the righteous and the wicked, it is 
not nearly so large as that between man and God because all humans by nature commit 
sins. 
  If the language of reproduction in Job 15:35 is understood literally (see discussion 
of this verse earlier in this chapter), then Eliphaz would appear to be suggesting that the 
offspring of the wicked are wicked themselves:  “They conceive (haœroœ) mischief and bear 
(w§yaœloœd⋲) evil, and his womb (u®b⋲it√naœm) prepares deceit.”
236  Even if the language of 
childbirth is not understood literally, the saying at the very least suggests the traditional 
wisdom notion that like begets like.
237 Most of the references to collective retribution in 
the book of Job promote the concept as just.  Job’s comforters appeal to the punishment 
of the wicked’s children as evidence that God exercises justice in punishing wrongdoers.  
Job’s  complaint  in  21:19-21  appears  not  to  reject  the  idea  outright,  but  rather,  as 
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previously  noted,  to  object  to  situations  in  which  the  offspring  of  the  wicked  suffer 
instead of the sinner, rather than in addition to the sinner.  Job argues not that God should 
not punish the children of the wicked, but rather that God must administer punishment 
immediately  in  order  for  the  sinner  to  recognize  the  correlation  between  sin  and 
suffering.
238  This would seem to suggest that none of the diverse parties represented in 
the book of Job finds injustice in the suffering of the children of the wicked.  This may 
result either from their believing the children to be wicked as well or from their not 
accepting the concept and existence of the righteous sufferer.  In support of this latter 
possibility is the fact that Job’s friends do not accept that Job is in fact righteous, a 
perspective that Job can share only with the omniscient narrator and YHWH himself.  
That  Job,  as  a  righteous  sufferer  himself,  does  not  sympathize  with  the  (innocent) 
children of the wicked who suffer for the sins of their father, is curious, especially when 
one considers that Job’s own children were righteous sufferers themselves who died for 
the sake of a test of their father.   
  Job’s comforters often depict the wicked’s posterity as being cut off so that the 
wicked individual is without remembrance.  The wicked and his children perish so that 
no one remains in his evil line.  For example, see Job 15:28-35, 18:14-21, 8:22, 27:14-15.  
This type of punishment does not strike the reader as an act of divine mercy but rather as 
a  punitive  indication  of  divine  displeasure  with  wickedness.    Indeed,  as  all  of  the 
examples cited are used by Job’s comforters to argue that YHWH deals justly with the 
wicked, it is not surprising that they would depict divine punishment as extreme.  How 
can Job’s comforters justify this use of intergenerational retribution?  Why do they not 
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perceive injustice in the suffering of the children of the wicked?  Does the absence of 
objection to intergenerational retribution indicate that these sages believed the children of 
the wicked to be wicked themselves, and thus deserving of punishment?  Similarly, Job 
does  not  seem  to  be  bothered  by  collective  reward.    In  the  case  of  intergenerational 
reward, this could suggest that Job believes the children of the righteous to be righteous 
as  well,  and  so  deserving  of  divine  blessing.    However,  in  the  case  of  the 
intragenerational or horizontal reward that occurs in Job 42:7-10, Job knows the guilt of 
his friends, who have wrongfully accused him of sinning and have not spoken of YHWH 
what is right (v. 7), but he does not object to interceding on their behalf so that YHWH 
will absolve them. 
 
VI.  Summary of Findings in Job 
The issue of unjust suffering is acute for Job, and although his main concern is not 
the unjust suffering of innocent children born to wicked parents, the issue of collective 
accountability does recur throughout the book.  The prologue foreshadows Job’s later 
complaint  that  moral  order  depends  on  the  wicked  suffering  for  their  misdeeds 
personally.  Job’s objection to sinners passing their punishment onto their children rather 
than experiencing it themselves (Job 21:19-21) may represent a modification of notions 
found elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible that intergenerational punishment spared the sinner 
and brought suffering only on his offspring. 
Although the use of intergenerational punishment elsewhere in the Bible often 
functions as a merciful divine act, the use of this concept by Job’s friends is generally 
meant to defend God against the claim that the wicked do not endure enough suffering   111 
for their wickedness.  The comforters suggest, contrary to Job’s claim that the wicked 
prosper, that their suffering extends beyond their own physical well being; witnessing the 
misfortunes or destruction of their lineage likely inflicted great emotional distress as well 
(18:15-21;  20:10,26,28;  27:14-15).    The  crimes  of  the  wicked  and  the  retribution 
envisioned for their offspring are often vague, but the sages generally expound upon a 
basic idea that the line of the wicked is cut off.  Not only will the wicked suffer and 
perish himself, but he will lose his possessions and his progeny as well (5:3-5; 15:28-35). 
At  times,  the  characters  in  Job’s  drama  appear  to  promote  and  to  reject 
intergenerational punishment simultaneously (compare Job 4:7-9 with 4:10-11, 8:4 with 
18:15-21).    Even  Job  himself  is  inconsistent  in  his  position.    This  is  true  in  several 
respects.  Firstly, although he ostensibly rejects, or at least modifies, intergenerational 
retribution  in  Job  21:19-21,  he  appears  to  advocate  it  in  17:5  and  31:8.    Secondly, 
although Job himself is a righteous sufferer, he appears to be unbothered by the righteous 
suffering of the children of the wicked.  This is evident both in his statement in 17:5  (cf. 
31:8)  and  in  the  emphasis  he  places  in  21:19-21  on  the  importance  of  the  wicked 
experiencing  the  consequences  of  their  sins  themselves,  rather  than  appealing  to  the 
injustice of children suffering for the crimes of their father.  Finally, Job does not seem to 
object to collective reward, either horizontal or vertical, even though he finds fault with 
collective punishment. 
Despite the fact that righteous suffering is a very prominent theme of the book of 
Job, the righteous suffering of the children of the wicked is never lamented.  Job does not   112 
sympathize  with  their  ostensibly  similar  plight,
239  and  his  comforters  often  use  this 
theological concept to argue that the wicked do indeed suffer for their sins.  Job’s friends 
emphasize God’s justice by appealing to the negative fates that await the children of the 
wicked.  Intergenerational punishment looks more like the vindictive punishment called 
for in Psalm 109 than the merciful punishment depicted in Numbers 14.   The comforters 
also  do  not  intend  to  warn  Job  against  certain  behaviors  by  depicting  wide-reaching 
consequences as was sometimes the case in Proverbs.  Their main interest appears to be 
proving to Job that the wicked suffer terribly.  The suffering of their children, and even 
the question of their innocence, is ignored in order to make a more important point:  God 
punishes the wicked and rewards the righteous. 
The activities that merit collective reward are often not specific either.  General 
righteousness can earn rewards like an abundance of offspring (Job 5:24-25).  If Job were 
to  repent  and  cease  from  charging  God  with  wrongdoing,  then  his  righteousness, 
according to Eliphaz, could redeem others from their sins (Job 22:28-30).  This prediction 
comes to fruition in the epilogue (Job 42:7-10).    Job also recalls a time before the 
Satan’s test afflicted him in which his children benefitted from the divine favor their 
father received from God (Job 29:4-5).  Collective reward does not appear to cause any of 






239 It may be noteworthy that none of the comforters proposes that Job’s suffering relates to the sins of his 
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Chapter Four:  Collective Accountability in Qoheleth 
 
I.  Introduction 
As  mentioned  in  the  first  chapter,  the  concern  for  the  fate  of  one’s  offspring 
weighed heavily on the minds of many of the Israelites depicted in the Hebrew Bible.  In 
order  to  protect  their  progeny,  well-intentioned  parents  guided  their  children  with 
instructions, some of which are preserved in Israel’s wisdom literature, intended to steer 
the  student  on  the  path  of  righteousness  so  that  he  might  reap  the  rewards  of 
righteousness and wisdom and avoid the punishments associated with sin and folly.  For 
one  notable  Israelite,  however,  the  sentiments  expressed  above  do  not  ring  true.  
Qoheleth,
240 the teacher who takes on the persona of King Solomon in part of the book,
241 
subverts conventional wisdom by questioning the absolute truth of such basic tenets as 
the good will of God toward humanity, the value of life, and any retributive theory that 
links prosperity or misery to human behavior. 
Qoheleth  draws  upon  personal  observations  to  conclude  that  wisdom  and 
righteousness do not guarantee longevity:  “I have seen both in the days of my breath: 
there is a righteous one who perishes in his righteousness, and there is a wicked one who 
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prolongs his life in his wickedness” (Eccl. 7:15;
242 cf. 8:14).  The sage discerns no pattern 
correlating good behavior with divine favor or bad conduct with divine punishment.  In 
fact,  in  the  course  of  his  philosophizing,  he  concludes:    “All  this  I  laid  to  heart, 
examining it all, how the righteous and the wise and their deeds are in the hand of God; 
whether it is love or hate one does not know. Everything that confronts them is vanity, 
since the same fate comes to all, to the righteous and the wicked, to the good and the evil, 
to the clean and the unclean, to those who sacrifice and those who do not sacrifice. As are 
the good, so are the sinners; those who swear are like those who shun an oath” (Eccl. 9:1-
2).  Whether God favors or despises humanity is unknown, and eventually everyone, 
good or bad, succumbs to the same fate.  Trusting in one’s own righteousness or the other 
traditional trappings of religious worship cannot change the ultimate fate in which all 
humanity shares, death.
243  Wisdom for Qoheleth, then, is not a set of guidelines
244 that 
enables one to be righteous and to avoid punishment, but rather a tool by which humanity 
can understand the limits of its ability to comprehend the divine plan for humanity.
245 
  The  promise  of  fame  and  a  lasting  legacy  does  not  offset  the  inequity  of 
humanity’s  shared  fate,  death.    According  to  Qoheleth,  “For  there  is  no  eternal 
remembrance of the wise or of the fool; already in the days to come all will have been 
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forgotten. How can the wise die like the fool?” (Eccl. 2:16).  This view contrasts with the 
position held by traditional sages, which suggests that possession of wisdom ensures the 
continued remembrance of one’s name (Sir. 37:26) and that a virtuous name cannot be 
forgotten (Sir. 41:11).
246  However, in Qoheleth’s opinion, even the wise man who uses 
his wisdom to save the lives of an entire urban population has no lasting remembrance, 
neither among his own family nor among those whom he saved (Eccl. 9:13-15).  The 
actions of an individual can and do affect the community, but one suspects that Qoheleth 
laments the unfairness of the group prospering while their savior receives no reward.  
Concerns that motivate other sages and Israelites, like establishing an enduring legacy or 
behaving righteously so as to guard one’s life from death, are irrelevant for Qoheleth.  
Wisdom is a powerful tool, but not powerful enough to raise the status of the one who 
exercises it among his peers and descendants, who forget his heroic display of wisdom, 
and certainly not powerful enough to change his divinely decreed fate, which is like that 
of the rest of humanity.
247 
Qoheleth’s  pessimistic  approach  to  wisdom  and  existence  does  not  permit  a 
notion of divinely administered accountability that is discernible to the human mind.
248  
Everyone eventually comes to the same fate, and no patterned correlation exists between 
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one’s behavior and one’s lot in life.  Calamities are not a sign of divine judgment (Eccl. 
9:12),  nor  are  blessings  a  sign  of  divine  favor.    If  Qoheleth  accepted  the  notion  of 
collective  or  individual  accountability,  he  might,  as  Halpern  has  suggested,
249  have 
discerned some pattern in the conduct of individuals and the blessings and calamities that 
mark their lives.
250  However, because both the righteous and the wicked die without any 
lasting  memory,  the  sage  questions  the  advice  of  conventional  wisdom.    Neither 
collective nor individual retribution appears to be operative in Qoheleth’s understanding 
of divinely ordered reality. 
Despite  Qoheleth’s  rejection  of  divine  retribution,  the  sage  still  offers  some 
insights into the issues associated with collective accountability among Israel’s sages.  
These include several comments related to an individual’s posterity and to the issue of 
determinism.  A closer examination of Qoheleth’s view on each of these matters may 
provide  a  useful  perspective  to  compare  with  the  results  found  in  the  other  wisdom 
books. 
 
II.  Collective Accountability in Qoheleth 
Although Qoheleth denies any divinely guided system of just retribution that is 
perceptible  to  humans  (Eccl.  7:15),
251  the  sage  appears  to  desire  a  correspondence 
between deeds and welfare:  “There is a vanity that occurs on earth, which is that there 
are righteous people who are treated according to the conduct of the wicked, and there are 
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wicked people who are treated according to the conduct of the righteous. I said that this 
also  is  vanity”  (Eccl.  8:14).    Qoheleth  observes  that  no  consistently  appropriate 
correspondence exists between conduct and consequences, but he describes this situation 
as a heb⋲el, “vanity.”
252  Qoheleth is fond of using the term heb⋲el, “vanity,” which can 
literally mean “breath, vapor, puff,” to describe the illusory and ephemeral aspects of this 
world.
253  So, while Qoheleth would like a system of retribution to exist, for reasons that 
elude the capacity of human wisdom, it does not.  Such a concept is vanity because it is 
unreliable; the pattern of punishment corresponding to sin and of reward corresponding to 
good deeds is inconsistent and illusory.  It may still be worthwhile to ask, however, if a 
retributive system did exist, would Qoheleth prefer that it be individual or collective? 
This question is especially pertinent in light of Eccl. 3:17, 11:9, and 12:14, which suggest 
that  Qoheleth  did  entertain  the  notion  of  a  world  in  which  retributive  justice  was 
operative, even if its pattern is unrecognizable to humans. 
Several  verses  before  declaring  the  lack  of  correspondence  between  act  and 
consequence to be heb⋲el, “vanity” (Eccl. 8:14), Qoheleth indicates not only a desire for 
retributive justice, even if only human-administered, but also familiarity with the concept 
of  collective  accountability.    Qoheleth  observes  a  pattern  of  human  behavior:  “As  a 
sentence against a wicked deed is not executed quickly, therefore the mind of mortals is 
fully set to do evil” (Eccl. 8:11).  Qoheleth would prefer a system of retribution in which 
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justice does not delay but instead immediately confronts the wrongdoer.
254  He criticizes 
justice  systems,  perhaps  human,  perhaps  divine,
255  in  which  the  penalties  are  not 
administered swiftly.   Job’s comforters frequently appeal to the explanation of delayed 
punishment to explain that the apparent prosperity of the wicked is temporary.  They are 
responding to a complaint, like the one Qoheleth makes in v. 11, that retribution ought to 
be immediate.  As discussed in the previous chapter, Job himself asks this question in a 
poignant  way  that  seeks  to  modify  the  notion  of  collective  accountability  as  he 
understands it, ““(You say),
256 ‘God stores up his iniquity for his sons.’  Let it be paid 
back to him so that he may know it.  Let his eyes see his cup,
257 and let him drink from 
the wrath of Shaddai.  For what is his delight in his house after him when the number of 
his months is cut off?” (Job 21:19-21).   When collective punishment is understood as an 
act of divine mercy, the operative principle behind it is not that God expunges the sin 
completely,  but  rather  that  God  delays  punishment  by  spreading  it  out  over  several 
generations.  Qoheleth, like Job, observes that a delay in the punishment does nothing to 
punish, and thus also to prevent further, misdeeds.   
Qoheleth and Job are not the only wisdom authors to recognize the faults of a 
retributive system of justice in which punishment is not always immediate.  As will be 
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discussed  in  the  next  chapter,  Ben  Sira  deals  with  the  problem  created  by  delayed 
punishment by denying its existence (Sir. 7:16).  Despite this denial, it is clear from other 
biblical  texts  that  Qoheleth  and  Job  are  aware  of  explanations  that  use  delayed 
punishment to account for why sinners do not experience immediate punishment for their 
wrongdoings.  For example, in the murmuring scene found in Numbers 14 in which 
Moses intercedes on behalf of the Israelites who face total annihilation, Moses appeals to 
God by quoting, in part, the divine attribute formula that God had revealed to Moses in 
Exodus 34:6-7.  In response to Moses’ prayer, God relents from his plan to kill the 
Israelites “as one man” (k§}ˆîsû }ehΩaœd⋲) (Numbers 14:15).  God agrees to forgive the people 
(v. 20), but divine forgiveness does not completely expunge the sin.  Rather, God delays 
the deaths of these Israelites until they have reached the edge of the Promised Land.  In 
delaying their punishment, God also subjects the children of these sinners to enduring the 
punishment of wandering in the wilderness for forty years (vv. 28-35).  Although delayed 
punishment  frequently  appears  intergenerationally,  which  is  to  say,  as  a  form  of 
collective accountability,
258 it can also manifest itself as an individual punishment that 
has been postponed during the course of that individual’s lifetime.
259  For example, in Job 
13:26, the righteous sufferer accuses God of afflicting him with suffering in his old age 
for sins committed as a youth.   
As Crenshaw has noted, Qoheleth’s statement in 8:11 redirects the attention of the 
reader from the sinner who commits the crime to the authority that should punish sinners 
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but delays in such a way that it encourages more crime (v. 11b).
260  Such a criticism 
would apply both to human justice systems
261 and, on the basis of the prominence of 
divinely  executed  collective  accountability  in  the  Hebrew  Bible,  to  divine  justice.  
Additionally,  Qoheleth’s  observation  may  target  the  claims  of  sages,  like  Job’s 
comforters, who explain the ostensible prosperity of the wicked by arguing that God 
postpones punishment.  Delayed punishment (and reward) cannot solve the problem of 
retributive justice that Qoheleth has observed. 
Qoheleth also acknowledges that an individual’s offspring can benefit from the 
conduct of his parents.  However, contrary to other fathers in the Hebrew Bible who 
aspire  to  leave  an  inheritance  to  their  children,  Qoheleth  views  the  practice  less 
favorably:  
(18) I hated all my toil in which I had toiled under the sun, that I must 
leave it to the man who comes after me, (19) and who knows whether he 
will be wise or foolish? Yet he will have dominion over everything for 
which I toiled and used my wisdom under the sun. This also is vanity.  
(20) So I turned and gave my heart up to despair concerning all the toil for 
which I labored under the sun, (21) for there is the case of the man who 
toiled with wisdom and knowledge and skill, yet to a man who did not 
labor for it he must give his portion. This also is vanity and a great evil. 
(Eccl. 2:18-21)  
 
Qoheleth  resents  his  toil,  the  produce  of  which  will  benefit  his  heirs,
262  for  several 
reasons.  For the sage, pleasure commends itself, but his labor will produce pleasure for 
someone other than himself.  In addition to this, Qoheleth also objects to the vanity and 
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great evil of his heirs, regardless of their wisdom or foolishness, enjoying that for which 
they did not work.
263  He perhaps also sees vanity in the possibility that, although both a 
wise heir and a foolish heir would be undeserving of the produce of another’s toil, his 
heirs may be foolish and so squander his toil, and he lacks any control over this situation.   
  Qoheleth’s  reasoning  reflects  beliefs  that  are  relevant  to  the  debate  between 
individual and collective accountability. Although Qoheleth does not embrace the notion 
of divine retribution, he does nevertheless appear to express the desire for one’s behavior 
to  correlate  with  one’s  life  circumstances,  even  if  the  divine  plan  (hamma{∞síe)  that 
determines this correlation is inscrutable to him (Eccl. 3:11).
264  His concern that the 
individual who produced the pleasures be able to enjoy those pleasures himself suggests 
that  he  would  prefer  individual  reward,  but  he  does  not  ascribe  to  such  a  theology 
because this is not what he has witnessed in the course of his studies.  Nevertheless, he 
would  appear  to  object  in  principle  to  the  notion  of  collective  reward.    Why  should 
someone else enjoy the benefits of another individual’s good deeds?  One expects that the 
converse  of  this  sentiment,  namely  collective  punishment,  would  also  ring  true  for 
Qoheleth:  Why should someone else suffer the consequences of another individual’s 
wicked deeds?  
Like the case of the sage who leaves his riches to his heirs after him, the case of a 
toiling individual with no family is also a vanity.  According to Qoheleth, “Again, I saw 
vanity under the sun:  there is a solitary individual, with no one else, neither son nor 
brother; but there is no end to all his toil, and his eyes are never satisfied with riches.  
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‘But for whom am I toiling,’ [he asks,] ‘and depriving myself of pleasure?”  This also is a 
vanity  and  an  unhappy  business”  (Eccl.  4:7-8).    Although  2:18-21  suggested  that 
gathering riches to be enjoyed by another is vanity, this passage argues that gathering 
riches even though there is no one else with whom to share them is vanity.  Qoheleth puts 
a poignant question into the mouth of the solitary individual that would presumably elicit 
a questioning of his activities.  Rather than continue to work, the individual should enjoy 
his riches himself before he dies.  Qoheleth suggests that greed compels this foolish 
toiling (“his eyes are never satisfied with riches”).  So, the vanity derives not from the 
absence of heirs or family with whom to share this wealth, but rather from the failure to 
stop toiling long enough to enjoy the product of one’s toil.
265  Ben Sira observes the same 
phenomenon:  the  miser  who  hoards  wealth  while  denying  himself  enjoyment  of  that 
wealth will never enjoy the product of his hard toil (Sir. 14:3-5).
266 
  Qoheleth also considers a case in which children do likely suffer because of the 
conduct of their parents:  “(12) There is a grievous ill that I have seen under the sun: 
riches were kept by their owners to their hurt, (13) and those riches were lost in a bad 
venture; though he fathered a son, he has nothing in his hands” (Eccl. 5:12-13).  The 
son’s  suffering  is  not  divinely  inflicted
267  but  rather  the  natural  consequence  of  his 
father’s bad investments.  Nevertheless, Qoheleth focuses the tragedy of this situation not 
simply on the individual who lost his riches, but rather on the bankrupt man’s status as a 
father to a son, for whom his empty hands cannot provide.  Although Israelites generally 
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interpreted the birth of a son as a sign of divine favor,
268 in this case the presence of a son 
signals the father’s negative state.  The father has no means of supporting his family 
during his lifetime and no inheritance to leave to his son once he has passed.   
  The subject of the statement, “he has nothing in his hands” (v. 13) is ambiguous.  
Both the father and the son are empty-handed.  Similarly, the subject is ambiguous in v. 
14, which asserts, “Just as he came forth from the womb of his mother naked, so shall he 
return again; he will not have anything to show for his toil that he can carry in his hand.”  
While the statement in v. 13 could refer to either the father or his son, Crenshaw has 
argued that the ambiguity functions deliberately to convey “the common lot of the once-
rich father and the poor son.”
269  Such an interpretation demonstrates well the reality of 
intergenerational suffering. 
 
III.  The Role of Wisdom Instruction for the Righteous and the Wicked in Qoheleth 
Like the book of Job, Qoheleth presents an alternative understanding of wisdom.  
Although Qoheleth’s teachings often overturn the lessons of traditional wisdom sayings, 
the sage is not so pessimistic that he sees no value in the human endeavor to attain 
wisdom  for  oneself  and  to  instill  that  quest  in  others,  which  Qoheleth  himself  does 
through his role as a teacher.  The inescapable nature of death for all humans prompts 
Qoheleth to reject any notion of divine retribution that is intelligible to humans, but even 
without  this,  human  reason  remains  for  the  philosopher  an  important  standard  of 
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judgment  (Eccl.  1:13,  21;  7:23).
270    Thus  it  is  worth  investigating  Qoheleth’s 
understanding of human nature and the ability of wisdom to benefit the pupil who studies 
it.   
Qoheleth’s claim in 2:19 that he cannot know whether his heirs will be wise or 
foolish speaks to the possibility that wise parents can produce foolish children.  The 
inadequacies of human wisdom would appear to be such that, in the mind of Qoheleth, 
providing  wisdom  instruction  to  one’s  children  cannot  guarantee  that  all  of  one’s 
descendants will be wise like their progenitor.  According to Qoheleth’s philosophical 
position, the successful student of wisdom understands wisdom’s limits.  Even living a 
righteous life according to the traditional standards of wisdom cannot guarantee longevity 
and prosperity because humans cannot observe any pattern that correlates behavior to 
consequences. 
  Like  Job’s  comforters,  Qoheleth  views  humanity  as  inherently  incapable  of 
perfect righteousness:  “Surely there is no man on earth so righteous that he does good 
without ever sinning” (Eccl. 7:20).  The human inability to escape sin entirely, according 
to Qoheleth, originates with human activity, not divine creation:  “See, this alone I found, 
that God made humankind upright, but they have devised many schemes” (Eccl. 7:29).  
Humans,  though  sinful  by  nature,  can  control  their  level  of  righteousness;  however, 
perfect righteousness and extreme wickedness should be avoided (7:16-18).  Qoheleth 
provides examples of individuals who can change their status through wisdom or lack 
thereof (i.e., Eccl. 4:14).  However, other statements take a more predetermined outlook:  
“What is crooked cannot be made straight, and what is lacking cannot be counted” (Eccl. 
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1:15).  Applied to human nature, such a worldview suggests that humans cannot change  
whether  they  are  wise  or  foolish,  righteous  or  wicked.    It  is  unclear  from  these 
contradictory  views  whether  or  not  it  is  fruitful  to  educate  a  foolish  child  to  attain 
wisdom.  It would appear, however, on the basis of passages like 4:14 and 2:18 that the 
sage recognized that parents do not necessarily produce children like themselves with 
respect  to  righteousness  and  wisdom.    That  Qoheleth  cannot  venture  a  guess  as  to 
whether his own descendants will be wise or foolish does not express much confidence in 
the ability of wisdom instructions to produce wise offspring.
271  Wisdom can help the 
human to discern the limits of human wisdom to elucidate the divine plan, but nothing in 
this  ephemeral  world,  not  even  wisdom,  can  guarantee  success  for  oneself  or  one’s 
offspring. 
   According to 2:26, “For to the man who pleases him [God] gives wisdom and 
knowledge and joy; but to the sinner he gives the work of gathering and heaping, only to 
give to one who pleases God.  This also is vanity and a chasing after wind.”  The sage 
seems to observe that God bestows wisdom upon those who please him.  Just how they 
please  him  is  not  clear  to  the  human,  but  the  contrast  with  the  sinner  whom  God 
preoccupies with work may suggest that the wise are pleasing to God because, despite not 
yet having the wisdom that directs one to heed God’s laws, these pleasing people are 
righteous.  However, the sage’s judgment that this situation is vanity complicates the 
issue. One possible interpretation of the passage is that wisdom originates with God, and 
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humans do not choose whether to be “pleasing” or a “sinner.”
272  The futility of the 
situation is that while a divine plan may underlie who pleases God and receives wisdom 
and who does not, the human cannot discern this plan or pattern.   
  Humans,  according  to  Qoheleth,  ultimately  lack  any  control  over  an  arbitrary 
world  ruled  by  an  inscrutable  deity.
273    Wisdom  is  no  guarantee  because  despite  its 
superiority  over  foolishness  in  most  situations,  it  cannot  produce  success  in  every 
situation and it cannot prevent death, the ultimate fate of the wise and the fool alike.
274  
Human efforts to control this divinely appointed fate are, for Qoheleth, hebel, “vanity.”
275 
 
IV.  Summary of Findings in Qoheleth 
  Although Qoheleth does not make any direct statements concerning collective 
accountability, several passages from this collection of wisdom touch on related issues.  
While caution is necessary in extrapolating from these passages a sense of Qoheleth’s 
stance on the debate between collective and individual accountability, the sage would 
appear likely, on the basis of passages like Eccl. 2:18-21 and 8:11, to favor individual 
accountability if he were to accept traditional notions of divine retribution at all.  Despite 
his apparent preference for individual accountability, he does acknowledge the impact 
that a father’s choices can have on his offspring (5:12-13).    
Like Israel’s other sages examined so far, he does not present a systematic picture 
of his notion of determinism. The tension between fate, whether it is fixed by God or 
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manifests  itself  as  some  impersonal  force,  and  moralism  is  problematic  not  only  for 
Israel’s sages, but also for the Hebrew Bible and religious systems more generally.
276  As 
von Rad has noted, determinism is a prominent strand of thought in the Hebrew Bible, 
but it cannot be philosophically rigorous because of the tensions created when an older 
tradition  comes  into  contact  with  new  modes  of  understanding.    Nevertheless,  these 
tensions, which are evident only when the older tradition is reinterpreted in light of newer 
ideas, rarely affect the free will of the individual to choose to behave according to the 
morals taught by Israel’s sages.
277   
Rudman has argued that Qoheleth does not allow for human will independent 
from God’s will.  Thus, in Rudman’s understanding of Qoheleth, if humankind is capable 
of an action, it is divinely sanctioned.  Accordingly, Qoheleth can commend pleasure 
because it is possible, and therefore God has approved it (Eccl. 9:7).
278  Human free will, 
then, has rather severe limits in Rudman’s view.
279   
However, it is also possible to understand Qoheleth’s endorsement of pleasure in 
a manner that does not constrain human free will.  The divine plan is inscrutable to 
humans; they cannot control it anymore than they can understand it.  All that humans can 
know of the divine plan is that death is a great leveler of all moral and social classes.  
Life after death and the endurance of one’s wealth and lineage are not reliable solutions 
to  the  permanence  of  death.    Consequently,  enjoying  one’s  existence  is  the  only 
worthwhile activity that remains for humans since the other activities with which they 
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preoccupy  themselves  can  neither  stave  off  death  nor  guarantee  eternal  existence  for 
one’s family.
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Chapter Five:  Collective Accountability in the Wisdom of Ben Sira
281 
 
I.  Introduction 
  For  the  sage  Ben  Sira,  collective  notions  hold  importance.    Immortality, 
unachievable for individuals, is attainable through the community:
282  “The life of a man 
is a number of days, but the life of the people of Israel is days without numbers” (Sir. 
37:25). Wisdom instruction functioned as a crucial parental activity because, although the 
individual parent could not live forever, his lineage could endure if his offspring learned 
the valuable life-affirming lessons imparted through traditional wisdom instruction.
283 
  The presence of a sage within ancient Israelite communities was beneficial for 
everyone belonging to the group.  According to the Greek translation of Ben Sira, “A 
wise person instructs his own people, and the fruits of his intelligence are reliable” (Sir. 
37:23).  Not only does the sage earn honor for himself on account of his wisdom, but his 
wisdom also provides a lasting contribution to his community.
284  The entire community, 
which includes both contemporaries and later generations, benefits because of the wise 
individual.    Wisdom  has  a  profound  communal  impact.    Although  neither  example 
considered above treats the case of a reward directly administered by YHWH himself, 
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both cases indicate a sapiential appreciation of communal thinking and of the power of 
the individual to have a pronounced impact on his entire community. 
  This chapter will explore the notion of collective accountability in the wisdom of 
Ben Sira.  First, it will present the verses relating to collective punishment (II), followed 
by those relating to collective reward (III).  Then it will consider examples in which 
collective accountability appears to be rejected (IV).  Next, it will investigate the ability 
of wisdom instruction to help the pupil avoid or attain the fate of his forebears (V).  The 
chapter will conclude with a summary of its findings (VI). 
 
II.  Collective Punishment in Ben Sira 
Ben Sira 40:15 
  According to the Greek translation of Sir. 40:15,  “The offspring of the ungodly 
will not multiply branches; they are unclean roots on a steep rock.”285  Here the sage 
suggests that the ungodly will not achieve familial longevity, an individual’s best hope 
for immortality, through the proliferation of his offspring.  Producing abundant offspring 
was a goal for most ancient Israelites, and the righteous individual who merited God’s 
favor is often blessed with numerous descendants (consider, for example, Abraham, who 
is promised offspring more numerous than the stars).  However, the offspring of the 
ungodly, according to Ben Sira, will not attain this goal.  Rather, the children of the 
wicked  are  in  a  precarious  situation  and  unlikely  to  produce  many  children,  if  they 
produce any at all.  The text does not mention any wrongdoing on the part of the ungodly 
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man’s offspring and does not appear to find their failure to thrive because of their father’s 
misconduct  to  be  theologically  troubling.    The  verse  seems  to  offer  comfort  to  the 
righteous individual who sees the ungodly producing offspring, generally considered a 
sign of divine favor,
286 and wonders why such a person should receive a divine blessing 
instead of punishment.  Ben Sira’s imagery is reminiscent of Job 8:11-12, in which one of 
Job’s comforters assures the righteous sufferer that the success of the wicked is only 
temporary.   
  The imagery of “roots on sheer rock” (v. 15b) recalls Jesus’ parable of the sower 
in Matthew 13; the seeds that fall on rocky ground flourish rapidly, a result which some 
might  interpret  to  mean  that  God  had  blessed  them;  but,  on  the  contrary,  they  lack 
durability because of the poor soil (Matt. 13:5; cf. 13:21).  Though the seeds seem to 
prosper, they cannot weather any storm and their success is only fleeting.  One must 
consider the entire life cycle of the plant to extrapolate any meaning from its progress 
because to consider only its early success would produce a false interpretation of its 
divine  favor.
287    Patience,  then,  is  a  necessary  condition  for  observing  the  expected 
pattern of divine punishment for the wicked and divine blessing for the righteous. 
Ben Sira 41:5-10 
     Ben Sira offers a relatively lengthy discussion concerning the children of the 
wicked:   
(5) Abominable children are the children of sinners, and they live among 
the lodgings of the ungodly.  (6) An inheritance is lost by the children of 
sinners, and disgrace continues with their offspring.  (7) Children blame 
an ungodly father, for on account of him they will be reproached.  (8) Woe 
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to you, godless men, who forsake the law of God Most High!  (9) And if 
you beget (children), you will have begotten them for cursing; and if you 
die, you will be allotted a curse.  (10) Everything that is from earth will 
return to earth, thus the ungodly will go from curse to ruin. (Sir. 41:5-10)  
 
The  curses  awaiting  the  children  of  sinners  are  numerous:  a  bad  reputation,  loss  of 
wealth, shame, and contempt for their father.  The association of children of sinners with 
other  ungodly  individuals  invites  even  more  negative  consequences,  as  Sir.  22:13
288 
suggests,  because  the  troubles  of  the  wicked  seem  to  be  contagious  for  those  who 
associate with them (for a full discussion of this verse, see below).  The intragenerational 
consequences  of  this  will  be  explored  below  in  connection  with  Sir.  22:13,  but  it  is 
important to note in the discussion of Sir. 41:5-10 that the children of the ungodly face 
insuperable  odds  in  avoiding  the  retribution  incurred  by  their  parents.  The  passage 
suggests that the children of sinners are by their very nature detestable.
289  That they 
dwell  among  the  ungodly  could  be  a  case  either  of  like  attracting  like  or  of  the 
unbreakable cycle of wickedness; because the child’s father is wicked and exposes his 
son  to  his  wicked  accomplices,  the  child  inherits  the  negative  consequences  of  his 
father’s actions and associations.  
The adverse situation of the children of the wicked is not necessarily the result of 
direct divine retribution, but it may certainly reflect reality as Ben Sira, and the sages 
upon whom he builds, observed it.  As creator of the universe, God may ultimately claim 
responsibility for ordering reality in this manner, but his role in the wicked nature of the 
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children of the wicked is indirect.  The children, after all, blame their father, not God, for 
their unfortunate lot.  The notice that the children blame their father for their suffering 
does not appear to be an observation of injustice but rather a warning to the would-be 
sinner that his name will not be remembered for good purposes among any progeny that 
he manages to leave behind.  This is significant for Ben Sira because he considers a good 
name to enable a man to achieve eternity (Sir. 41:11-13).
290 
Ben Sira 47:20, 22-23 
  As will become evident as this chapter progresses, Ben Sira frequently reflects on 
historic examples of collective accountability. One such historical reference occurs in the 
sage’s Praise of the Ancestors, an historical reflection on the heroic figures of Israel’s 
past that appears in the book’s conclusion.  In addressing King Solomon, Ben Sira does 
not focus solely on the merits of the acclaimed wise man: 
(20) You put a blemish on your glory and profaned your couch; anger is 
upon your offspring and sighing upon your bed…(22) God will not turn 
back from his loving kindness (hΩsd⋲), and his words will not fall to the 
earth.  He [will not blot out] the offspring, and he will not destroy the 
posterity of the one who loves him ([w}w]hb⋲yw).  He gave to Jacob…and 
to  David…(23)  And  Solomon  lay  down  in  despair  and  he  left  behind 
                                                        
290 Jack T. Sanders, “Wisdom, Theodicy, Death, and the Evolution of Intellectual Traditions,” Journal for 
the  Study  of  Judaism  in  the  Persian,  Hellenistic  and  Roman  Period 3 6  (2005):  271–272.    Harrington 
considers Ben Sira’s reflections in 41:1-13 to be a warning against relying upon one’s descendants to 
achieve  immortality.  Harrington  argues  that  the  sage  challenges  the  traditional  notion  of  attaining 
immortality through one’s lineage because one’s success “depends too much on the moral quality of one’s 
children.”  Harrington perceives a contrast between achieving immortality through one’s descendants and 
achieving it through a good name (v. 11-13).  However, while God or the community may also preserve the 
name of an honorable man, children generally are responsible for the remembrance of their ancestors’ 
names.  Furthermore, one point of 41:5-10 is that the children of sinners will not perform the usual duties of 
a child, namely bringing honor to their parents and preserving their lineage.  These verses are meant to 
discourage the wicked individual, who thinks he has found God’s favor because he has begotten children, 
from trusting in the certainty that those children will remember his name forever.  This will only happen if 
the  father  in  fact  has  a  good  name  to  preserve;  otherwise,  the  children  will  curse  their  father  (v.  6). 
Harrington’s  interpretation  that  Ben  Sira  discourages  reliance  upon  one’s  descendants  for  attaining 
immortality is true insofar as it goes, but could be more precise.  His wisdom is meant to discourage the 
wicked father who has produced offspring from thinking that his children are evidence of divine favor and 
the permanence of his lineage.  The sage is not suggesting that righteous men cannot rely on their offspring 
to preserve their remembrance (see Sir. 30:1-6).  Harrington, Jesus Ben Sira of Jerusalem, 123–124.   134 
him…one  wide  in  folly  and  lacking  in  understanding,  Rehoboam;  he 
neglected the counsel of the people.  Jeroboam son of Nebat sinned and 
caused Israel to sin and set before Ephraim a stumbling block. (Sir. 47:20, 
22-23)  
 
Solomon, whose name was synonymous with wisdom in ancient Israel,
291 violates his 
covenantal  fidelity  to  YHWH  by  marrying  foreign  women  whose  foreign  religious 
practices lead him astray.  According to the biblical account of Solomon’s reign (1 Kings 
11:11-13), his actions bring divine wrath upon his children.
292  Di Lella notes that this 
results from his children having a foreign mother, one incapable of teaching them the fear 
of YHWH and normative practices of Israelite religion (cf. Ezra 9:2; Mal 2:15; Wis 3:16-
19).
293  This explanation is both likely and pragmatic, but one should also observe the 
clustered terminology used in the passage to describe God’s mercy. Verse 22 will be 
discussed later with respect to collective reward, but it is worth noting in anticipation of 
that  discussion  that  it  draws  on  terminology  that  is  prominent  in  the  divine  attribute 
formula in Exodus 34:6-7, which attests to YHWH’s use of collective accountability. 
  Solomon’s heir, Rehoboam, lacks his father’s wisdom and loses control over the 
unity of his father’s kingdom.  Unlike the text of 1 Kings, which foretells the division of 
the kingdom under Rehoboam because of his father’s sins, Ben Sira’s recollection of 
history does not suggest Rehoboam’s political missteps are punishment for Solomon’s 
sins.  Nevertheless, it is clear from Ben Sira’s portrayal that this particular offspring of a 
sinner does not prosper.  Di Lella suggests that the “sighing” upon Solomon’s bed is an 
                                                        
291 The fame of Solomon’s wisdom extends beyond the borders of Israel, according to the biblical account. 
 
292  Interestingly,  although  Solomon’s  wives  numbered  in  the  hundreds,  the  Bible  records  only  three 
offspring known to have resulted from these unions:  Rehoboam and his two (half?) sisters, Taphath and 
Basemath.  See 1 Kings 4:11, 15; 14:31; 1 Chr. 3:10. 
 
293 Di Lella and Skehan, Wisdom of Ben Sira, 528.   135 
allusion to the groans of the people of Israel who were denied their request for lightening 
their burden under Rehoboam (1 Kings 12).
294   The Book of Kings indicates that the 
division of the kingdom, a punishment that only Solomon’s offspring must endure and 
not  the  king  himself,  is  divine  retribution  for  Solomon’s  idolatry  (1  Kings  11:9-13).  
Surprisingly, however, Ben Sira does not connect the punishment endured by Rehoboam 
to the actions of his father. It is not clear whether or not this is a meaningful omission or a 
simple oversight in summarizing the deeds of Solomon.   
Ben Sira 3:9b 
  Ben Sira has gained considerable notoriety among modern biblical scholars for 
his negative depiction of women.
295  The sage notes that, in contrast to a father’s good 
deeds, a mother’s transgressions can produce negative consequences for her offspring:
296  
“The blessing of a father strengthens the root, but the curse of a mother uproots a plant” 
(Sir. 3:9).  Ben Sira associates “blessing” with the male parent and “curse” with his 
female counterpart, but it seems probable that each parental example is representative of 
the impact that a parent of either gender can have on his or her progeny.   In other words, 
the blessing of either a father or a mother can produce benefits for one’s children, and the 
curse of either parent can produce negative consequences.  One ought to choose a spouse 
carefully, however, because the passage may suggest that the failings of one parent can 




295 Warren Charles Trenchard, Ben Sira’s View of Women: A Literary Analysis (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 
1982). 
 
296 Cf. Psalm 109.   136 
The  use  of  plant  imagery  to  discuss  progeny  is  familiar  from  other  passages 
within this book (see, e.g., 40:15, discussed above, and 23:24-27, discussed below) and 
from Job (e.g., Job 15:28-35).  A curse incurred by a mother leads to the end of the 
lineage, a serious repercussion, as the plant metaphor suggests.   
Ben Sira 23:24­27 
  Although not extant in Hebrew, Sir. 23:24-27 reflects on the fate of the children 
of an adulterous woman:   
(24) She herself will be brought out to the assembly, and to her children 
the punishment will extend.  (25) Her children will not spread roots, and 
her branches will not bear fruit.  (26) She will leave behind her cursed 
memory, and her disgrace will never be wiped out.  (27) And those who 
survive her will recognize that nothing is better than the fear of the Lord 
and nothing is sweeter than to heed the commandments of the Lord. (Sir. 
23:24-27) 
 
The children in question appear to be those produced by a prohibited sexual union (Sir. 
23:22-23).  Ben Sira mentions public punishment as the fate of the adulterer (v. 21), but 
the children of the adulteress are his as well, so presumably the same wisdom applies to 
the  offspring  of  the  adulterous  man.
297    Their  punishment  is  public,  and  though  the 
adulteress’s sinful actions produced children, who were otherwise understood to be a 
divine blessing, they will not prosper or endure.  They will suffer punishment like their 
mother.    The  use  of  plant  imagery  again  resurfaces  in  connection  with  collective 
punishment.  This imagery is used not only in wisdom literature but also in the Hebrew 
Bible more generally (for example, Isa 37:31; Mal 3:19).     
                                                        
297 The father of such illegitimate children is not necessarily married himself.  Nevertheless, if the father 
has also violated his marriage covenant, Ben Sira is not concerned about the offense he has committed 
against his wife.  Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age, 69.   137 
According to rabbinic tradition, the children of an adulteress were excluded from 
the community of Israel.
298  Ben Sira’s use of collective punishment in the case of the 
adulteress  woman,  then,  may  point  to  his  observation  of  adultery-produced  children 
suffering  exclusion  from  the  community.
299  The  illegitimate  children  complicate  the 
inheritance plans of the adulterers and their spouses,
300 so excluding illegitimate children 
from the community offers a practical solution to the economic problems caused by an 
adulterous affair that produces offspring. Although God’s role in the punishment of the 
offspring of adulterers appears indirect, the perceived origin of a mandate to exclude the 
offspring of prohibited sexual unions is likely divine revelation,
301 so God is ultimately 
responsible for this punishment of the children of an adulteress. 
While Ben Sira’s use of collective punishment in this instance may indicate a 
practical  reality,  theological  and  educational  goals  are  also  factors.    As  Collins  has 
pointed  out,  the  punishment  of  the  adulteress’  children  for  their  parents’  sin  is 
reminiscent of Ezra’s banishing foreign wives and their children in Ezra 10 because of 
their fathers’ acting unfaithfully against God and marrying foreign women (Ezra 10:2).  
Although the children’s suffering in Ezra is human-inflicted, Ben Sira seems to envision 
a divine punishment that guarantees that the fruit of an unlawful sexual union will not 
                                                        
298 Babylonian Talmud Qiddushin 78b. Cf. Box and Oesterley, “The Book of Sirach,” 396. Di Lella and 
Skehan, Wisdom of Ben Sira, 325–326. 
 
299 The biblical law commanding death for adulterers likely did not inform legal practice during the time of 
Ben Sira.  Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age, 70. 
 
300 Ibid., 69. 
 
301 Deut. 23.  Cf. Sir. 23:23.   138 
prosper.  The adulteress’s disgrace, for Ben Sira, serves as “a moral lesson that it is better 
to keep the Law.”
302 
Ben Sira 25:24 
  The  early  chapters  of  Genesis,  especially  the  story  of  Adam  and  Eve  in  the 
Garden of Eden, are important to Ben Sira and his understanding of creation (cf. Sir. 
15:15; 17:7; 33:10-13), even if his interpretations of the biblical text at times stray from 
the original.
303  The sage alludes to Eve’s sin in the Garden of Eden:
304 “From woman is 
the beginning of sin/iniquity, and because of her, we die together.”
305  The passage occurs 
in the midst of Ben Sira’s discussion of the evils associated with a wicked woman and the 
benefits of a virtuous wife.   
  Levison  doubts  that  the  woman  in  question  does  indeed  refer  to  Eve.
306    He 
proposes instead that the reference is to the wicked woman examined in Sir. 25:13-23 
because elsewhere the sage attributes the origins of death to divine design (17:1-2) and 
nowhere else associates concepts like sin and death with the events of Genesis 2-3.
307  For 
example, the view of death in 25:24 contrasts with Ben Sira’s later allusion to Adam in 
40:1ff in which he does not describe Adam’s role as a tiller of the soil as punishment for 
                                                        




304 Ibid., 67.  
 
305 Although some commentators regard this verse as a secondary interpolation, I agree with Collins, who 
sees no reason to doubt its authenticity.  Ibid., 68, 81.   
 
306 Jack Levison, “Is Eve to Blame? A Contextual Analysis of Sirach 25:24,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 
47 (1985): 617–623. 
 
307 Ibid., 622.   139 
sin.
308  Not only does the sage ignore Adam’s sin, but he also elevates the status of Adam 
over all other life (Sir. 49:16b).   
However, as Collins has noted, Ben Sira is often contextual in his positions, rather 
than strictly logical.
309  That is, although the sage does not elsewhere envision death as a 
punishment for human sin (Sir. 17; 41:3-4), he is not always consistent in his teachings 
and may favor a particular belief when it suits his goals.  When searching for a suitable 
explanation for the origins of evil in a world created and governed by a benevolent deity, 
blaming  human  wrongdoing,  especially  when  the  human  in  question  is  the  highly 
esteemed  man  whom  the  sage  elevates  over  every  other  figure  in  Israel’s  illustrious 
history (Sir. 49:16b), seemed less appropriate to the sage.  By contrast, when attempting 
to drive home the wickedness that women bring into the lives of those around them—a 
favorite theme of the sage—he repeats one possible explanation that may have been in 
circulation in popular circles,
310 because it suits his tone, even if it is philosophically 
inconsistent.  It is worth noting that the sage’s decision to blame Eve, rather than Adam, 
does bring a certain amount of consistency with respect to his attitudes toward the figure 
of Adam and women in general.  Although later attributions of the origins of sin will 
point to Adam and not his female counterpart, some commentators have suggested that 
the notion that woman is the origin of sin may refer to the chronological order in which 
                                                        
308 Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age, 59.  Note, however, that Gen. 2:15 describes YHWH 
placing Adam in the garden as a tiller of soil prior to his sin. 
 
309 Ibid., 68. 
 
310 The notion that sin and death derive from Adam appears in the written record in the first century C.E., 
significantly later than Ben Sira’s time, but this does not preclude the possibility that it was in circulation 
before then.  See Rom. 15:12-21; 1 Cor. 15:22; Wis. 2:23-24; 4 Ezra 4:30; 2 Bar. 17:3.  John R. Levison, 
Portraits of Adam in Early Judaism: From Sirach to 2 Baruch (Sheffield, England: JSOT, 1988).   140 
the pair sin in the Garden of Eden (cf. 2 Cor. 11:3; 1 Tim. 2:14).
311   This explanation, 
however, is not wholly satisfactory because the context of Sir. 25:24 is generally critical 
of women and the negative consequences that they can bring upon their husbands. 
Ben Sira 22:8 
  Preserved only in the Syriac edition of Ben Sira, Sir. 22:8 suggests that wicked 
children can bring negative consequences upon their families as well:  “Children whose 
pride is in scornful misconduct besmirch the nobility of their own family.”  Misbehaved 
children hurt the honor of their family.  Although this passage may not be original to Ben 
Sira, the wisdom reflects a concern among the communities that studied (and added) to 
the  sage’s  teachings  for  intergenerational  punishment  that  was  capable  of  operating 
bidirectionally.  Sir. 22:8 must be balanced, however, with the preceding verse, preserved 
only in Syriac and the second Greek recension, that a child born into a family of shame 
can overcome his ignoble origins. 
Ben Sira 22:13  
  Ben Sira advises his pupils, “Do not multiply words with a fool and do not go to 
the one without understanding.  Guard yourself from him lest you have trouble, and do 
not be defiled when he shakes himself off.  Turn away from him and you will find rest 
and you will not be grieved by his madness” (Sir. 22:13).  Essentially, the sage counsels 
his students to avoid association with fools.  To a certain extent, the notion that the sinful 
actions of such individuals are bad influences upon the individual seeking wisdom and 
righteousness must underlie this advice.  A foolish person can entice his companions to 
engage  in  foolish  and  sinful  behavior  as  well,  and  thus  bring  punishment  upon  his 
                                                        
311 Di Lella and Skehan, Wisdom of Ben Sira, 348.   141 
associates in addition to himself (cf. Prov. 12:26).  However, the sage suggests that the 
fool’s wickedness is contagious, like a pig spattering mud when it shakes itself off.
312 
  Such an interpretation of the fool’s sinful state as contagious has a precedent in 
the Hebrew Bible.  In his work on collective punishment, Kaminsky has investigated the 
overlapping notions that underlie the ancient Israelite conception of this type of divine 
retribution.  One difficult example of collective punishment for scholars to make sense of 
has been Joshua 7, the story of Achan’s theft of hΩeœrem and Israel’s subsequent defeat at 
Ai.  Israelite notions of holiness required that the people be holy like their God so as to 
enable his immanence in the land of Israel and its cultic centers.  According to Kaminsky,  
It would be fair to describe holiness as analogous to an electrical charge 
that  can  be  quite  useful  when  channeled  properly  and  quite  dangerous 
when handled improperly.  Neither electricity nor holiness will act any 
differently simply on the basis of one’s interior state or intentions.  Just as 
a person might unawares come into contact with a live electrical charge 
and accidentally receive a severe or even fatal shock, so too, one could 
offend God’s holiness in an accidental or unconscious manner (Lev. 4).
313   
 
For Ben Sira, it may bße that associating with a fool is like knowingly approaching a live 
electrical charge (cf. Sir. 16:6).  The companion of a fool risks dangerous consequences 
by involving himself with someone whose behavior is likely to attract the wrath of God, a 
wrath  that  can  spread  to  those  rendered  impure  by  interaction  with  a  sinner,  just  as 
Achan’s family and property suffered death because of their proximity to Achan and the 
stolen plunder.   
                                                        
312 This interpretation, found in the second Greek recension of the text of Ben Sira, relies on the Syriac 
reading of “pig” for “one without understanding,” which may be the preferred reading.  Rudolf Smend, Die 
Weisheit Des Jesus Sirach (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1906), 199.  Box and Oesterley, “The Book of Sirach,” 
391. 
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  It is, of course, not strictly necessary to interpret Sir. 22:13 in the manner outlined 
above.  The metaphorical language of the sinner shaking himself off may refer simply to 
the reality that keeping company with sinners leads to bad consequences (for example, 
sinners might feel no compunction about lying in a legal proceeding in order to save 
themselves  while  their  associates  suffer  the  repercussions  of  the  sinners’  actions).  
However,  because  of  the  act-consequence  model  upon  which  the  divinely  structured 
universe was built, the fate suffered by the sinner’s associates is divinely sanctioned (for 
a fuller discussion of the act-consequence model, see chapter seven).  This verse does not 
deal with punishment in a strict legal sense, but given the sage’s worldview, the negative 
results that follow from associating with sinners function as divinely created punishments 
for and/or deterrents to “multiply[ing] words with a fool” or “go[ing] to one without 
understanding.” 
 
III.  Collective Reward in Ben Sira 
Ben Sira 3:8-9 
Sir.  3:8-9  has  already  been  discussed  above  with  respect  to  its  comment  on 
collective punishment, but it also expresses the notion of collective reward:  “My son, 
with your word and your deed honor your father so that all blessings will come upon you.  
The blessing of a father strengthens the root, but the curse of a mother uproots a plant.”  
Children  coveted  a  father’s  blessing  in  ancient  Israel,  as  several  stories  in  Genesis 
indicate  (cf.  Gen.  9:27;  27:27-38;  28:1,  6;  48:15-16;  49:25-26).
314    Such  a  blessing 
“strengthens the root,” a metaphor for preserving and nurturing the father’s lineage.
315   
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Ben Sira 26:19-21 
  Although not extant in the Hebrew text,
316 Sir. 26:19-21 offers insight into Israel’s 
wisdom tradition’s understanding of collective reward:  “My child, keep sound the bloom 
of your youth, and do not give your strength to strangers.  Seek a fertile field within the 
whole  plain,  and  sow  it  with  your  own  seed,  trusting  in  your  fine  stock.    So  your 
offspring will prosper, and, having confidence in their good descent, will grow great.” 
Ben Sira’s advice metaphorically discourages exogamy.  The offspring produced by an 
endogamous  marriage  enjoy  success  and  have  assurance  in  their  lineage.    Biblical 
justification for Ben Sira’s advice is compelling. Figures as illustrious and as wise as 
Solomon find their downfall in marriage to foreign women, under whose influence their 
children turn away from exclusive worship of YHWH.  Tales such as that of Dinah and 
Shechem in Gen. 34 or Zimri and the Midianite woman in Numb. 25 deal unfavorably 
with the issue of exogamy, and didactic legal materials, like Deut. 7:3-4, make clear the 
perils of intermarriage with non-Israelites.  Although several stories—like those of Tamar 
in Gen. 38, Ruth in the Book of Ruth, and Rahab in Josh. 6—depict heroic and righteous 
foreign women who intermarry with Israelite men to help preserve the lineage of the 
Davidic line, the issue remained a divisive one in ancient Israel, as evidenced by Persian-
period texts like Ezra 10 and Neh. 10:30; 13:25. Joseph Blenkinsopp has proposed that 
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and Patrick William Skehan.  Das Buch Jesus Sirach Oder Ecclesiasticus Übersetzt Und Erklärt (Münster 
in Westfalen: Aschendorff Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1913), 218.    144 
the Persian period constitutes a likely background for the long discourse on the dangers 
of the “Outsider Woman” in Prov. 1-9.
317  
The issue remained pertinent also in Ben Sira’s era when Judean culture traded 
customs and ideas with the Hellenistic world. Like the Israelite wisdom preceding it, the 
advice found in Sir. 26:19-21 for the pupil facing these pressures is to marry within one’s 
own social group so as to produce benefits for his offspring. 
Ben Sira 26:26c 
Although Ben Sira frequently expresses negative judgments about women and 
their  deleterious  effects  on  men,  he  does  acknowledge  and  praise  the  benefits  of  a 
virtuous wife:  “…Happy is the husband of a good wife; for the number of his years will 
be  doubled.”  To  judge  from  the  surrounding  discourse,  which  primarily  focuses  on 
women who are social outcasts, the virtuous wife’s merits lie in her modesty and ability 
to bring honor to her husband (v. 26a-b). The man who marries a virtuous woman will 
ensure for himself longevity.  Ben Sira clearly envisions a great reward for the man wise 
enough to attach himself to a good woman, but the mechanism through which this reward 
is achieved is not explicit.  If Ben Sira’s advice is meant to be a practical observation of 
observed reality, it is not at all clear how a wife whose modesty and social graces bring 
her husband honor could also physically extend his life.  The sage’s wisdom may be 
considered hyperbolic and pedagogical.  Great benefits await the one who chooses his 
wife  wisely.    The  nature  of  this  reward  is  not  a  divine  gift  but  rather  the  natural 
consequence of close association with a person of good character. 
Ben Sira 37:12 
                                                        
317 Blenkinsopp, “The Social Context of the ‘Outsider Woman’ in Proverbs 1-9,” 461.   145 
  As in the previous two examples discussed, Ben Sira 37:12 acknowledges again 
the possibility of intragenerational accountability in which a group or individual prospers 
through association with one meritorious individual:  “Only associate with the one who is 
fearing continually, who you know keeps the commandments, who in his heart is like 
your heart.  If you stumble, he will strike you.” The Hebrew text preserves two textual 
variants for the final colon of this verse, one of which is supported by the Greek:  “If you 
stumble, he will suffer with you.”  The Hebrew reading does not unambiguously convey 
a notion of reward, but the point of both readings seems to be that a person can benefit in 
some way from associating with righteous, pious individuals.  As Di Lella notes, Ben 
Sira’s description of such a person implies that the pupil should surround himself with 
those who provide wise counsel.
318  Here the notion of collective accountability seems 
quite practical; if the student associates only with those who provide wise counsel, he 
will benefit from the application of sage advice to his own life.
319 
Ben Sira 44:8-13 
  In  his  Praise  of  the  Ancestors,  Ben  Sira  offers  several  insights  into  his 
understanding of collective reward.  He suggests that the descendants of righteous men 
will benefit because of their ancestors’ merits:    
(8) There are some of them who have left a name to gaze on their portion.  
(9)  There  are  some  of  them  for  whom  there  is  no  remembrance;  they 
ceased as though they never existed, along with their children after them.  
(10) However, these were men of loving kindness/mercy (hΩsd⋲), and their 
righteousness will not be cut off.  (11) With their seed their goodness 
(wealth) is trusted, and their inheritance is for their children’s children.  
(12) In their covenant their descendants stand, and their offspring, for their 
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319 This calls to mind the case of Rehoboam, which Ben Sira also recalls in 47:23.  The young king had 
access to wise counsel but chose instead to follow the advice of his peers, who lacked the wisdom of his 
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sake.  (13) Their seed will stand forever and their glory will not be wiped 
away. (Sir. 44:8-13) 
 
Although the identity of the men with no remembrance may be ambiguous,
320 the rewards 
awaiting  individuals  of  lovingkindness  are  great.    “Lovingkindness,”  hΩesed⋲,  is  a 
characteristic that YHWH uses to define his own character in Exodus 34:6-7.  As Exodus 
34:7 promises, YHWH keeps his hΩesed⋲, “lovingkindness” to the thousandth generation, 
or forever.  Likewise, as vv. 12-13 observe, God will keep his hΩesed⋲, “lovingkindness,” 
for  the  descendants  of  these  righteous  men  forever.      Fidelity  to  the  covenant  and 
emulation of a divine attribute ensure the continuance of one’s lineage.  
Ben Sira 44:17-22 
Noah is among the first named forefathers praised in Ben Sira’s hymn:   
(17) Noah was found righteous and perfect; in the time of destruction he 
was the continuation.  On account of him there was a remnant, and by his 
covenant, the flood ceased.  (18) An eternal sign was cut with him never to 
destroy all flesh. (Sir. 44:17-18) 
 
According to the sage, Noah’s righteousness produced the remnant from which all of 
humanity  descends.    All  humans  owe  their  existence  to  God’s  intergenerational 
rewarding of Noah’s righteousness, and they are protected against future catastrophic 
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devastation because of the intergenerational nature of the covenant formed between God 
and Noah. Abraham also produces intergenerational benefits for his descendants: 
(19) Abraham was the father of a multitude of nations, and none has been 
found like him in glory.  (20) He kept the law of the Most High and 
entered into a covenant with him.  With his flesh he made the covenant, 
and when he was tested, he was found faithful.  (21) Therefore, with the 
swearing  of  an  oath  he  assured  him  that  he  would  bless  the  nations 
through his seed, that they would inherit from sea to sea and from the 
Euphrates to the ends of the earth.  (22) Also to Isaac he assured (a son) 
for the sake of Abraham his father.  He has given him the covenant of all 
the ancestors. (Sir. 44:19-22) 
 
In addition to the Abrahamic blessing of the nations through Abraham’s seed, Isaac, also 
benefits for the sake of his father.  Ben Sira recounts historical episodes of collective 
reward  when  praising  the  forefathers.    Their  merits  continue  to  have  lasting  benefits 
hundreds of generations later, just as YHWH promises in Exodus 34:6-7.   
Ben Sira 47:22 
  In his presentation of Solomon’s kingship, Ben Sira notes the king’s changed 
fortunes.  Although he “overflowed like the Nile with understanding” in his youth (Sir. 
47:14), he later falls victim to activities characteristic of a fool: 
(19) But you gave your loins to women, and through your body you were 
ruled.  (20) You put a stain upon your honor and you stained your couch, 
so that you brought anger upon your offspring and sighing upon your bed. 
(21) Your kingdom became two tribes, and from Ephraim came a kingdom 
of violence. (Sir. 47:19-21) 
 
Although his kingdom is initially glorious, Solomon’s behavior is worthy of punishment, 
and so his kingdom is divided and his offspring now suffer.  Nevertheless, Ben Sira takes 
a long view of political history: 
But the Lord will not forsake his mercy, and he will not destroy any of his 
words, and he will not wipe out his chosen offspring, and the seed of one 
loving him he will not remove.  To Jacob he gave a remnant and to David  
one of his own root.  And Solomon rested with his fathers, and he left after   148 
him one of his seed, foolish and lacking in understanding, Rehoboam, who 
removed the people from his counsel. (Sir. 47:22) 
 
Solomon is indebted to God’s favoring of his father David for his own peaceful reign 
over a united monarchy despite his sins (Sir. 47:12).
321  Although Solomon’s offspring 
suffer on account of his love of foreign women, the Davidic line persists because of 
YHWH’s covenantal fidelity to Solomon’s father.
322 As he promised in Exodus 34:6-7 to 
Moses, YHWH will reward to the thousandth generation the offspring of the one who 
loves him, like David.  Likewise, although the Northern Kingdom will suffer on account 
of continual political upheaval in royal succession, the southern kingdom will have a 
remnant on account of YHWH’s promise to the eponymous ancestors of the kingdom. 
 
IV.  Rejection of Collective Punishment in Ben Sira 
Ben Sira 40:1 
  Ben Sira appeals to historical memory in ways that sometimes suggest a rejection 
of  the  concept  of  collective  accountability.    For  example,  the  sage  presents  the 
punishment incurred by Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden in a new manner:  “God 
apportioned hard work and a heavy yoke for the sons of Adam from the day of his 
coming out of his mother’s womb until the day of his return to the mother of all the 
living.”
323  According to Gen. 3:17-19, YHWH curses the ground so that Adam must 
                                                        
321 Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age, 104. 
 
322 According to Beentjes, Ben Sira denigrates Solomon’s leadership on the basis of the “Law of the King” 
in Deut. 17:14-20 in order to elevate the status of the Aaronide priesthood.  Pancratius C. Beentjes, “‘The 
Countries Marvelled at You’:  King Solomon in Ben Sira 47,12-22,” in “Happy the One Who Meditates on 
Wisdom” (Sir. 14:20):  Collected Essays on the Book of Ben Sira (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 142–143.    
 
323 The reference to the “mother of all the living” is an allusion to the etymology provided for Eve’s name 
in Gen. 3:20.   
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perform difficult labor all the days of his life in order to make the earth bear fruit for his 
consumption.  The story functions as an etiology that explains the origins of the human 
condition; because of Eve’s sin, all women suffer pain in childbirth (Gen 3:16); because 
of  Adam’s  sin,  all  humans  toil  laboriously  throughout  their  lives  to  cultivate  food.  
Although Ben Sira clearly alludes to this creation narrative,
324 he does not suggest that 
the  heavy  yoke  placed  upon  Adam’s  descendants  is  the  result  of  intergenerational 
punishment. Rather, he suggests that God apportioned hard labor for everyone as though 
this  decision  were  part  of  an  original  divine  plan  and  not  a  punitive  reaction  to  the 
exercise of human free will.
325  By ignoring the etiological implications of Gen. 2-3, Ben 
Sira  seems  to  reject  an  explanation  of  intergenerational  punishment  for  the  human 
condition.  Such a position could be explained by the fact that Exod. 34:6-7 (cf. the 
Decalogue) limits intergenerational divine retribution to only three to four generations, in 
contrast to divine reward, which lasts to the thousandth generation.  If the laborious 
nature of the human condition were attributed to punishment for the sin of Adam, God’s 
wrath would fail to be limited as other biblical sources suggest it is.  However, Ben Sira’s 
statement in 16:12, to be discussed below, militates against this interpretation. 
Ben Sira 16:7-12 
  In  another  example  of  historical  remembrance,  Ben  Sira  alludes  to  several 




324 Di Lella and Skehan, Wisdom of Ben Sira, 469. 
 
325 Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age, 59.  Smend, Die Weisheit des Jesus Sirach, 367. 
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(7) He did not forgive the princes of old, the ones rebelling in their might.  
(8) He did not pity the neighbors of Lot, who were angering him with their 
pride.    (9)  He  did  not  pity  the  nations  devoted  to  the  ban,  the  ones 
trampled because of their iniquity, (10) or the six hundred thousand foot 
soldiers gathered in the pride of their heart.  (11) Indeed, if there were one 
stiff-necked  person,  it  would  be  a  wonder  if  he  remained  unpunished 
(ynqh).    For  mercy  (rhΩmym)  and  wrath  are  with  him;  he  bears  [sin] 
(wnwsí}) and forgives, but on the wicked he pours out his anger.  (12) As 
great as his mercy, so is his reproof; he will judge each man according to 
his works.  (Sir. 16:7-12) 
 
This passage begins with an allusion to the enigmatic Nephilim mentioned in Gen. 6:4 
whose existence results from the fraternization of the sons of God with human women; it 
immediately precedes the notice that God perceives all of humanity, with the exception of 
Noah, to be wicked and deserving of annihilation through a flood.  As Ben Sira notes, 
God  did  not  show  them  mercy,  which  may  be  the  original  function  of  collective 
accountability  as  it  is  described  in  Exod.  34:6-7.
327    Rather,  God  exercised  mostly 
individual justice.  All of humanity was extinguished with the exception of one righteous 
man.  Of course, Noah’s family survives the deluge through collective reward, but this is 
a practical matter that explains the perpetuation of the human race and is not the focus of 
Ben Sira’s discussion.   
  Ben Sira’s reference to the people of Sodom and Gomorrah appeals to a case in 
which  YHWH  exercises  a  mix  of  collective  and  individual  punishment,  despite 
Abraham’s best efforts to compel “the judge of all the earth [to] do justice” (Gen. 18:25) 
and to “forgive the whole place for their [fifty righteous individuals’] sake” (Gen. 18:26).  
Although Abraham suggests that “justice” is pardoning the group for the sake of the 
individual,
328  YHWH’s  messengers  cannot  find  the  requisite  number  of  righteous 
                                                        
327 For an explanation of the merciful origins of collective punishment, see Chapter 3. 
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individuals on whose account the city can be spared.  God promises Abraham that he will 
execute  collective  justice  on  the  cities  of  Sodom  and  Gomorrah,  but  he  ultimately 
exercises a hybrid of collective and individual punishment.  On the side of collective 
accountability, Lot is spared even though his behavior in response to the divine warnings 
of impending doom is foolish.
329  While one might object that YHWH spares Lot because 
he  righteously  did  not  participate  in  the  acts  of  inhospitality  that  his  neighbors 
perpetrated, YHWH had already planned to destroy Lot along with his wicked neighbors, 
except in the event that he could find ten righteous individuals, which he obviously did 
not.  The text suggests that Lot is spared for Abraham’s sake (Gen. 19:29). Lot’s family 
is granted safe passage out of the doomed city because of their associations with Lot.  On 
the side of individual accountability, the wicked inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah, 
among whom God’s messengers could find no righteous men, suffer destruction.  Ben 
Sira’s  focus  is  not  on  the  fate  of  Lot  but  on  that  of  his  neighbors.    He  emphasizes 
individual accountability in his interpretation of a text that involves both individual and 
collective accountability. 
  Ben Sira’s reference to the six hundred thousand foot soldiers in 16:10 alludes to 
the Israelites themselves during their wilderness sojourn.  The sage recalls the numerous 
episodes of the people murmuring against God and his chosen leaders.  According to the 
various versions preserved in the biblical account, God punishes the entire community 
                                                        
 
329 Although Lot’s actions to welcome the strangers are commendable (Gen. 19:3), he also demonstrates 
foolish behavior (Gen. 19:16, 19, 33), and v. 29 notes that God spared Lot not because he was righteous but 
because  God  “remembered  Abraham.”    However,  later  traditions,  namely  2  Peter  2:7-8  and  Wis.  2:6, 
remember Lot as a righteous man.  Jubilees, however, suggests that God spares Lot for Abraham’s sake.  
Jubilees’ interpretation does not mention any righteousness on the part of Lot and describes the sin he 
committed with his daughters as the greatest sin on earth since the time of Adam. Jubilees 16:7-8.   152 
with  the  exceptions  of  Moses,  Aaron,  Joshua,  and  Caleb.
330    Moses  prevents  the 
destruction of the entire community with an intercessory prayer in Numb. 14:18 that 
recycles elements of Exod. 34:6-7.  Dozeman has argued that the author of Numbers is 
attempting to controvert the traditional notion that God punishes the group on account of 
the individual sinner.
331  Ben Sira’s interpretation of this episode here appears to agree 
with Dozeman’s interpretation of Numbers 14 because he remarks that no sinner will go 
unpunished  (Sir.  16:11).
332    Such  a  statement  appears  to  reject  the  notion  that  God 
rewards the group for the sake of the individual.   
 
V.  The Role of Wisdom Instruction for the Righteous and the Wicked in Ben Sira 
  As discussed in previous chapters, the effectiveness of wisdom instruction for 
enabling  a  child  to  reap  the  benefits  of  wisdom  and  righteousness  and  to  avoid  the 
dangers of folly and sin is an important factor to consider in understanding a sage’s 
conception of collective accountability.  To what extent are the children of the wicked 
destined to suffer the same fate as their parents and what power do they have to create a 
different life for themselves through the exercise of free will and wisdom? 
  The crucial passage for understanding Ben Sira’s view of free will is Sir. 15:14-
17, which seems to address the issue directly.  In response to the sinner who blames God 
                                                        
330 The various Pentateuchal sources preserve different traditions regarding whom God will spare.  God 
promises to spare only Moses in Exodus 32:10-14 on account of the Golden Calf and again in Numbers 
14:12.  Both Moses and Aaron are to be spared in Numb. 16:21, 45.  Caleb alone will be spared in Numb. 
14:23, and both Caleb and Joshua will be spared according to 14:30, 38. 
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for  his  wrongdoings  (Sir.  15:11-12;  cf.  Jas.  1:13-16),  the  sage  explains  that  humans 
choose their own actions:   
(14) God in the beginning created humankind and set him in the power of 
his own free choice.  (15) If you choose you can keep the commandment, 
and to act faithfully is his choice.  (16) He pours out before you fire and 
water,  from  which  you  will  choose  to  send  your  hand.    (17)  Before 
humankind are life and death, whichever he chooses will be given to him. 
(Sir. 15:14-17) 
 
These verses emphasize the power of human choice and, thus, suggest that humankind 
exercises free will.
333  The logical conclusion that one would draw from this passage 
alone is that if the children of the wicked suffer, they have their own actions and choices 
to blame for their situation. 
  Nevertheless, in reflecting on God’s creation of humankind, the sage suggests that 
something other than human free will controls their ultimate destinies:
334  “A vessel of 
clay, and from the dust was formed humankind.  The knowledge of the Lord separated 
them, and he set them to dwell on the earth and he changed their ways.  And some of 
them he blessed…and made them low…and expelled from their works” (Sir. 33:10-12). 
This passage contains an allusion to the Canaanites (“made them low”), and Ben Sira 
suggests  that  God  predetermined  their  fate.    According  to  the  biblical  account,  the 
Canaanites are not allotted a lowly position from the beginning of creation.  Rather, the 
actions of the father (Ham) of their eponymous ancestor (Canaan) results in Noah cursing 
Canaan:  “‘Cursed be Canaan.  Lowest of slaves will he be to his brothers’” (Gen. 9:25).  
Noah,  who  punishes  the  child  (Canaan)  for  his  father’s  (Ham’s)  sin,  does  not  make 
explicit that this curse is to extend to all Canaanites, but the etiological function of the 
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story suggests as much.
335  Whereas the account in Genesis explains the Canaanites’ 
status as the result of an intergenerational curse merited by sexual misconduct (Gen. 
9:22), Ben Sira omits any historical reason for it and instead proposes that their lowly 
status is part of a divine plan.  Other Second Temple interpretations of this story
336 are 
concerned to explain why Canaan should be cursed for his father’s sin.
337  Ben Sira is 
unique in resolving this issue by denying that the curse is the result of any human action 
at all.  The Canaanites are by their very creation lower in status than the Israelites. 
This  contrasts  with  an  earlier  comment  by  the  sage  that  human  pride  is  the 
impetus for God’s decision to elevate some while humbling others (Sir. 10:7-18).
338  The 
reader is left to wonder whether the Canaanites are to blame for their lowly status.  Could 
they have chosen, in Ben Sira’s worldview, to keep the commandments and thus reap the 
rewards of wisdom and righteousness?  Ben Sira allows context (God’s role in human sin 
in Sir. 15 and divine omnipotence in Sir. 33) to dictate his views on the tension between 
determinism  and  free  will.
339    Although  this  unresolved  tension  is  philosophically 
unsatisfying, it reflects the very tensions that prompted Israelites to question the notion of 
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collective accountability that appears in such prominent places as Exodus 34:6-7 and the 
Decalogue (Exod. 20:5-6; Deut. 5:9-10).   
If Muffs is correct that the original purpose of collective accountability, in terms 
both of reward and of punishment, is merciful,
340 then this form of divine retribution only 
appears merciful or fair from one perspective, that of the sinner.  From the perspective of 
the righteous individual who suffers on account of others, collective accountability is 
neither fair nor merciful.  For Israel’s sages, suggesting that the pupil lacks any power to 
avoid the consequences of sin, or the sin of another, would undermine the very goal of 
wisdom literature.  So, with respect to the issue of collective accountability, Ben Sira 
embraces human free will when the power to control one’s own fate can empower the 
child of a sinner to choose wisdom over folly, but when his concern is to discourage a 
father  from  wicked  behavior,  determinism  and  its  consequences  for  collective 
accountability are effective threats. 
  Like  other  sages  examined  so  far,  Ben  Sira  presents  a  mixed  picture  on  the 
character of the wicked and their children.  In his discussion on the children of sinners 
(41:5-10), the sage suggests that the offspring of an apostate father will not be a blessing 
to their father, as children were generally considered to be, but rather will be a curse (Sir. 
41:9).  Ben Sira seems to promote the familiar adage that like begets like:  “Everything 
from the end returns to the end.  Thus the ungodly go from chaos to chaos” (Sir. 41:10). 
Sinners beget detestable children who deserve punishment themselves.   
  Similarly, Ben Sira suggests that a wise and virtuous father will produce a son 
like himself.  In Sir. 30:1-13, the sage advises that a good father should discipline his son 
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with physical rebuke, and these actions will produce an offspring worthy of praise and 
boasting, so much so that “When the father dies, it will be as if he did not die.  For he has 
left behind a son who is like himself” (v. 4; cf. Tob. 9:6).
341  A father could achieve 
immortality through properly disciplining his son and thus avoid having his posterity cut 
off; in this way the father would abide by the conventional wisdom that spoiling a child 
will produce shame and sorrow.
342 
  Despite the advice to train one’s child properly so that the wise parent can reap 
the benefits of producing a child like oneself, Ben Sira also seems to acknowledge that a 
good  father  can  produce  children  who  are  not  like  himself.    For  example,  the  sage 
counsels his students,  
(1) Do not desire the form of children of emptiness, and do not rejoice in 
sons of iniquity.  (2) Even if they multiply, do not rejoice in them if the 
fear of the Lord is not in them.  (3) Do not trust in their lives or rely on 
their footprints, for there will not be for them a good end.  For one making 
favor is better than a thousand, and to die childless is better than to have 
many children of iniquity.  (4) Through a childless one with the fear of 
God a city can dwell, but through families acting treacherously it becomes 
wasted. (Sir. 16:1-4) 
 
Not all children, even perhaps for the righteous, are a blessing that will provide their 
father with immortality.  All people are not equally capable of appreciating and practicing 
wisdom.    As  Ben  Sira  notes,  “The  one  teaching  a  fool  is  like  one  gluing  together 
potsherds or one waking a sleeping person from a deep sleep” (Sir. 22:9).  Trying to 
impart wisdom to a fool is futile (cf. Prov. 1:7; 27:22).
343  Wisdom, it would appear, does 
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not have the power to benefit everyone.  Ben Sira’s saying, “For not everything is good 
for everyone, for not everyone delights in everything.  Not every soul chooses every 
kind” (Sir. 37:28), may be relevant here as well. 
  Despite the possibility that wisdom instruction may not benefit every child, Ben 
Sira nonetheless warns his students: “The shame of a father is in uneducated offspring; a 
daughter is born as a defect.  A wise daughter will inherit her own husband, and the one 
who acts shamefully is a grief to the one who begot her.  An insolent woman shames 
father  and  husband  and  dishonors  both”  (Sir.  22:3-5;  cf.  22:8).
344  When  a  child—
presumably  either  male  or  female,  but  here  Ben  Sira  focuses  on  the  female—acts 
disgracefully, she brings grief and shame to her father because her actions make evident 
that  he  has  not  successfully  educated  and  disciplined  her.
345    In  his  Praise  of  the 
Ancestors, Ben Sira draws attention to the fact that Solomon’s son Rehoboam is “foolish 
and  lacking  in  understanding”  (Sir.  47:23).    Although  Solomon  is  celebrated  for  his 
wisdom, he produces a child who lacks it, and this situation, for Ben Sira, likely reflects 
poorly  on  the  status  of  the  monarch.    Both  Solomon  and  Rehoboam  differ  from  the 
founder of their monarchy, King David.  Ben Sira suggests in 47:22 that despite the 
shortcomings of Solomon and his offspring, YHWH’s faithfulness to David persists; in 
the case of the Davidic line, intergenerational reward appears to skip generations and fall 
only on those descendants who are deserving of divine favor.  Sinful descendants of 
David benefit only from not being destroyed for David’s sake. 
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VI.  Summary of Findings in Ben Sira 
  The  preceding  discussion  of  collective  accountability  has  observed  both 
continuities and innovations, with respect both to the other wisdom literature examined 
so far and to the Hebrew Bible more generally.  Ben Sira’s treatment of intergenerational 
punishment yields explanations similar to those found in the other wisdom books.  For 
example,  the  notion  that  the  children  of  the  wicked  do  not  prosper  often  functions 
pedagogically. It can also comfort the righteous individual grappling with the ostensibly 
unjust  situation  of  a  wicked  individual  producing  numerous  offspring,  which  are 
generally regarded as blessings in ancient Israel (i.e. Sir. 40:15). Additionally, the notion 
can  also  discourage  the  pupil,  who  desires  to  preserve  his  lineage  and  only  hope  of 
immortality in an ephemeral world, from rejecting wisdom and choosing evil (i.e., Sir. 
23:24-27, 41:5-10).  Likewise, collective reward at times also functions pedagogically to 
encourage  behavior  that  comports  with  the  sage’s  priorities.    For  example,  Ben  Sira 
advises his students that endogamy will produce rewards for their offspring (Sir. 26:19-
21).    This  advice  is  both  pedagogical  and  pragmatic  since  the  sage’s  goal  is 
enculturation,
346  and  he  cannot  succeed  in  this  task  if  the  child’s  parents  hail  from 
different cultures with different values that they both wish to inculcate in their shared 
offspring. 
  In  addition  to  at  times  being  pragmatic,  Ben  Sira’s  comments  on  collective 
accountability often appear to be rooted in experience.  For example, the claim that the 
offspring of the adulteress are cut off and suffer like their mother (Sir. 23:24-27) may 
reflect the historical legal practice of excluding illegitimate children from the community. 
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If God plays a role in the punishment of the children of an adulteress, Ben Sira does not 
make this explicit.  As creator of the universe and the progenitor of Israelite law, the sage 
may  have  considered  intergenerational  consequences  to  be  divine  will,  but  he  rarely 
points directly to God’s role in executing intergenerational punishment.  However, in the 
case of intergenerational reward, such as the continuation of the Davidic line despite the 
missteps of Solomon and Rehoboam (Sir. 47:18-23), Ben Sira does directly attribute the 
intergenerational  consequences  to  God  directly.    While  both  divinely  administered 
consequences and those that result from the act-consequence model derive from God 
ultimately, the sage strongly favors the latter in his descriptions of deeds that produce 
consequences for the families and associates of the individual performing the deed.  For 
Ben Sira, who is likely responding to Qoheleth’s subversion of traditional notions of 
retribution,
347 the suffering and prospering of those related to sinners and do-gooders, 
respectively,  fits  into  a  consistent  act-consequence  system  of  retribution.    Critics  of 
traditional  wisdom  teachings,  like  Qoheleth,  observed  that  God  does  not  consistently 
reward the righteous and punish the wicked; Ben Sira points out to his students that the 
natural consequences of an individual’s actions can affect those around him (i.e., Sir. 3:9, 
22:13, 23:24-27, etc.).  God’s direct role in bringing about these consequences may not 
be  observable,  but  reality  nevertheless  confirms  the  lesson  taught  by  generations  of 
wisdom teachers about the existence of an orderly schema of retribution.  
  A  woman’s  role  in  providing  benefits  or  curses  to  her  family  and  offspring 
appears repeatedly in Proverbs (Prov. 12:4, 13:20, 14:1, 31:10-31), and Ben Sira expands 
upon this line of thinking.  He notes that a mother’s curse can lead to the end of one’s 
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lineage  (Sir.  3:9b),  and  thus  encourages  careful  wife  selection  with  the  promise  of 
doubling the life of a good wife’s husband (Sir. 25:24).  Although possibly not original to 
Ben Sira himself, the notion that woman is the source of sin and death, a likely reference 
to Eve, suggests that at least one case of sinning led to punishment that lasted forever and 
was not limited to only three or four generations.
348   
In addition to his wife, any member of a man’s family can produce collective 
consequences for the father and his family.  Properly trained children preserve a father’s 
lineage and bring him great pride, whereas an undisciplined child will cause his parents 
grief (Sir. 30:1-13; cf. 22:8).  Thus, intergenerational punishment operates bidirectionally 
for Ben Sira, just as it does for other sages and Israelite lawmakers (Deut. 21:18-21). 
More  than  any  other  sage,  Ben  Sira  considers  the  phenomenon  of 
intragenerational accountability.  Association with fools produces negative consequences.  
The  sage’s  advice  on  this  topic  largely  appears  to  be  pragmatic  and  not  directly 
attributable to divine will (i.e. Sir. 22:13, 37:12).  Nevertheless, some vestigial notion of 
the contagious nature of sin like that found in Joshua 7 may form part of the sage’s 
understanding of this concept. 
  Historical considerations and forces play a strong role in Ben Sira’s conception of 
collective  accountability.    For  example,  his  rejection  of  Solomon  and  claim  that  a 
remnant  will  persist  for  David’s  sake  may  betray  his  desire  to  elevate  the  Aaronide 
priesthood of his time (see Sir. 45:6-22 and 50, especially vv. 13-16, for the sage’s vision 
of the prominence of Aaron’s descendants).  In several cases in which Ben Sira appeals to 
historical  examples  to  make  his  point,  he  seems  to  make  an  implicit  rejection  of 
                                                        
348 Cf. Sir. 16:12.   161 
collective punishment.  For example, he does not describe the yoke placed on Adam and 
his descendants as a punishment (Sir. 40:1).  He also singles out several examples of 
group  punishments  in  which  a  single  righteous  individual  is  spared  (Sir.  16:7-11).  
Although this would seem to suggest that God does not reward the group for the sake of 
the righteous individual, other examples, like the remembrance of figures like Noah and 
Abraham (Sir. 44:17-22), suggest that future generations can benefit from their righteous 
ancestors. 
With  respect  to  the  ability  of  the  sinner’s  offspring  to  avoid  the  negative 
consequences of his parent’s actions, Ben Sira presents a mixed picture, much like other 
sages.  For Ben Sira, humans have free will (15:14-17), but the child does not always 
appear to have the power to change his fate from that of his parents (i.e. 41:5-10).   
As James Crenshaw has noted, theodicy was a primary concern for Ben Sira.  Ben 
Sira employs the debate formula (}al-toœ}mar, “Do not say…”) to refute arguments put 
forth by other sages (for example, Sir. 5:3-7) concerning the nature of God’s justice.
349  
According to Crenshaw, “While we cannot identify these antagonists, we can discern the 
basic thrust of their attack.  In essence they argue that God’s boundless mercy bestows 
upon his devotees license to sin, that his blessings in material wealth give security, that 
his power robs man of the freedom to act decisively to avoid sinful conduct, and that his 
blindness makes evil profitable, especially when the perfidious deed can be concealed 
from  humans  eyes  as  well.”
350    The  tension  between  God’s  merciful  and  punishing 
                                                        
349  James  L.  Crenshaw,  “Problem  of  Theodicy  in  Sirach:  On  Human  Bondage,”  Journal  of  Biblical 
Literature 94 (1975): 47.   
350 Ibid. 
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natures lies at the heart of Ben Sira’s theological conundrum,
351 and this same tension has 
great relevance to the biblical notion of collective accountability in which God metes out 
mercy by punishing the children of sinners to only the third or fourth generation while 
rewarding the children of the righteous to the thousandth generation (Exod. 34:6-7).  The 
sage must, then, interact on some level with biblical notions of collective accountability.  
In 16:12-14, he asserts: “As great as his mercy, so is his reproof.  He judges a man 
according to his deeds.  The unjust will not escape with plunder, and the hope
352 of the 
righteous will never cease.  For everyone doing righteousness there are wages, and every 
man goes out before him according to his deeds.” Here Ben Sira suggests a notion of 
individual accountability in which justice is fairly executed based on individual merits.
353   
Furthermore, he alters the notion of mercy found in the divine attribute formula in 
Exodus 34:6-7.  Whereas God’s mercy far exceeds his vengeance in Exod. 34:6-7, Ben 
Sira suggests that the two are equal.  He reminds his students:  “Do not enroll in the ranks 
of  sinners;  remember  that  retribution  will  not  skip  over”  (Sir.  7:16).    The  Greek 
translation of yit◊{abbeœr, “skip over,” reads chroniei, “delay.”  In either case, the statement 
seems to relate to notions of intergenerational punishment in which the punishment is 
thought to pass from the sinner on to his children or to be delayed until the sinner’s 
children can bear the burden of the punishment. 
                                                        
351  According  to  Beentjes,  the  fact  that  text-critical  issues  plague  numerous  passages  in  Ben  Sira  that 
contain the Hebrew root r-hΩ-m, “mercy,” suggests that the theological issue was not only divisive for Ben 
Sira and the sages with whom he was engaging, but also for the scribes who copied and transmitted this 
text.  Pancratius Cornelis Beentjes, “God’s Mercy: ‘Racham’ (pi.), ‘Rachum’, and ‘Rachamim’ in the Book 
of Ben Sira,” in “Happy the One Who Meditates on Wisdom” (Sir. 14,20): Collected Essays on the Book of 
Ben Sira (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2006), 244. 
 
352 Emended from ta}∞wat◊, “desire,” to tiqwat◊, “hope” on the basis of the Greek.  Di Lella and Skehan, 
Wisdom of Ben Sira, 270, 274. 
 
353 Ibid., 274.   163 
Two trends occur in Ben Sira that are relevant for understanding the diachronic 
developments that emerge within Israel’s biblical wisdom tradition and its treatment of 
collective accountability.  Firstly, Ben Sira engages with philosophical traditions from 
neighboring cultures to a far greater extent than his predecessors.  Although the sage does 
not accept notions of judgment after death or an eternal soul, he seems to set the stage for 
the great shift that will appear in the Wisdom of Solomon with respect to this issue.  
Secondly, Ben Sira incorporates biblical references and allusions into his teachings in a 
manner  and  to  an  extent  not  previously  seen  in  the  biblical  wisdom  corpus.    His 
engagement  with  the  writings  of  the  Hebrew  Bible  introduces  reflections  on  and 
rewritings of historical examples of collective accountability to the wisdom tradition.  













Chapter Six:  Collective Accountability in the Wisdom of Solomon 
 
I. Introduction 
  The Wisdom of Solomon, a Greek work likely composed in Alexandria in the first 
century CE,
354 addresses an audience that identifies with the children of Israel.
355  For 
example, the sage recalls in Wis. 12:21 that God gave “oaths and covenants full of good 
promises” to his ancestors and to the ancestors of his students.  Though separated from 
these  ancestors  by  centuries,  the  sage  believes  his  community  to  be  the  continued 
recipient of those promises.  Collective thinking underlies the sage’s understanding of 
himself and his community as well as his understanding of God, whom he believes to 
have a special relationship with his community (for example, Wis. 12:20-22) because of 
its ancestry. 
This chapter will examine the use of collective accountability in the Wisdom of 
Solomon.  First it will consider the verses related to collective punishment (II) and then 
those related to collective reward (III).  Next, it will consider examples in which the sage 
rejects  collective  accountability  (IV).    Then  it  will  focus  on  the  sage’s  positions  on 
human free will and divine determinism so as to determine whether or not the sage holds 
out any hope for the children of the wicked to reverse the fate brought upon them by their 
sinful parents (V).  This chapter will conclude with a summary of its findings (VI). 
 
II.  Collective Punishment in the Wisdom of Solomon 
                                                        
354  David  Winston,  The  Wisdom  of  Solomon:    A  New  Translation  with  Introduction  and  Commentary 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1979), 20–25.  Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age, 178–179. 
 
355 It should, however, be noted that the sage identifies his audience as rulers, kings, and judges of the earth 
(Wis. 1:1, 6:1ff).   165 
Wisdom of Solomon 3:12-19 
According to the Wisdom of Solomon, the ungodly suffer punishment for their 
failings (Wis. 3:10).  All their labors are in vain (3:11), and even producing children 
seems to offer them no benefit because their families are evil and accursed:  “Their wives 
are  foolish  and  their  children  wicked;  cursed  are  their  offspring”  (Wis.  3:12). 
Traditionally, ancient Israelites regarded the father of many children as the recipient of 
divine favor:  “Sons are an inheritance from YHWH, the fruit of the womb a reward” (Ps. 
127: 3, cf. v. 5).
356   
Wis. 3:12-13, however, contrasts the fates of the doomed family of the wicked 
with the incorporeal benefits that await a righteous woman without children: “For blessed 
is the barren woman who is undefiled, who has not known a bed in trespass; she will have 
fruit in the examination of the soul” (3:13).
357  The fruit in question here is not offspring 
but rather virtues, like wisdom, which will benefit the women in the final judgment.  The 
comparison  suggests  that  the  sage  is  addressing  a  difficult  problem  for  the  righteous 
members  of  his  community,  a  problem  that  recurs  as  a  motif  in  numerous  biblical 
narratives  about  the  mothers  of  Israel’s  great  heroes  (for  example,  Sarah,  Rebekah, 
Rachel, Hannah, etc.).
358  Like the concern of other sages for vindicating theodicy, Wis. 
must address observed reality, which sometimes seems to contradict the notion of justice 
                                                        
356 Ernest G Clarke, The Wisdom of Solomon, The Cambridge Bible Commentary: New English Bible 
(Cambridge [Eng.]: University Press, 1973), 33. 
 
357 The notion that good deeds can help the righteous individual to bear fruit preferable to children also 
appears in the rabbinic tradition.  Ibid., 33–34.  Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 132. 
 
358  Hans  Hübner,  Die  Weisheit  Salomos:  Liber  Sapientiae  Salomonis,  Alte  Testament  Deutsch  Bd.  4 
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whereby  God  rewards  the  righteous  with  an  abundance  of  children  but  punishes  the 
wicked with barrenness (cf. Ps. 37:28).
359   
In agreement with Wis., Job’s comforters and Ben Sira offer the solution that the 
children of the wicked suffer and do not prosper on account of their father’s wrongdoings 
(Job 18:15-21; Sir. 15:34-35, 40:15).  By contrast, however, the earlier sages assure their 
audiences that the righteous will be rewarded with numerous and prosperous descendants 
(Job 5:24-25; Sir. 3:8-9).  The Wisdom of Solomon does not guarantee the eventual 
reward of children to the righteous, but rather assures the barren woman that she need not 
worry about trying to attain immortality through her lineage because of her eternal soul, 
which will fare well in the final judgment.
360  Despite the continuity of message with 
earlier wisdom writings, Wisdom’s innovative solution demonstrates development in the 
wisdom tradition’s understanding of death and immortality.   
The use of the image of “fruit” recalls the plant imagery so often used to depict 
how the children of the wicked are cut off (for example, Job 5:3, 15:30-33, 18:16; Sir. 
3:9, 23:24-27).  Plant imagery resurfaces in 3:15 in connection with the barren woman 
and the eunuch because they are righteous.  The righteous woman incapable of bearing 
the  metaphorical  fruit  that  frequently  refers  to  children,  will  bear  a  different  kind  of 
metaphorical fruit, namely, virtues like wisdom that will protect her immortal soul from 
becoming defiled.  Likewise, the righteous eunuch who cannot reproduce will also bear 
                                                        
359 Lester L Grabbe, Wisdom of Solomon, Guides to Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha (Sheffield, England: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 49. 
 
360  Otto  Kaiser,  Die  Weisheit  Salomos:  Übersetzt,  eingeleitet  und  durch  biblische  und  ausserbiblische 
Parallelen erläutert (Stuttgart: Radius, 2010), 57–58. 
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“fruit,” even if that fruit does not metaphorically refer to children (Wis. 3:14).
361  The 
author  of  Wis.  has  replaced  a  successful  lineage  with  an  eternal  soul  as  ephemeral 
humanity’s hope for immortality (for Wisdom’s perspective on immortality, see Wis. 3:4; 
8:13, 17; 15:3).
362  Centuries of shifting attitudes and the growth of apocalyptic notions 
likely contributed to the sage’s ability to draw on an idea rejected by earlier sages, like 
Qoheleth and Ben Sira (Eccl. 3:18-22; Sir. 40:1-41:13).
363  In addition to this, the author 
of Wis. has knowledge of Greek notions of the immortal soul, like Plato’s idea of the 
preexistent  soul  (cf.  Wis.  8:19-20),  that  do  not  appear  to  have  been  familiar  to  Ben 
Sira.
364  Moreover, whereas the sage’s forebears in the biblical wisdom tradition had 
rejected  the  notion  of  an  afterlife  (for  example,  Eccl.  9:5),  the  Wisdom  of  Solomon 
criticizes those who illogically reason that life ends when the physical body dies (Wis. 
2:1-5).  
The  Wisdom  of  Solomon’s  forebears  did  not  appeal  to  notions  about  the 
immortality  of  the  soul  to  vindicate  theodicy,  although  they  were  likely  aware  of 
arguments  in  favor  of  divine  judgment  after  death.
365    Eliphaz  assures  Job  that  God 
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362 The existence of a shift in the understanding of immortality as something attained by a community to 
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punishes  the  wicked  by  cursing  their  children  (Job  5:3-5,  cf.  8:22)  and  blesses  the 
righteous  with  abundant  offspring  (Job  5:24-25).    Job,  however,  does  not  find  these 
traditional arguments convincing.  He objects that the wicked are blessed with abundant 
offspring who live in prosperity and peace (Job 12:6a; 21:7-3).  It seems unlikely that Job 
would have found satisfaction in Wisdom’s solution since he rejects the notion of human 
immortality (Job 14), but Wisdom’s new proposal nevertheless demonstrates an attempt 
to explain why observed reality does not always match the sage’s advice.  
Wis. 3:12 presents the children of the wicked as wicked themselves.
366  In Wis. 
3:13, the barren woman, who will bear fruit in her final judgment, “has not known a bed 
in trespass.”  In contrast to the sexual morality of the barren women, vv. 16-19 deal 
specifically with the children produced through adultery: “But the children of adulterers 
will not reach maturity, and offspring from an illicit bed will perish.  For even if they are 
long-lived, as nobody they will be counted, and finally in their old age they will be 
dishonored.    If  they  die  quickly,  they  will  not  have  hope  or  comfort  on  the  day  of 
judgment.  For the end of an unrighteous generation is harsh.”  The children of adulterers 
are  evil  because  of  the  immorality  of  the  act  that  created  them.
367  The  children  are 
accused of no other crime, yet they live under a curse.  In this case, like begets like (cf. 4 
Ezra 9:17) inasmuch as an act of sin produced a sinner.  Although the children did not, of 
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course, choose to be born to sinners, their fate appears fair to the sage because they are 
wicked like their parents. 
 The notion that children produced through an adulterous affair will suffer for 
their parents’ wrongdoing also occurs in Sir. 23:24-27.  In both passages, the children of 
adulterers do not reproduce or leave any persisting legacy.  Both sages understand that 
such illicitly produced children will endure disgrace.  In spite of their affirmations that 
such children will perish, both sages also address the possibility that the adulteress’s 
lineage might not disappear completely or immediately.  Ben Sira suggests that any child 
that does not perish will understand from his dishonor that observance of divine law 
could have prevented his suffering (Sir. 24:27).  In the Wisdom of Solomon, however, the 
sage does not necessarily distinguish between immediate death and delayed death for the 
child of adulterers.  In either case, the child’s end is final and there is no hope for his 
soul.  Whether death comes quickly or not only determines the amount of time spent 
suffering. 
Because the rewards promised to the barren woman and to the eunuch come from 
God, one is inclined to understand the fate of the children as divinely determined.  The 
text,  however,  does  not  make  this  explicit.  Given  the  passage’s  context  within  a 
discussion of theodicy, it seems probable that the sage understands the fate that befalls 
the children of adulterers to be a part of divine justice, and thus perceives some divine 
role, even if indirect, in this example of intergenerational punishment.
368  Very likely the 
shame suffered by the children of adulterers was observed reality for the sage, and their 
failure to prosper the natural result of the punishment inflicted upon their parents by the 
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human justice system and societal norms.  The observation of natural consequences and 
the operation of divine causality are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
Wisdom of Solomon 4:3-6 
Using  plant  imagery  familiar  from  both  Job  and  Ben  Sira,
369  Wis.  4:3-6  also 
assures those who witness the wicked producing an abundance of children that this is not 
evidence of divine blessing:   
(3) The fertile abundance of the ungodly will not be profitable, and none 
of their illegitimate seedlings will produce a root with depth or settle in a 
safe foundation.  (4) For even if he sprouted with branches for a while, 
standing insecurely, they will be shaken by the wind, and by the violence 
of the wind they will be uprooted.  (5) Their branches will be broken off 
while still immature, and their fruit will be worthless, not ripe for eating, 
and useless to everyone.  (6) For children begotten through lawless sleep 
are witnesses of wickedness against their parents in their trial. 
 
The sage metaphorically suggests that no lasting benefit will come to an ungodly person 
who begets children because they will also suffer ill fates on account of their parents’ 
actions.  This position contradicts the popular notion that children are a divine reward.  
Although they serve no beneficial purpose for their parents, children produced through 
unlawful sexual relationships will provide them with one crucial disservice; they will 
serve  as  evidence  against  their  parents  when  God  judges  them  (v.  6).
370    As  in  the 
references to intergenerational punishment in 3:12-13 and 3:16-19, this passage validates 
theodicy.  So, although God remains unmentioned, the act-consequence system of the 
divinely created universe is just, according to this sage. 
Wisdom of Solomon 18:5 
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In Wisdom 18:5, the sage recalls the Pharaoh’s plan to annihilate all the male 
Hebrew babies and the divine punishment of the Egyptians through the Passover:  “When 
they had planned to kill the children of your holy ones, and one child had been exposed 
and saved, as reproof you took away the multitude of their children, and you destroyed 
them  of  one  accord  with  violent  water”  (cf.  Wis.  11:7).
371    The  sage  readily 
acknowledges that God punished children for the wrongdoings of their parents, in this 
case the Egyptians who obeyed Pharaoh’s command to throw male Hebrew babies into 
the Nile (Exod. 1:22).  Given the context of the Passover, which freed the Israelites from 
the yoke of slavery, the sage praises God for punishing innocent children.   
However, the sage has a specific motive for this method of punishment in mind, 
and  it  does  not  originate  in  God’s  character  as  intergenerational  punishment  does 
elsewhere (i.e. Exod. 34:6-7):  “For in the same way by which you punished our enemies, 
summoning us you glorified us” (Wis. 18:8).  God punishes the Egyptians with the death 
of their children, which was the very offense that they had committed against God and 
the  Israelites.
372    By  comparison,  the  sage  also  notes  that  God  used  animals  in  the 
wilderness to punish the wandering Israelites, who themselves had sinned by worshipping 
animals (Wis. 11:15), “so that they might know that by the things by which one sins he is 
punished” (Wis. 11:16).  In other words, the author of Wisdom has observed that, in 
accordance with the principle of lex talionis, one’s punishment resembles one’s crime.
373  
Prov. 17:13 recognizes this same principle in the act-consequence model that governs the 
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universe: “As for the one returning evil for good, evil will not depart from his house” (cf. 
Josh. 7:25).
374  Rather than understanding the punishment of children to reflect God’s 
character as revealed in Exodus 34:6-7, the sage attributes this form of punishment to his 
understanding of divine retribution as taking on the form of the sin being punished. 
Whereas  Proverbs  17:13  relies  upon  vague  language  to  describe  the  act-
consequence model that causes a sinner to suffer in a manner similar to the suffering he 
inflicted on others, Wis. appeals to an historical example.  Although Ben Sira also made 
use of historical examples, Wisdom’s use of them is not entirely parallel.  Whereas Ben 
Sira  often  transforms  historical  examples  of  collective  accountability  into  cases  of 
individual  punishment,  Wis.  18:5  refers  to  a  prominent  historical  example  of  divine 
punishment of children for the sins of their parents.  Interestingly, the punished children 
and their parents are Egyptians and do not have a covenantal relationship with God.
375  
Wisdom of Solomon 18:20 
  The sage contrasts the plague of the firstborn sons of Egypt with a plague that 
threatened the Israelites in the dessert following Korah’s rebellion (Numb. 16:46).  As 
Wis. recounts the story, it notes the intragenerational nature of the punishment:  “The 
experience of death touched the righteous also, and a plague came upon the multitude in 
the desert, but the wrath did not stay long” (Wis. 18:20).   The narrative in Numbers 16 
suggests that the entire Israelite congregation participated in the rebellion against Aaron 
and Moses that caused YHWH to punish the community with a plague (Numb. 16:41).  
Despite the appearance that all of the Israelites are guilty, the sage suggests that some of 
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those afflicted by the plague were righteous, or, in other words, innocent sufferers being 
punished for the actions of a subset of their group.  Wis. appears to revise history ever so 
slightly to suggest that God exercised intragenerational punishment in an historical event 
that  otherwise  appears  to  have  involved  individual  punishment,  albeit  of  an  entire 
community. 
  This  example  of  intragenerational  punishment  asserts  more  strongly  than  the 
example of intragenerational punishment found in Sir. 22:13 (“Do not multiply words 
with a fool and do not go to the one without understanding.  Guard yourself from him lest 
you have trouble, and do not be defiled when he shakes himself off.  Turn away from him 
and you will find rest and you will not be grieved by his madness”)
376 the notion of 
collective punishment as contagious wrath that spreads beyond the boundaries of the 
wicked to affect those near them.  In contrast to Sir. 22:13, the sage here seems to see this 
not as a natural consequence of human actions but rather as a consequence of divine 
wrath.  The divergence may owe to the fact that Wis. is dependent upon an historical 
narrative for its example of intragenerational punishment, whereas Sir. 22:13 draws not 
upon history, but rather personal experience. 
 
III.  Collective Reward in the Wisdom of Solomon  
Wisdom of Solomon 18:21-25 
  In the last example of collective punishment examined above (Wis. 18:20), the 
sage recalls an episode from Israel’s journey through the wilderness.  The divine wrath 
                                                        
376 This verse is not extant in Hebrew.  See Chapter 5 for a full discussion of it.   174 
that produced this intragenerational punishment does not last long, according to the sage, 
because of human intercession: 
(21) For a blameless man hastened to serve as a champion; he brought the 
shield of his ministry, prayer and propitiation by incense; he opposed the 
anger and put an end to the calamity, showing that he was your servant.  
(22)  He conquered the wrath not by strength of body, not by action of 
weapons, but by his word he subdued the punisher, by reminding him of 
the oaths and covenants given to our ancestors.  (23)  For as the dead had 
already fallen on one another in heaps, he meanwhile stood and drove 
back the wrath, and cut off its way to the living. (24)  For on his long robe 
was the whole world, and the glories of the fathers were on four rows of 
carved stones, and your majesty was on the crown on his head.  (25) From 
these the destroyer withdrew; these he feared; for a test only of wrath was 
sufficient.  (Wis. 18:21-25) 
 
The reference, of course, is to Aaron’s cultic efforts to stop the plague in Numbers 16.
377  
In its original context following Korah’s rebellion, in which several Israelites challenge 
Moses and Aaron’s control of divine communications, the episode proves that God has 
chosen Aaron and his descendants to control the cult.  In describing Aaron as “blameless” 
(Wis. 18:21), the sage ignores the priest’s role in the Golden Calf incident, his most 
egregious sin among other shortcomings.
378  The effect of this effort to sweep Aaron’s 
sins under the rug is that the priest’s righteousness, rather than simply his cultic actions or 
chosenness, becomes a factor in his ability to turn back God’s wrath.  This would seem to 
suggest that the sage understands Aaron’s intercession as a form of intragenerational 
reward in which the deeds of the righteous result in mercy for sinners.   
In  v.  22,  the  sage  explicitly  credits  Aaron’s  words,  a  reminder  about  God’s 
covenants with the ancestors, with stopping the spread of divine wrath.  This version of 
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Auslegung des Buches Genesis, Exodus 1-15 und Teilen der Wüstentradition in Sap 10-19 (Frankfurt am 
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378 The characterization of ancient Israel’s first high priest, Aaron, as blameless may owe to his role in the 
Day of Atonement.  McGlynn, Divine Judgement and Divine Benevolence in the Book of Wisdom, 210.   175 
events does not agree with the depiction of Aaron’s intercession in Numbers 16.  The 
biblical  account  mentions  Aaron’s  manipulating  incense,  making  atonement,  and 
standing between the dead and the living (Numb. 16:47-48).  The narrator mentions no 
speech at all by Aaron, let alone a specific invocation of a divine covenant with his 
ancestors.  Why, then, does Wis. offer this explanation for Aaron’s successful termination 
of the plague? 
The  story  of  Aaron’s  intercession  in  the  Pentateuch  is  the  culmination  of  a 
succession of intercession stories that involve Moses and/or Aaron.  In Exodus 32-34, 
Aaron leads the Israelites into sin by creating a golden calf for the people to worship, and 
this provokes YHWH’s anger so that he plans to destroy the Israelites and to create a new 
nation from Moses alone.  Moses intercedes by appealing to YHWH’s reputation among 
the  nations  and  promises  to  the  Israelites’  forefathers  (Exod.  32:12-13).    During  this 
episode, the Levites earn for themselves a special place in the service of YHWH (32:29).  
A rebellion against Moses in Numbers 14 results in another divine attempt to 
destroy the Israelites and to create a new nation with Moses.  Moses again offers an 
intercessory prayer.  Moses points out the negative effect that such a plan would have on 
YHWH’s honor among the nations (Numb. 14:11ff), and YHWH relents from his plan.   
Following  the  presentation  of  legal  materials  designed  to  prevent  innocent 
communities  from  suffering  the  effects  of  contagious  divine  wrath  provoked  by  an 
individual’s unintentional sin (Numbers 15), the next opportunity for YHWH to resolve 
to  destroy  all  Israel  occurs  in  Numbers  16  when  several  Israelites  lead  a  group  in 
protesting  against  Moses  and  Aaron’s  leadership.    Their  complaint  is  that  since  all 
Israelites are holy, then they should all have equal access to divine interaction, especially   176 
those interactions achieved through cultic means.  The rebels challenge Aaron and Moses 
to a cultic contest; when the rebels lose and Moses and Aaron are vindicated, YHWH 
resolves to destroy the entire population except Moses and Aaron (Numb. 16:20-21).  
Moses and Aaron intercede:  “They fell on their faces and said, “O God, the God the 
spirits  of  all  flesh,  shall  one  man  sin  and  you  become  angry  with  the  whole 
congregation?”  (Numb.  16:22).    YHWH  responds  positively  to  their  request  not  to 
exercise collective punishment (Numb. 16:32-33).
379   
The final intercession in this series (Numb. 16:41) is the one to which Wis. 18:21-
25 alludes.  Even though the punishment of Korah and his associates was intended to 
confirm Aaron and his descendants as the divinely sanctioned protectorates of the cult 
(Numb.  14:40),  this  final  rebellion  prompts  YHWH  to  make  Aaron’s  chosen  status 
unmistakably clear by causing Aaron’s staff to sprout (Numb. 17:1-10).  The Israelites, 
roused to rebellion by Korah and his companions’ complaint that all Israelites are holy 
and should have cultic access, finally acknowledge the danger of the cult (Numb. 17:12-
13).  When YHWH charges Aaron with the priesthood, he suggests that Aaron’s and his 
descendants’  role  is  to  prevent  the  innocent  from  suffering  the  effects  of  contagious 
divine wrath:  “‘You yourselves will perform the duties of the sanctuary and the duties of 
the altar, so that wrath will not again come upon the sons of Israel’” (Numb. 18:5).  
Although the priesthood certainly brings advantages, Aaron commits to endangering his 
life and the lives of his descendants so that they can offer cultic intercession for the 
                                                        
379 The executed punishment is not entirely individual.  Numb. 16:32-33 notes that the earth also swallowed 
the families of the sinners.  However, Numb. 26:11 suggests that, at least in the case of Korah, the children 
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Israelites and prevent intragenerational punishment by appeasing divine wrath before it 
breaks out upon the innocent. 
Although one may question whether Aaron is to be understood as a prophet or a 
priest and whether his intercession is prophetic or cultic,
380 the similarities among all 
these  stories  suggest  that  it  is  appropriate  to  consider  the  connection  between 
intercession, prophetic or otherwise, and collective accountability.  Abraham expresses 
very concisely the interceding prophet’s expectation about collective accountability when 
he  bargains  with  YHWH  to  spare  Sodom  and  Gomorrah:    “Suppose  there  are  fifty 
righteous within the city; will you indeed sweep away the place and not forgive it for the 
sake of fifty righteous who are in it?  Far be it from you to do this thing, to kill the 
righteous with the wicked!  Far be it from you for the righteous to fare like the wicked!  
Will not the judge of all the earth do justice?” (Gen. 18:24-25).  Justice, in the mind of 
the intercessor, is not individual accountability.  Justice is not merely the absence of 
collective  punishment.    Justice,  Abraham  argues,  is  collective  reward.    He  expects 
YHWH to spare the wicked for the sake of the righteous. 
  In  his  article,  “‘Who  Will  Stand  in  the  Breach?’    A  Study  of  Prophetic 
Intercession,” Muffs argues that willingness to stand between YHWH’s wrath and the 
Israelites distinguishes a true prophet from a false one.
381  Because YHWH shares his 
plans  to  destroy  the  people  with  his  prophets  prior  to  annihilating  them,  ancient 
                                                        
380 Schwenk-Bressler notes that Aaron’s intercession extends beyond his priestly function and mimics the 
prophetic role usually played by Moses.  This functions to highlight Aaron’s great power and service to 
YHWH as similar to Moses’.  Both prophet and priest can perform an intercession with equal success.  
Schwenk-Bressler, Sapienta Salmonis, 285. 
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interpreters understood that he sought a prophet who would stand up for the Israelites.
382  
In the book of Ezekiel, YHWH describes searching in vain “for anyone among them [the 
Israelites] who would repair the wall and stand in the breach before me on behalf of the 
land, so that I would not destroy it; but I found no one” (Ezek. 22:30).
383  With no one to 
intercede, he resolves to allow his wrath to consume the people (v. 31).  In a case of 
extreme divine wrath, YHWH asks Jeremiah not to intercede for the Israelites (Jer. 7:16, 
14:11-12), even though the prophet persists.  Jeremiah, although presumably an innocent 
individual, identifies with the people and their sins in an effort to turn back YHWH’s 
anger (Jer. 14:7).
384  Psalm 106 recalls the Exodus and offers an explanation for how 
Moses averted YHWH’s wrath after the Golden Calf:  “Therefore he swore to destroy 
them except that Moses, his chosen one, stood in the breach before him to turn away his 
wrath from destroying” (Ps. 106:23).   
Kaminsky has observed that conceptions of contagious divine wrath underlie the 
understanding  of  collective  accountability  in  the  Deuteronomistic  History,
385  and  this 
may also be true for the author of Wisdom (Wis. 18:21-25).  Human actions provoke 
divine anger, which results in negative consequences even for people who played no role 
in producing God’s rage.  Because YHWH does not desire to destroy his people, he raises 
up a prophet who can intercede for the people on the brink of destruction, and through 
collective reward, this prophet can prevent the impending doom. 
                                                        
382 Note Amos 7:2, 5:  “Who will stand (for) Jacob?  He is so small!” In rabbinic tradition, God cries when 
Moses dies because he has lost a true prophet willing to oppose his wrath.  Muffs, “Who Will Stand?,” 32–
35.  
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In cases of prophetic intercession, the actions of the individual save the group.  
The biblical accounts do not make clear if the mechanism that successfully achieves a 
collective pardon for sinners is the prophet’s innocence, the logic of his argument, his 
prostration, or his use of a specific prayer. Perhaps it may be the very act of a guilt-free 
individual jeopardizing his own safety to protect his people from destruction. Wisdom, 
then, attempts to clarify the mechanism through which an individual intercessor saves an 
entire  group.  Wisdom’s  portrayal  of  Aaron’s  intercession  in  Numbers  16  seems  to 
understand that one individual’s intercession results in an unmerited reward for the entire 
group.  A false prophet, especially the kind that offers only hopeful messages, may fail to 
see the breach or may see it but refuse to stand in it as Moses does so successfully.
386  
This notion of false prophecy suggests that the false prophet’s refusal to stand in the 
breach perhaps owes to the fact that he must risk his own life by throwing his lot in with 
the doomed people that he is trying to save.  Moses repeatedly refuses YHWH’s offers to 
make a great and mighty nation through him alone.  Moses’ life and lineage are already 
secure without sacrificing his own glory to preserve the lives and lineages of his people.  
Likewise, Wisdom 18:21-25 remembers Aaron jeopardizing his own life in order to place 
himself between YHWH’s contagious rage and the Israelites. His intercession enables the 
lives of those who rebelled to continue. 
Wisdom of Solomon 12:20-22 
Although it is certainly not overt, Wis. 12:20-22 may hint at the notion that the 
sage considers the Israelites to be the beneficiaries of collective reward:   
(20) For if you punished the enemies of your children and those destined 
for death with such great attention and deliberation and gave them time and 
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opportunity so that they might put away their wickedness, (21) then with 
how much strictness you have judged your own sons, to whose forefathers 
you gave oaths and covenants of good promises!  (22) Though we have 
been disciplined, you whip our enemies ten thousand times more, so that 
when we judge, we can reflect on your goodness, and when we are judged, 
we may expect mercy. 
 
Israel’s enemies receive God’s justice, although he spreads out his punishment so as to 
provide them with the possibility of saving themselves through repentance and reform.  
This delay in punishment to Israel’s enemies is a form of mercy, although the sinful 
nature  of  these  people  cannot  prevent  the  inevitable  fate  of  an  unrepentant  sinner.  
Likewise, the sage views the punishment experienced by Israel as a form of mercy even 
greater than the mercy shown to her enemies.
387  God judges his people strictly (v. 21), 
yet  the  sage  asserts  that  Israel  can  expect  mercy  (v.  22).    The  only  intervening 
observation between the claim that God judges Israel strictly, which would normally 
seem to preclude mercy, and the claim that Israel can expect mercy is the recollection of 
promises made to Israel’s ancestors (v. 21).  The divine remembrance of these promises 
as an act of intergenerational reward is not explicit, but it is reminiscent of the discussion 
of David and Solomon in Ben Sira’s Praise of the Ancestors.  In Sir. 47:12, the sage notes 
that Solomon lives in security because of the merit of his father, David, with whom God 
formed  a  covenant  (v.  11).    Although  Solomon’s  sins  deserve  punishment,  God  has 
mercy upon his lineage for the sake of covenants formed with his ancestors:  
But the Lord will not forsake his mercy, and he will not destroy any of his  
words, and he will not wipe out his chosen offspring, and the seed of one  
loving him he will not remove.  To Jacob he gave a remnant and to David   
one of his own root.  And Solomon rested with his fathers, and he left after  
him one of his seed, foolish and lacking in understanding, Rehoboam, who  
removed the people from his counsel. (Sir. 47:22) 
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Both passages speak of mercy and loyalty to promises made to Israel’s forefathers.  It 
seems possible that the sage who produced Wis. 12:20-22 understood the divine mercy 
bestowed  upon  Israel  to  be  the  result  of  intergenerational  reward  earned  through  the 
merits of the ancestors.   
 
IV.  Rejection of Collective Accountability in the Wisdom of Solomon 
Wisdom of Solomon 10:6-8  
   Given the previous discussion of the role of collective accountability involved in 
prophetic intercession, it is now appropriate to consider Wisdom’s presentation of the 
destruction  of  Sodom  and  Gomorrah.    In  contrast  to  the  examples  of  intercession  in 
which Moses and Aaron attempt to save their own people, Abraham intercedes for a 
population  of  non-Israelites  in  Gen.  18:16ff.    Residing  among  those  Israelites  is 
Abraham’s nephew, Lot.  Although Abraham argues and YHWH agrees that he should 
spare  the  wicked  inhabitants  for  the  sake  of  ten  righteous  individuals,  his  divine 
messengers  cannot  fill  this  quota  and  so  the  plan  to  destroy  the  cities  proceeds.  
According  to  the  biblical  account,  YHWH  spares  Lot—who  repeatedly  demonstrates 
foolish behavior—because he “remembered Abraham” (Gen. 19:29).  The recounting of 
Lot’s survival plays out differently in Wisdom of Solomon 10:6-8:
388 
(6) As the ungodly were perishing, it [wisdom] delivered a righteous man, 
fleeing the fire descending on the Five Cities, (7) which are still a witness 
to the wickedness:  a continually smoking wasteland, plants bringing forth 
fruit that does not ripen, a pillar of salt standing as a monument to the 
unbelieving soul.  (8) For wisdom passing by them, not only were they 
hindered from knowing the good, but also it left behind for humankind a 
memorial of its foolishness, so that their failings could not be forgotten. 
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Although Lot behaves foolishly in the Genesis account (Gen. 19:16, 19, 33), the sage of 
Wisdom  of  Solomon  credits  Wisdom  with  being  his  salvation.    Instead  of  being  the 
recipient of divine favor for the sake of another righteous man, the sage describes Lot as 
being righteous himself in contrast to his neighbors.
389  In other words, the story is no 
longer a tale of a prophet pleading for collective reward for a city of sinners and having 
to settle for the collective reward of only those family members who were at least wise 
enough to heed the divine instruction to flee the city; rather the sage transforms
390 it into 
a case of individual accountability in which the wicked reap just punishment and the 
righteous escapes through the exercise of wisdom.   
  Ben Sira also points out that YHWH did not show mercy to Sodom and Gomorrah 
as Abraham had wanted (Sir. 16:8), but he does not go so far as the Wisdom of Solomon 
to assert that Lot is blameless or guided by wisdom.  It is possible that the depiction of 
Lot as righteous owes to the sage’s need for examples of righteous individuals to fit his 
schema.  The sage does not attribute Lot’s salvation to God as both the Genesis account 
and Ben Sira do.  Rather, the operation of wisdom in the world saves Lot from the fate of 






390 It is possible that, rather than actually transforming the biblical tradition, the sage is drawing upon other 
traditions about Sodom and Gomorrah that are unknown to modern scholars.  The fact that the sage’s 
Pentapolis may include Zoar, a city spared in the Genesis account, may point toward this conclusion.  At 
the very least, the sage appears to be drawing upon details of Sodom and Gomorrah known not from Gen. 
18-19, but rather from other biblical allusions to the cities (Deut. 29:22).  Ibid., 74–75. 
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Wis. 16:5-14, which recounts the episode in Num. 21:4-9 in which God punishes 
the  complaining  Israelites  with  poisonous  snakes,  contrasts  with  the  depiction  of 
prophetic intercession in Wis. 18:21-25, which credits the righteous Aaron with saving 
the Israelites.  In Numbers 21, the people repent and ask Moses to intercede (Numb. 
21:7).  YHWH then instructs Moses to make a bronze serpent to cure the people (v. 8).  
In Wisdom’s interpretation of this instance of prophetic intercession, the sage avoids 
mentioning Moses’ role.  Although he recognizes that God’s “wrath did not last until the 
end” (Wis. 16:5), the sage credits not Moses but rather God’s mercy with rescuing the 
people (v. 10).  In this manner, the salvation of the community is achieved through God’s 
grace, not his merciful sparing of a group for the sake of one of its members. The absence 
of Moses and his intercessory efforts from Wisdom’s account of this wilderness episode 
appears deliberate.  So, although any comment on collective accountability in the passage 
would certainly be subtle, the replacement of collective salvation through the actions of 
an intercessor with direct divine healing may suggest some discomfort with the presence 
of collective accountability in this narrative. 
In describing the salvation of the people in this episode, the sage elaborates on the 
mechanism of healing in v. 12:  “For neither herb nor medicine healed them, but it was 
your word, O Lord, healing all.”  YHWH’s only speech in the Numbers narrative is his 
instruction for Moses to create a serpent to heal those afflicted with venom.  While this 
speech may be the words to which the sage refers, he omits Moses’ role in executing the 
divine command, which is necessary for YHWH’s words to be effective in ending the 
outbreak of his wrath.  The sage emphasizes divine sanction in this story because it bears 
a  resemblance  to  the  creation  and  worship  of  idols,  the  very  topic  that  leads  him  to   184 
discuss  this  historical  allusion.    However,  given  the  continuous  interplay  between 
wrath/punishment (vv. 5, 9, 13) and mercy/kindness (vv. 5, 7, 10, 11, 12), it is possible 
that the saving words envisioned by the sage are those that YHWH himself revealed to 
Moses in Exodus 34:6-7 and that Moses later reuses in Num. 14:18 to ask for mercy.   
Wisdom of Solomon 12:10-11 
Another  example  of  the  sage  transforming  an  historical  example  of  collective 
accountability into something else occurs in Wis. 12:3-18, a reflection on the fate of the 
Canaanites and theodicy.
392  Confronted with the biblical depiction of the Canaanites as 
an abominable people that the Israelites could not successfully uproot from the land with 
a  single  swift  military  campaign  despite  having  divine  help  on  their  side,  the  sage 
explains how the Canaanites’ continued presence in the land results from God’s mercy 
rather than from his inability to help the Israelites eradicate them: 
(10) But judging them in small increments, you provided an opportunity 
for repentance, though you were not unaware that their origin was evil and 
their  wickedness  inborn,  and  that  their  reasoning  would  never  change.  
(11) For they were an accursed seed from the beginning, and it was not out 
of reverence for anyone that you left them unpunished for their sins. (Wis. 
12:10-11) 
 
According to the sage, God exercises delayed punishment for a lineage that is innately 
wicked.  The sage is concerned with defending theodicy; against the charge that God 
unjustly annihilated the Canaanites (vv. 12-15), Wis. 12:10 makes clear that they were 
free to repent and that the opportunity for repentance came at God’s expense.  God bears 
iniquities that are not punished immediately; this is characteristic of his mercy according 
to Exod. 34:6-7.     
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educational intention behind divine punishment.  For Schwenk-Bressler, pedagogy and theodicy need not 
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In response to the suggestion that the utter destruction God commanded for the 
Canaanites  is  unjust,  the  sage  implies  that  the  total  annihilation  of  the  population  is 
justified because every last Canaanite, even the young children, was individually guilty.  
The sage appeals to their inborn nature to explain how he knows that every Canaanite 
was deserving of punishment (v. 10).  Ben Sira similarly depicts the Canaanites as having 
been evil from creation (Sir. 33:10-12).
393  Both sages diverge from the biblical depiction 
of the Canaanites inheriting their inferiority from the punishment of their eponymous 
ancestor, Canaan, for a sin committed by his father, Ham (Gen. 9:22-27).
394  The biblical 
depiction explains the status of the Canaanites as an intergenerational punishment for 
human sin.  The author of the Wisdom of Solomon explains it as a feature of creation.  
This  explanation  seems  to  be  a  response  to  claims  that  God’s  punishment  of  total 
annihilation was unjust (see Wis. 12:12ff).  By building their evil nature into creation, 
God’s justice is vindicated, unless, of course one questions why he would have created an 
innately wicked people.  God, who the sage claims is merciful to all (Wis. 11:23), also 
loves all of his creations and would not have made anything that he hated (v. 24).  The 
sage’s logic does not hold up to scrutiny since God appears to hate the Canaanites from 
the beginning of their creation, but this explains the sage’s need to exculpate God by 
demonstrating that he held out mercy to the Canaanites even if they were too morally 
corrupt to take advantage of it (Wis. 12:10-11). 
Because the logic is not at all convincing, one must question whether the sage 
really intends to overturn the biblical depiction of the Canaanite’s status as a punishment 
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394 It is possible that the language of cursing in Wis. 12:11 refers to the Genesis account of Noah’s cursing 
of Canaan.  Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 241.   186 
that resulted from human sin rather than as a feature of the divine plan.  The cursing of 
Canaan in Gen. 9 represents an etiology that attempts to explain the inferior status of all 
present-day Canaanites.  Wis. 12:3-18 agrees with the biblical author in its assessment 
that  all  Canaanites,  by  nature  of  their  peoplehood  or  descent  from  the  eponymous 
ancestor  Canaan,  are  innately  evil  and  hated  by  God.    The  sage  of  Wisdom  uses  a 
different explanation, one perhaps more palatable to an audience that might question the 
justice of punishing children for the sins of their fathers, for how it came to be that all 
Canaanites deserved the wrath of God, but his main purpose is the same as that of the 
author of Genesis 9.  All Canaanites are inferior to Israelites and deserve their ultimate 
fate. 
 
V.    The  Role  of  Wisdom  Instruction  for  the  Righteous  and  the  Wicked  in  the 
Wisdom of Solomon 
  Like every wisdom book considered so far, the Wisdom of Solomon presents a 
conflicting  picture  of  the  roles  of  free  will  and  divine  determinism  in  the  world.  
Although several verses suggest that the student who desires wisdom can attain it through 
discipline and instruction (Wis. 6:14-15, 6:17, 8:18), other passages acknowledge that 
Wisdom chooses her students (6:16).  Even the sage, who represents himself as Solomon 
and recognizes that he was endowed at his creation with natural gifts and goodness (Wis. 
8:19-20), understands that he owes his attainment of wisdom to divine grace (Wis. 8:21; 
cf. 9:6). 
  The case of the Canaanites captures this enigma.  Although God gives them the 
opportunity to repent and find mercy, he also created them innately evil so that they are 
not able to take advantage of this opportunity (Wis. 12:10-11; cf., e.g., the case of God   187 
hardening Pharaoh’s heart in the plague narrative in Exodus and the associated question 
of Pharaoh’s culpability).
395  The opportunity exists not for the sake of the Canaanites, 
but only in order to validate theodicy to those whom God does not hate.  As long as one 
does not consider the perspective of the Canaanites, who were condemned to their fate 
without the choice or opportunity to change it yet who also no longer exist and likely 
would not be concerned with the theodicy of Israel’s God if they did, no contradiction 
between determinism and human free will exists. 
The Wisdom of Solomon has many points of contact with the thinking of Greek 
philosophical traditions, like Platonism and Stoicism.
396  Although it has been suggested 
that Wisdom’s use of Hellenistic philosophy reflects only a superficial understanding of 
the various schools,
397 it appears more likely that the sage was familiar with the world of 
Middle Platonism, a philosophical tradition that combined Stoic and Platonic concepts in 
order to make better sense of Plato.
398  Nevertheless, the book still represents wisdom 
literature and not a philosophical treatise because “it does not pursue its (philosophical) 
analyses in a rigorous or sustained way.”
399  Although the modern reader of the Wisdom 
of  Solomon  finds  the  coexistence  of  divine  determinism  with  human  free  will  to  be 
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illogical, the ancient reader did not seem to object to it.
400  The sage can affirm that 
humans have absolute free will because from the human perspective, they do.  From the 
divine perspective, of course, human free will is only relative.  Humans believe that they 
act freely, and this is part of the divine plan, but God ultimately controls the fates of 
humans.  Divine determinism and human free will only come into conflict when humans 
attempt to have insight into the divine perspective, which, by the very nature of the gulf 
between  God  and  humans,  they  cannot,  of  course,  successfully  apprehend  in  its 
entirety.
401  As long as humans believe in the power of choosing good over evil and trust 
in the goodness of the divine plan, free will and determinism can coexist. 
 
VI.  Summary of Findings in the Wisdom of Solomon 
  Collective accountability in the Wisdom of Solomon has both continuities and 
discontinuities with collective accountability in other wisdom books.  Like other sages, 
the author of Wisdom uses collective accountability to vindicate divine justice and is 
generally unconcerned with the perspective of the suffering children, whom the sage 
seems to regard as being wicked themselves (Wis. 4:3-6).  In some historical cases (e.g., 
Wis. 18:5), God’s role in exercising collective accountability is explicit, but in other 
instances of collective accountability (e.g., Wis. 4:3-6) it is only implicit.  The sins that 
merit collective punishment range from quite specific, like adultery, to somewhat vague, 
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different cultures, so it would be surprising if he did not notice or could not understand that his positions on 
divine determinism and human free appear contradictory.  
 
401 Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 57–58.   189 
like being ungodly.  For the children of the wicked, their punishment is general.  They 
will be cut off, a fate often depicted with plant imagery.  The focus of the punishment is 
not so much on what specifically the children will endure but what their parents will 
suffer.    Their  souls  will  not  enjoy  the  immortality  that  the  sage  associates  with  the 
uncorrupted righteous soul.  Both through the loss of the immortality of a righteous soul 
and through the loss of their progeny, the wicked’s hope for immortality is crushed.  The 
acceptance  of  the  notion  of  an  immortal  soul  and  judgment  after  death  marks  a 
remarkable departure from earlier wisdom literature. 
  Observations about punishment are not generally based on revelation (like Exod. 
34:6-7) but rather on the structure of the universe.
402  The sinner is punished with the 
very  thing  by  which  he  sinned.    Only  in  historical  examples  does  intragenerational 
punishment appear to be embraced not as a natural consequence of human action but 
rather by the contagious nature of divine wrath (Wis. 18:20).  This contrasts with Ben 
Sira’s  example  of  intragenerational  punishment  in  which  the  logical  consequences  of 
associating with the wrong crowd are to bring judgment upon oneself as well. 
  In  Wisdom’s  depiction  of  collective  reward,  an  intercessor,  Aaron,  prevents 
God’s wrath from destroying his people (Wis. 18:21-25).  The author describes Aaron as 
righteous, which may suggest that an individual’s righteousness can bring a reward (or 
lack of punishment) upon a group of sinners. 
                                                        
402 This statement is true inasmuch as Exodus 34:6-7 offers a revelation of the divine nature.  The sage’s 
observations of the act-consequence model at times are rooted in his understanding of the divine nature, but 
this  understanding  is  not  always  based  upon  biblical  revelation.    At  times  it  aligns  with  the  Platonic 
teachings.    The  sage’s  discussion  of  punishment  and  mercy  in  Wis.  12:1-10  may  reflect  an  effort  to 
combine  notions  of  the  merciful  divine  nature  known  from  Exod.  34:6-7  with  principles  known  from 
Hellenistic philosophy.  McGlynn, Divine Judgement and Divine Benevolence in the Book of Wisdom, 42–
43.   190 
  Like  other  sages,
403  the  author  of  Wisdom  does  not  clearly  favor  either 
determinism or free will, but uses both to explain his understanding of the world.  In Wis. 
4:3-6, the sage seems to regard the children and wife of the wicked as also being wicked.  
This  alleviates  one  moral  concern  by  making  clear  that  the  children  are  not  unjustly 
punished.  The availability of YHWH’s mercy and his tendency to judge slowly (Wis. 
12:10-11) perhaps also helps to justify their punishment because it is clear that they have 
had  opportunity  to  repent,  even  if  they  are  innately  incapable  of  repentance  and 
righteousness.  As his perspective is not that of the child or wife, the sage’s main purpose 
















403 See Section IV of Chapter 2, Section V of Chapter 3, Section III of Chapter 4, and Section IV of Chapter 
5.   191 
 





  Any study of collective accountability in the Hebrew Bible as a whole would 
necessarily  consider  two  prominent  sayings  about  the  topic:    Exodus  34:6-7  (or  its 
reiterations) and the sour grapes proverb cited in Jeremiah 31 and Ezekiel 18.  This 
chapter will examine these two formulaic sayings, each of which has proposed origins in 
the realm of wisdom, about intergenerational accountability and their connections to the 
wisdom tradition.  It will explore the nature of the relationship between the credo of 
Exodus 34:6-7 and wisdom literature, on the one hand, and between the proverb cited by 
both Jeremiah and Ezekiel and the wisdom tradition, on the other.   
  Exodus  34:6-7  constitutes  a  formulaic  expression  in  which  YHWH  describes 
himself as visiting the sins of the father upon the sons; it is reiterated in the Decalogue 
(Exod. 20:5-6; Deut. 5:9-10).
404  Although this passage is quoted in various ways in many 
places in the Bible,
405 none of the wisdom books quotes it directly.  Nevertheless, some 
scholars  have  posited  a  connection  between  Exodus  34:6-7  and  the  wisdom  tradition 
because of overlapping language and shared values.
406  Is this formula a product of the 
wisdom tradition?  What role, if any, did the worldview of Israelite wisdom literature 
play in the creation and likely liturgical use of this formula describing YHWH as a deity 
                                                        
404 See note below for the sequencing and dependence of these passages on Exod. 34:6-7 or traditions 
similar to it. 
 
405 Exod. 20:5-6; Deut. 5:9-10, 7:9-10; Numb. 14:18; Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2; Nahum 1:2-3; Mic. 7:18-20; Jer. 
32:18; Neh. 9:17; 2 Chron. 30:9; Ps. 25:10, 78:38, 86:5, 103:8-10, 111:4, 112:4. 
 
406 Dentan, “The Literary Affinities of Exodus XXXIV 6f,” 48.   192 
who executes collective punishment and reward?   
  Jeremiah and Ezekiel both use a form of traditional wisdom literature, namely a 
proverb, to overturn the previously dominant notion that God is punishing the generation 
of the Babylonian exile for its ancestors’ sins.  Ezekiel 18 delivers an oracle on the issue 
of collective responsibility that first challenges the theological concept and then provides 
examples  of  a  righteous  parent  producing  an  unrighteous  child  who  in  turn  begets  a 
righteous child.  For Ezekiel, one’s own nature can differ from that of his parent or child, 
and so the individual is not accountable for the sins of another.  Jeremiah employs the 
same proverb in an extended consolation that promises the restoration of the people Israel 
in their homeland (Jer. 31:29).  Whereas Ezekiel speaks of people ceasing to repeat the 
proverb in the present tense, Jeremiah suggests that it will occur in the near future (Jer. 
31:27, 29).  The Jeremiah text then focuses on the future creation of a new covenant 
between God and Israel, one that differs from the one God created with their ancestors, 
whose sins the current generation blames for their punishment.   
  Both  Ezekiel  and  Jeremiah  refer  to  what  appears  to  be  a  traditional  wisdom 
proverb in order to refute the doctrine of collective accountability:  “The parents have 
eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge” (Ezek. 18:2, Jer. 31:29).  
What is the relationship between this proverb and Israel’s wisdom literature?  Do Ezekiel 
and  Jeremiah  use  this  proverb,  a  product  of  human  wisdom,  in  order  to  avoid 
contradicting a more sacred text (i.e., Exod. 34:6-7 or the Decalogue),
407 or does their use 
of  the  proverb  reflect  an  underlying  connection  between  the  concept  of  collective 
responsibility and traditional wisdom? If this proverb did originate in wisdom circles, 
                                                        
407 Levinson, Legal Revision and Religious Renewal in Ancient Israel, 87.   193 
does the wisdom tradition reject the notion expressed in the proverb, just as these two 
prophets do?   
  This chapter will first review the use of Exodus 34:6-7 in the Hebrew Bible in 
order to demonstrate how it is reused, recycled, and transformed to suit the needs of later 
communities grappling to understand divine justice and mercy (II.a.).  This discussion 
will  provide  a  framework  through  which  can  be  understood  the  recurrence  of  the 
language and themes from Exodus 34:6-7 in Israel’s wisdom books.  After considering 
how Israel’s wisdom literature interacts with and incorporates the language and themes of 
a popular liturgical formula about intergenerational punishment found in non-wisdom 
biblical literature (II.b.), this chapter will then focus on the use of a wisdom saying, 
namely a proverb about intergenerational punishment in the Hebrew Bible (Jeremiah 31 
and Ezekiel 18), to engage with the notion of intergenerational punishment (III).  In other 
words, the two main halves of this chapter, the discussion of Exodus 34:6-7, on the one 
hand, and Jeremiah 31:29 and Ezekiel 18, on the other, are complementary.  The first 
half, the discussion of Exodus 34:6-7, focuses on the use of a formulaic statement about 
intergenerational punishment known from outside Israel’s wisdom literature in Israel’s 
wisdom literature.  The second half, the discussion of Jeremiah 31:29 and Ezekiel 18, 
focuses on the use of a literary form borrowed from the realm of wisdom, the proverb, in 
non-wisdom literature to engage with the concept of intergenerational punishment.  The 
chapter will conclude with a summary of its findings (IV).   
 
II.a.  The  Reuse  of  Exodus  34:6-7  in  the  Biblical  Tradition  (Excluding  Wisdom 
Literature) 
   194 
What is the relationship between the notion of YHWH’s mercy and justice as 
expressed  in  Exodus  34:6-7  and  the  wisdom  literature?    Based  on  a  study  of  the 
frequency of terminology familiar from Exodus 34:6-7 in other corpora of the Hebrew 
Bible,  Dentan  has  concluded  that  the  same  sages  responsible  for  producing  Israel’s 
wisdom literature also produced the description of YHWH in Exodus 34:6-7:   
The literary affinities with the Wisdom literature are so definite that one 
can  assert  with  confidence  that  the  entire  formula  is  a  product  of  the 
School of the Wise Men.  Once this conclusion has been tentatively drawn 
on the basis of vocabulary and style, a renewed examination of form and 
content can only confirm the judgment.  As already noted, the passage 
stands out from its context and from most of the theological formularies of 
the OT by its ‘proposition’ nature.  It is not kerygmatic, but descriptive; it 
is concerned not with God’s acts, but with His character.  There is no 
mention  of  Israel;  the  spirit  is  universalistic;  the  concern  is  not  with 
Israelite  man,  but  with  man  as  such.    God’s  basic  attributes  are  love, 
patience,  graciousness,  willingness  to  forgive—qualities  particularly 
esteemed by the Wise Men; there is nothing here of the militant, jealous 
and holy deity of early Hebrew religion.  Yahweh’s concern for ethical 
conduct is indubitable, but even this is stated in negative, almost diffident 
terms:  ‘He will not leave (the guilty) unpunished’.  The inescapable fact 
that children commonly suffer for the failings of their parents is adduced 
(somewhat harshly, to later taste) as evidence that sin does not flourish 
unrequited.    In  the  entire  formula,  the  only  trace  of  the  conception  of 
Yahweh as the stern judge is to be found in the statement that he ‘visits 
iniquity’, and it is significant that this is the one point at which the formula 
is dependent upon the prophetic literature.
408 
 
Dentan is certainly correct to observe affinities between the language of Exodus 34:6-7 
and the clustering of its terminology in several wisdom books.
409  However, no evidence 
                                                        
408 Dentan, “The Literary Affinities of Exodus XXXIV 6f,” 48–49. 
 
409 Dentan breaks down Exodus 34:6-7 into its component parts and looks for the occurrence of these parts 
in other biblical corpora.  He frequently excludes from his analysis their occurrences in certain texts on the 
basis of usage or literary dependence on Exod. 34:6-7.  While I cannot agree with every instance in which 
he excludes the occurrence of Exod. 34:6-7 terminology from consideration, I present here a sampling of 
the evidence that he provides for the literary affinities between Exod. 34:6-7 and the wisdom books:  The 
root hΩ-n-n occurs in Prov. 14:21, 14:31, 19:17, 28:8.  The expression }erek⋲ }appayim occurs only in  Exod. 
34:6-7, passages dependent on it, and Prov. 14:29, 15:18; 16:32; cf. Eccl. 7:8.  The phrase hΩesed⋲ we}§met◊ 
occurs in Prov. 3:3, 14:22, 16:6, and 20:28.  Thirty of the 61 biblical occurrences of noœsΩeœr are in Proverbs   195 
points to the unambiguous conclusion that Israel’s sages produced Exodus 34:6-7.
410 In 
order to reach the conclusion that terminology from Exod. 34:6-7 is clustered only in 
Israel’s  wisdom  literature,  Dentan  must  first  exclude  from  the  pool  of  evidence  any 
passage  that  he  considers  to  be  dependent  on  Exod.  34:6-7.    While  he  considers 
quotations and paraphrases of Exod. 34:6-7 in other parts of the Bible to be dependent on 
Exod. 34:6-7, he starts with the assumption that the occurrence of this terminology in 
Israel’s wisdom literature is not dependent on Exod. 34:6-7 (or the liturgical tradition that 
produced this text).  However, it is equally likely that the occurrence of terminology from 
Exod. 34:6-7 in wisdom literature reflects an effort by Israel’s sages to interpret a famous 
liturgical statement about the nature of God.   In fact, on the basis of the frequency with 
which other biblical authors interact, reinterpret, and recycle Exodus 34:6-7 for their own 
theological purposes,
411 it seems more probable that the clustering of terminology from 
                                                        
(20) and Job (10).  The expression loœ} y§naqqeh occurs seven times in Proverbs.  Job 9:28 and 10:14 also 
use this expression in the pi‘el.  Ibid., passim. 
 
410 For Dentan’s theory to hold water, one would require clear evidence that Israel’s wisdom literature, or 
the traditions underlying it, predates the composition of Exodus 34:6-7, or the traditions underlying it.  
However, while prophetic quotations of Exod. 34:6-7 suggest that the credo was in (re)use relatively early 
in Israel’s literary tradition, most of Israel’s wisdom literature dates to the post-exilic era.  Raymond Van 
Leeuwen, “Scribal Wisdom and Theodicy in the Book of the Twelve,” in In Search of Wisdom: Essays in 
Memory of John G. Gammie, ed. Leo G. Perdue and Bernard Brandon Scott (Louisville, KY: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 1993), 32. 
 
411 These texts will be discussed below.  I understand Exodus 34:6-7 to be the base text for all other 
allusions to it because it is the fullest form of the formula.  Despite the fact that traditions tend to accrete 
new elements over time, in this case, the length of the formula in Exodus 34:6-7 appears to demonstrate its 
primacy.  Without a full statement that includes a description of both YHWH’s mercy and punishment, one 
must rely on circuitous methods to explain how the other forms of the quotation, which cite only parts of 
the entire formula, came into existence.  In order to make sense of the dialogue between Nahum and Jonah, 
each of whom relies on different parts of the formula, one must posit the existence of a formula that united 
each of the elements used by the prophets.  Most scholars agree in considering Exod. 34:6-7 to be the base 
text, although Levinson is one notable abstention.  He considers the formula as it appears in the second 
commandment, Exod. 20:4-6, to be the most nearly original.  Levinson’s preference for the Decalogue’s 
version is likely owing to the fact that he sees the origins of intergenerational punishment in the sphere of 
international treaties.  Finding the passage originally situated in a legal context that draws upon ancient 
Near  Eastern  treaty  formulae  supports  his  case.    However,  the  formula  that  appears  in  the  second 
commandment describes YHWH’s actions (he punishes and rewards intergenerationally on the basis of   196 
Exodus  34:6-7  in  wisdom  literature  represents  a  sapiential  attempt  to  reinterpret  the 
formula. Furthermore, Dentan’s conclusion that these two verses from Exodus 34 share 
the  same  universal  outlook  as  wisdom  literature  cannot  be  substantiated  with  such  a 
minute sample size, and, as the discussion below will demonstrate, wisdom literature 
does not emphasize the merciful connotations of Exodus 34:6-7 to the exclusion of its 
associations  with  justice.    While  I  agree  that  Israel’s  wisdom  literature  shares 
terminology  with  Exodus  34:6-7,  I  cannot  agree  with  Dentan’s  conclusion  that  this 
overlapping of terminology results from Israel’s sages playing a role in the composition 
of Exod. 34:6-7.   
  In order to understand the wisdom tradition’s interaction with Exodus 34:6-7, it is 
first necessary to review briefly the popularity of this passage among ancient biblical 
authors.  The point here is to demonstrate that the liturgical formula created a theological 
problem with which many of ancient Israel’s greatest thinkers engaged themselves.  This 
process of inner-biblical exegesis has produced numerous passages in every corner of the 
Bible that draw on the language and themes of Exodus 34:6-7 but reformulate them so as 
to serve their own objectives.
412  Even its appearance in Exod. 34:6-7 may be secondary.  
The final redaction of Exodus 34 portrays the formula as a divine self-description, words 
                                                        
covenant fidelity), but not his character (merciful, gracious, slow to anger, abounding in faithfulness) with 
the  exception  of  describing  him  as  jealous,  an  attribute  not  mentioned  in  Exod.  34:6-7.    While  many 
interpretations of the formula likely are engaging the formula’s appearance in the Decalogue, they also 
appear  to  be  aware  of  Exod.  34:6-7.    For  example,  Deut.  7:9  looks  very  similar  to  the  second 
commandment, but it describes YHWH as faithful, a term used in Exod. 34:6-7 but not the Decalogue.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that not all later reformulations draw on Exodus 34:6-7 alone.  For example, the 
description  of  YHWH  as  a  jealous  God  (}eœl  qannaœ})  appears  in  the  Decalogue,  but  not  Exod.  34:6-7.  
Nahum 1:2 describes YHWH as jealous, but Nahum 1:3 draws on terminology, namely “slow to anger” 
(}erek⋲ }appayim) present in Exod. 34:6-7 but not the Decalogue.  The author of Nahum either draws on both 
texts or is familiar with another form of the formula not preserved in the Bible that includes all these 
elements.  Levinson, “The Human Voice,” 46–47. 
 
412  Fishbane,  Michael,  “Torah  and  Tradition,”  in  Tradition  and  Theology  in  the  Old  Testament 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), 281.   197 
that  YHWH  speaks  about  himself.    However,  apart  from  the  literary  framework  that 
introduces YHWH as the speaker, the passage is written in the third person, which may 
suggest that the formula originated as a human description of YHWH.
413 
  Within the Pentateuch, the formula from Exodus 34:6-7 recurs in the Decalogue 
(Exod. 20:5-6; Deut. 5:9-10), in the parenetic materials of Moses’ farewell address (Deut. 
7:9-10), and in another case of prophetic intercession in the wilderness (Numbers 14:18).  
The second commandment prohibits the creation and worship of idols.  YHWH provides 
an  explanation  for  this  law:    “For  I,  YHWH,  your  God  am  a  jealous  (qannaœ})  God, 
visiting (poœqeœd⋲) the iniquity ({∞woœn) of the fathers upon the sons to the third or fourth 
generation of those who hate me (l§síoœn§}aœy), but showing steadfast love ({oœsíeh hΩesed⋲)
414 
to the thousandth generation of those who love me (l§}oœh∞b⋲ay) and keep (u®l§sûoœm§re®) my 
commandments” (Exod. 20:5b-6; cf. Deut. 5:9b-10).  Although more concise in some 
aspects than the formula that appears in Exodus 34:6-7, the second commandment agrees 
with the liturgical formula and codifies this liturgical formula in ancient Israel’s most 
sacred legal materials.  By using this description of YHWH’s nature as a rationale for the 
commandment against idolatry, the author of the Decalogue suggests that this aspect of 
God’s nature does not apply to all human sin, but rather is limited to cases of covenant 
infidelity,  that  is,  treason  against  YHWH.
415    The  Decalogue  introduces  covenantal 
                                                        
413 Dentan, “The Literary Affinities of Exodus XXXIV 6f,” 37. 
 
414 Another good translation for hΩesed is “loyalty.”  This rendering captures the covenantal and legalistic 
associations of the term. 
 
415 Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation, 344.   198 
language
416  to  the  formula  by  clarifying  that  YHWH  exercises  intergenerational 
punishment on those who “hate” him but rewards those who “love” him.
417 
When Moses paraphrases the liturgical formula as part of his hortatory speech to 
the Israelites on the brink of entering a land already inhabited by other peoples, he omits 
the part of the formula that refers to intergenerational punishment and replaces it with an 
affirmation of individual divine retribution:  “Know that YHWH your God is God, the 
faithful (hanne}§maœn) God who keeps the covenant and steadfast love (w§hahΩesed⋲) to 
those  who  love  him  (l§}oœh∞b⋲aœyw)  and  keep  (u®l§sûoœm§re®)  his  commandments  to  the 
thousandth generation and who repays those who reject him (l§síoœn§}aœyw) in their own 
person.  He does not delay but repays in their own person those who reject him (l§síoœn§}o®)” 
(Deut. 7:9-10).  In paraphrasing the second commandment using its familiar terminology, 
Moses introduces a drastic change into the formula’s meaning.  Rather than identifying 
YHWH as a God who punishes children for the sins of their parents, the passage asserts 
the opposite, namely that God executes individual, not collective, punishment.
418 
                                                        
416 It should be noted, however, that while these covenantal terms do not appear in Exod. 34:6-7,  Exod. 
34:10 casts the passage in a covenantal context.  For a discussion of the covenantal connotations of this 
terminology,  see  William  L.  Moran,  “Ancient  Near  Eastern  Background  of  the  Love  of  God  in 
Deuteronomy,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 25 (1963): 77–87. 
 
417  According  to  Blenkinsopp,  the  Deuteronomic  editor  modifies  the  meaning  of  the  formula  with  the 
addition of this covenantal terminology by suggesting that the children are like their ancestor in fidelity or 
infidelity.  If this is the case, this meaning is certainly not unambiguous.  Furthermore, Blenkinsopp does 
not explain what role the Deuteronomic editor played in the appearance of this same terminology of the 
second commandment as it appears in Exodus 20:5-6.  In its present form, the version of the Decalogue that 
appears in Exodus 20 shows affinities to the Priestly theology.  Martin Noth, Exodus:  A Commentary, 
trans.  J.S.  Bowden,  Old  Testament  Library  (London:  SCM,  1962),  163.  Deuteronomy  1-11:    A  New 
Translation with Introduction and Commentary, 1st ed, The Anchor Bible v. 5 (New York: Doubleday, 
1991),  81,  317.  Blenkinsopp,  “Abraham  and  the  Righteous  of  Sodom,”  124.    Cf.    Fishbane,  Biblical 
Interpretation,  335,  343–344.  Klaus  Koch,  The  Growth  of  the  Biblical  Tradition:  The  Form-Critical 
Method, trans. S. M. Cupitt (New York: Scribner, 1969), 47. Kaminsky, Corporate Responsibility in the 
Hebrew Bible, 130–131.  
 
418 Levinson, “The Human Voice,” 54.  Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation, 343.   199 
  In an act of intercession to prevent an angry deity from destroying the rebellious 
Israelites in the wilderness, Moses partially quotes YHWH’s self-description:  “YHWH is 
slow  to  anger  (}erek⋲  }appayim),  abounding  in  steadfast  love  (w§rab⋲-hΩesed⋲),  forgiving 
(noœsíeœ}) iniquity ({aœwoœn) and transgression (waœp⋲aœsûa{), but by no means clearing the guilty 
(w§naqqe® loœ} y§naqqeh), visiting (poœqeœd⋲) the iniquity ({∞woœn) of the fathers upon the sons 
to the third or fourth generation” (Numb. 14:18).  Moses omits the portion of the formula 
that mentions rewarding those who love YHWH and keep his commandments because a 
prayer for reward when the people have sinned would be inappropriate.   
According to Dozeman, Moses’s partial quotation of Exodus 34:6-7 in Numbers 
14:18 does not alter the meaning of the original formula, but the subsequent verses do.
419  
In  Numbers  14:20-24  YHWH  agrees  to  Moses’  request  for  mercy,  but  rather  than 
punishing the progeny of the sinners to the third or fourth generation, YHWH punishes 
only the guilty generation directly by preventing it from entering the land.  YHWH defers 
its punishment, but the delay does not surpass the boundaries of the wicked generation’s 
lifetime.    Once  that  generation  has  died  in  the  wilderness,  YHWH  would  permit  its 
offspring to enter the land promised to its ancestors.
420  The priestly writer responsible for 
this episode emphasizes individual responsibility. 
Among Israel’s literary prophets, the liturgical formula appears in Micah, Joel, 
Nahum, Jonah, and Jeremiah.
421  Each of these prophets reinterprets Exodus 34:6-7 in 
                                                        
419 Dozeman, “The Book of Numbers:  Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections,” 125.  Cf. Michael 
Widmer, Moses, God, and the Dynamics of Intercessory Prayer: A Study of Exodus 32-34 and Numbers 13-
14 (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 7. 
 
420 Dozeman, “The Book of Numbers:  Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections,” 125. 
 
421 Van Leeuwen also includes Hosea in this list because the names of his children play upon YHWH’s 
nature as revealed in Exodus 34:6-7 (Loœ} RuhΩaœma®, “Not-Pitied”) and upon YHWH’s ownership of his   200 
light  of  his  historical  context,  and  in  many  cases,  the  prophets  also  engage  with  the 
interpretations of this passage that other prophets have offered.   Joel quotes the first line 
of the liturgical formula and adds the phrase “and he relents from evil:”  “For he is 
gracious  (hΩannu®n)  and  merciful  (w§rahΩu®m),  slow  to  anger  (}erek⋲  }appayim),  and 
abounding  in  steadfast  love  (w§rab⋲-hΩesed⋲),  and  he  relents  (w§nihΩaœm)  from  evil  ({al-
haœraœ{a®)” (Joel 2:13ab-b).  The context in which Joel uses this formula is an oracle against 
Judah.  By reminding his audience of YHWH’s merciful nature, and even expanding 
upon his mercy, the prophet encourages repentance as a means of averting impending 
divine wrath.  Like Moses’ acts of intercession in Exodus 32:12 and Numbers 14:13-16, 
Joel 2:17 also appeals to YHWH’s honor and reputation among the nations as further 
justification, in addition to the reminder about the divine nature, for God to spare his 
people, who otherwise deserve punishment.   
Jonah,  according  to  Dozeman,  draws  upon  this  notion  of  YHWH’s  reputation 
among the nations to satiric effect.
422  Jonah, who delivers an oracle of doom to the 
people of Nineveh without identifying the divine source of the impending destruction or 
the promise that repentance holds for averting it, grows angry when the people respond 
by repenting and receiving divine mercy.  So Jonah quotes the first line of the divine 
attribute formula with the same addition that Joel makes, “and he relents from evil,” 
w§nihΩaœm {al-haœraœ{a (Jonah 4:2b).  However, in its new narrative context, the prophet uses 
the quotation to complain about God’s nature!  In so doing, Dozeman argues, Jonah 
                                                        
people in his dialogue with Moses following the Golden Calf incident (Loœ} {Ammˆî, “Not-My-People”). Van 
Leeuwen, “Scribal Wisdom and Theodicy in the Book of the Twelve,” 35. 
 
422  Thomas  B.  Dozeman,  “Inner-Biblical  Interpretation  of  Yahweh’s  Gracious  and  Compassionate 
Character,” Journal of Biblical Literature 108 (1989): 213–214.   201 
reverses Joel’s usage of the formula and thereby focuses the satire on himself, a prophet 
whose role as intercessor includes using this formula to obtain divine pardon.
423  The 
author of Jonah frees the liturgical formula from its covenantal moorings and thereby 
suggests that YHWH’s gracious character extends beyond the boundaries of YHWH’s 
chosen people. 
  Jonah is not only in dialogue with Joel, but also with Nahum, a prophet whose 
writings detail the fall of Nineveh.  Nahum opens his prophecy with a statement laced 
with terminology from Exodus 34:6-7 and the Decalogue and a partial quotation of the 
liturgical formula that focuses on divine wrath and judgment, rather than mercy:  “A 
jealous (qanno®}) and avenging God is YHWH, YHWH is avenging and wrathful; YHWH 
takes vengeance on his adversaries and rages against his enemies.  YHWH is long in 
anger (}erek⋲ }appayim), and great in strength, and YHWH by no means will clear the 
guilty (w§naqqe® loœ} y§naqqeh)” (Nah. 1:2-3a).  Nahum transforms a liturgical formula 
about YHWH’s gracious nature into a promise of punishment for YHWH’s (and the 
prophet’s)  enemies.
424    The  prophet  cleverly  accomplishes  this  by  subtly  reworking 
language  from  Exod.  34:6-7:    YHWH  is  “great  in  strength”  (g⋲§d⋲o®l-koœahΩ)  instead  of 
“abounding in steadfast love” (rab⋲-hΩesed⋲), “long in anger” (}erek⋲ }appayim) instead of 
“slow to anger” (}erek⋲ }appayim), and “raging (no®t√eœr) against his enemies” instead of 





424 Fishbane, Michael, “Torah and Tradition,” 280–281.  Machinist, “The Fall of Assyria,” 182. 
 
425 Fishbane, Michael, “Torah and Tradition,” 280–281.   202 
Whereas  the  description  of  YHWH’s  nature  as  it  appears  in  the  Decalogue 
restricts YHWH’s punitive measures to cases of covenant infidelity by the Israelites, 
Nahum  extends  divine  vengeance  to  YHWH’s  chosen  people’s  human  enemies,  who 
have no covenantal relationship with YHWH.  In contrast to Nahum, who focuses solely 
on the hostile aspects of YHWH’s nature and the benefits that they hold for Israelites 
who had endured Assyria’s military wrath, Jonah focuses solely on his compassionate 
attributes and their negative implications for justice. As several scholars have noted, the 
editor  of  the  Book  of  the  Twelve  Minor  Prophets  may  have  used  the  inner-biblical 
prophetic dialogue concerning Exod. 34:6-7 as a means of uniting the collection with 
“hermeneutical patches.”
426 
  Many  scholars  regard  Micah  7:18-20,  which  also  recycles  terminology  from 
Exodus 34:6-7, as secondary to the eighth century prophet.
427 In contrast with Nahum and 
his emphasis on vengeance, but similar to Jonah, Micah emphasizes only the merciful 
aspects of God’s nature:
428 “Who is a God like you, bearing (noœsíeœ}) iniquity ({aœwoœn) and 
passing over transgression (pesûa{) of the remnant of his inheritance?  He does not keep 
his anger (}appo®) forever, for he delights in steadfast love (hΩesed⋲).  He will again have 
compassion on us (y§rahΩ∞meœnu®); he will cleanse our iniquities ({∞woœnoœt◊e®nu®).  You will 
cast into the depths of the sea all our sins.  You will show faithfulness (}§met◊) to Jacob 
and steadfast love (hΩesed⋲) to Abraham as you swore to our ancestors from the days of 
                                                        
426 Van Leeuwen, “Scribal Wisdom and Theodicy in the Book of the Twelve,” 32.  This notion is also 
inchoate in Fishbane’s study of the reuse of the divine attribute formula.  Fishbane, Michael, “Torah and 
Tradition,” 280.  
 
427 For example, see Hans Walter Wolff, Micah: A Commentary, trans. Gary Stansell (Minneapolis, MN: 
Augsburg, 1990), xxvii–xxxvi. 
 
428 Fishbane, Michael, “Torah and Tradition,” 279–80.   203 
old” (Micah 7:18-20). The secondary nature of this allusion to Exod. 34:6-7 may support 
Van Leeuwen’s thesis that the editor of the Book of the Twelve used these interactions 
with Exod. 34:6-7 as a deliberate organizational method.  Likewise, the allusion to Exod. 
34:6-7 in Nahum 1:2 interrupts an acrostic poem and is thus also likely to be secondary.  
Furthermore, the editorial insertion at the conclusion of Hosea (14:10) may betray the 
hand  of  an  editor  with  a  particular  concern  for  wisdom.    The  distinctions  between 
prophetic and wisdom circles, if they ever firmly existed, become very blurry in later 
biblical periods.
429 
  Jeremiah  represents  another  prophetic  tradition  engaging  with  the  liturgical 
formula from Exodus 34:6-7.  However, in contrast to the prophetic transformations and 
subversions discussed so far, Jeremiah does not rely on the first line of the formula, 
which lists YHWH’s attributes, but rather repeats language and ideas familiar from the 
second  half  of  the  formula,  the  part  that  focuses  on  intergenerational  accountability:  
“You show ({oœsíeh) steadfast love (hΩesed⋲) to the thousandth generation, but repay the 
iniquity ({∞woœn) of the fathers into the laps of their sons after them, Oh great and mighty 
God, whose name is YHWH of hosts” (Jer. 32:18).  Yet, despite acknowledging this 
aspect  of  YHWH’s  nature,  Jeremiah  rejects  the  continued  use  of  the  proverb,  “The 
fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the sons’ teeth are set on edge” (Jer. 31:29).
430  As 
                                                        
429 Andrew Teeter, private communication.  Van Leeuwen, “Scribal Wisdom and Theodicy in the Book of 
the Twelve,” 36. 
 
430  The  verse  following  Jeremiah’s  affirmation  of  YHWH  as  a  deity  who  practices  intergenerational 
punishment and reward suggests that the prophet also held that the same God punished and rewarded on the 
basis of individual merit (Jer. 32:19).  Jeremiah appears to be juggling two conflicting theologies about the 
nature of YHWH, but it is important to note that although they seem to conflict, Jeremiah likely holds both 
theologies.  Collective accountability is generally limited to instances of covenant infidelity, so it could not 
exist alone since individual accountability was necessary to explain the punishment of all other sins.  By 
cutting off the complaints of the innocent sufferers who repeat the sour grapes proverb in Jer. 31:29-30, the   204 
Kaminsky  has  demonstrated,  however,  the  theological  point  behind  the  prophet’s 
rejection of this proverb is not that God’s nature has changed.  Jeremiah does not suggest 
that God’s previous manner of collective punishment was unjust and will become just 
when  he  executes  individual  punishment.    Rather,  the  prophet  foresees  a  change  in 
human understanding of the divine nature.  Those who suffered divine punishment at the 
hands  of  the  Babylonians  will  accept  responsibility  for  their  role  in  earning  the 
punishment that came upon Jerusalem and thus will no longer accuse God of unfairly 
punishing them when they lacked the power to change the situation or to appease him.
431  
  In the postexilic era, Ezra alludes to Exodus 34:6-7 when he leads the Israelites, 
who have just separated themselves from foreigners, in a prayer that recounts YHWH’s 
mighty deeds:  “They refused to obey [your commandments], and they did not remember 
the wonders that you performed among them; they stiffened their necks and determined 
to return to their slavery in Egypt.  But you are a God ready to forgive, gracious (hΩannu®n) 
and merciful (w§rahΩu®m), slow to anger (}erek⋲-}appayim), and abounding in steadfast love 
(w§rab⋲-w§hΩesed), and you did not forsake them” (Neh. 9:17).  Speaking to a people for 
whom the memory of collective punishment is fresh, Ezra has no need to remind his 
audience of YHWH’s vengeful and punishing nature.  Before the prayer culminates in a 
request  for  compassion,  Ezra  reminds  God  of  his  nature  in  language  familiar  from 
                                                        
prophet  shifts  his  audience’s  focus  away  from  the  perceived  injustice  of  YHWH’s  nature  as  one  who 
punishes intergenerationally to his nature as one who punishes according to individual deeds.  Belief in 
individual retribution for most sins does not necessitate disbelief in collective retribution for sins against 
YHWH.  Indeed, it is probable that in the periods preceding Jeremiah and Ezekiel’s negation of the sour 
grapes proverb that individual retribution was already a commonly held belief in addition to the widespread 
acceptance of collective retribution. The two concepts, collective and individual retribution, can coexist 
because they apply to different classes of sins.  Kaminsky, Corporate Responsibility in the Hebrew Bible, 
150. 
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Exodus 34:6-7:  “Nevertheless, in your great mercies (u®b⋲§rahΩ∞me®k⋲aœ) you did not make an 
end of them or forsake them for you are a gracious (hΩannu®n) and merciful (w§rahΩu®m) 
God” (9:31). 
  The Chronicler also recycles the familiar language from the liturgical formula.  In 
describing  Hezekiah’s  reform,  the  Chronicler  tells  of  an  effort  to  send  messengers 
throughout Israel and Judah to encourage the people to observe the Passover.  In order to 
motivate the people to return to proper observance of divine law, the messengers describe 
YHWH’s merciful nature:  “For when you return to YHWH, your kindred and your 
children will find compassion (l§rahΩ∞mˆîm) with their captors and return to this land.  For 
YHWH your God is gracious (hΩannu®n) and merciful (w§rahΩu®m), and he will not turn his 
face  from  you  if  you  return  to  him”  (2  Chron.  30:9).    In  this  context,  the  author 
emphasizes the importance of repentance to the divine exercise of mercy.  Likewise, 
Ezra’s prayer only seeks mercy after acknowledging the people’s many shortcomings.  
YHWH’s  people  are  already  familiar  with  his  punishing  side  (2  Chron.  30:7-8);  to 
witness YHWH’s merciful side, the people must turn away from their wrongdoings. 
  Within the Psalter, numerous psalms reuse Exodus 34:6-7.  For example, in Psalm 
78, the psalmist recalls Israel’s rebellion in the wilderness and God’s merciful response:  
“Yet he, being compassionate (rahΩu®m), forgave their iniquity ({aœwoœn) and did not destroy 
[them]; he often restrained his anger (}appo®) ) and did not stir up all his wrath.  He 
remembered that they were flesh, a wind that passes and does not come again” (Psalm 
78:38-39).  In addition to emphasizing God’s mercy over his judgment, the psalmist also 
explains God’s mercy as a response to ephemeral human nature.  In a world governed by 
strict justice, humans, who are by nature incapable of avoiding sin (Ge. 8:21; 1 Kgs 8:46;   206 
cf. 2 Chron 6:36; Ezek. 20:44; Ps. 51:3; Eccl. 7:20; Job 15:14), would quickly cease to 
exist (Ps. 130:3).
432  The motif of divine mercy in response to human nature recurs in 
Psalm 103, which contrasts the impermanence of humanity (Psa. 103:14-16) with God’s 
eternally merciful nature (v. 17).  Psalm 103, in contrast to Exodus 34:6-7,
433 considers 
only YHWH’s mercy and largely ignores his punishing nature:  “YHWH is merciful 
(rahΩu®m)  and  gracious  (w§hΩannu®n),  slow  to  anger  (}erek⋲  }appayim)  and  abounding  in 
steadfast love (w§rab⋲-hΩaœsed⋲).  He will not always accuse, nor will he keep (yit√t√o®r)
434 [his 
anger] forever.  He does not deal with us according to our sins, nor does he repay us 
according to our iniquities” (Psa. 103:8-10).  This psalm implies that God does not punish 
as much as he could or should, and this idea is familiar from Jonah, although in this 
context  the  psalmist  is  not  complaining  about,  but  rather  praising,  God’s  mercy.  
Although God is merciful because of human frailty according to Psalms 78 and 103, 
Psalm 112 builds upon Psalm 111, which identifies God’s nature as gracious and merciful 
(v. 4b), by describing the righteous as humans possessing these same divine attributes 
(112:4b).
435  Psalm 25 suggests, “All the paths of YHWH are steadfast love (hΩesed⋲) and 
faithfulness (we}§met◊) for those who keep (l§noœsΩ§re®) his covenant and his decrees” (v. 10).  
The psalmist implores YHWH, “Cause me to know your ways, O YHWH, and teach me 
                                                        
432 Ibid., 185–186. 
 
433 Note, however, that many of the interpreters (i.e., Micah, Jonah, Nehemiah) of Exod. 34:6-7 discussed 
so far also ignore YHWH’s punishing nature. 
 
434 Cf. the use of n-t√-r in Nah. 1:2.  Benjamin Sommer describes the use of this root here as a pun.  He 
understands  n-t√-r  to  be  a  homonym  with  the  meaning  “to  guard”  (cf.  n-sΩ-r)  and  also  “to  be  angry.”  
Benjamin  D.  Sommer,  A  Prophet  Reads  Scripture:  Allusion  in  Isaiah  40-66  (Stanford,  CA:  Stanford 
University Press, 1998), 28. 
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your paths” (v. 4).  This psalm also perhaps suggests that the righteous individual should 
strive to attain those attributes that define YHWH.
436 
  Psalm 86 describes YHWH in language familiar from Exodus 34:6-7 (vv. 5, 15).  
In v. 5, the psalmist suggests that YHWH displays his gracious and merciful nature to 
“all who call on you.”  The notion that anyone who prays to YHWH can attain his mercy 
differs  from  other  inner-biblical  interpretations  of  Exodus  34:6-7.
437    Although  the 
liturgical formula does not specify to whom YHWH makes available his compassionate 
nature, the Decalogue suggests that it is for those who “love” him, or maintain covenantal 
fealty  by  observing  his  commandments.  Interpretations  like  those  of  Jonah  and  2 
Chronicles suggest that repentance is a necessary prequalification to receive YHWH’s 
mercy. 
  Like Nahum in the prophetic tradition, Psalm 109 focuses solely on YHWH’s 
attributes  of  vengeance.    The  psalmist’s  enemies
438  ask  that  YHWH  remember  the 
iniquity of his father and mother (v. 14) because he did not show steadfast love (hΩaœsed⋲) to 
the poor and needy, as Psalm 112:4b suggests is the expectation for righteous behavior.  
Like  Nahum  and  Jonah,  this  psalm  indicates  that  Israelite  interpreters  expected  the 
vengeful  attributes  of  YHWH  to  be  used  against  Israel  (or  the  psalmist’s)  human 
enemies. 
                                                        
436 For the connection of this psalm to perhaps both the wisdom tradition and the editing of the Book of the 
Twelve, see ibid., 37–38. 
 
437 2 Chron. 30:9, discussed above, could be an exception to this statement, but its context seems to suggest 
a limited audience of Israelites in exile, not a universal audience.  For the Chronicler, divine mercy relies 
on the notion of returning (taœsûu®b⋲u®) to YHWH, an act that is likely more exclusive than the psalmist’s all-
inclusive “all who call (qoœr§}e®k⋲aœ) on you.” 
 
438 The speaker of Psalm 109:6-19 is unclear, but even if it is not the psalmist, the psalmist asks that these 
same curses be inflicted on his enemies in v. 20.   208 
II.b. The Reuse of Exodus 34:6-7 in the Biblical Wisdom Tradition 
  Given  the  above  examination  of  the  various  methods,  genres,  and  contexts  in 
which the liturgical formula from Exodus 34:6-7 is reused in other parts of the Hebrew 
Bible, it is now appropriate to consider the usage of this passage, and terminology from 
it, in the wisdom literature.  The relationship between Exod. 34:6-7 and each of the 
biblical wisdom books will be examined below. 
As Dentan has observed, the presumed secular interests of sages have often led 
scholars to ignore Israel’s sages as theologians like their counterparts in other areas of the 
Hebrew Bible.
439  However, Israel’s sages were very much concerned with theological 
issues, and one should not be surprised that YHWH’s nature is one of those with which 
the sages engaged.   Just as the issues of divine mercy and justice were important to the 
authors of passages like the Decalogue, Numbers 14:18, Deuteronomy 7:9-10, Nahum 
1:2, Joel 2:13, 2 Chronicles 30:9, etc., so too did they weigh on the mind of those who 
penned  Israel’s  wisdom  literature.    Nevertheless,  the  connection  between  wisdom 
passages and Exodus 34:6-7 is not always certain as it tends to be in other biblical reuses 
of the divine attribute formula because of the aphoristic and pithy nature of wisdom 
literature.  Not every example discussed should be construed as a certain allusion to 
Exodus 34:6-7, but I have opted to included all possible connections in the interest of 




439 Dentan, “The Literary Affinities of Exodus XXXIV 6f,” 49.  The sages may even have had a hand in the 
editing of other sections of the Bible.  See Van Leeuwen, “Scribal Wisdom and Theodicy in the Book of 
the Twelve.”   209 
  Although  Proverbs  does  not  allude  to  or  draw  upon  biblical  literature  and 
traditions in the same manner that later wisdom books, like that of Ben Sira, do, I think it 
is likely that this work of wisdom participates in the inner-biblical debate about the nature 
of God.  The primary terminology used to discuss the divine nature was drawn from the 
liturgical formula, which, according to its biblical framework, is YHWH’s description of 
himself.  Even if the sage was not inclined to utilize biblical traditions, his reuse of 
language and themes from Exodus 34:6-7 throughout the book of Proverbs suggests that, 
at  the  very  least,  he  employed  the  debate’s  familiar  terminology,  drawn  from  the 
cultic/biblical tradition encapsulated in the divine attribute formula of Exod. 34:6-7, in 
order to make clear his position on the subject to his students. 
In  Proverbs  16:5-6,  the  sage  uses  terminology  from  Exodus  34:6-7:    “An 
abomination  of  YHWH  is  every  haughty  heart;  surely,
440  he  will  not  go  unpunished 
(yinnaœqeh).
441    Through  steadfast  love  (b§hΩesed⋲)  and  faithfulness  (we}§met◊)  iniquity 
({aœwoœn) is atoned, and through the fear of YHWH one turns aside from evil.”  This 
passage comes on the heels of v. 4 (“YHWH has made everything for its purpose, even 
the wicked for the day of trouble”),
442 which seems to suggest that evil individuals are so 
                                                        
440 Literally, the expression is “hand to hand” (yaœd⋲ l§yaœd⋲).  Cf. Prov. 11:21.  Although the expression of lex 
talionis in Exod. 21:23-25 is yaœd⋲ tahΩat◊ yaœd⋲, “hand instead of hand” (cf. Lev. 24:19-20, which uses the same 
preposition but does not include “hand instead of hand” in its list), Deut. 19:21 uses the preposition “b-“ to 
indicate lex talionis: yaœd⋲ b§yaœd⋲, “hand for hand.”  In light of this and the emphasis on strict retributive 
justice in both Prov. 16:5 and 11:21, the sage may have the notion of lex talionis in mind. 
 
441 The expression, “he will not go unpunished” (yinnaœqeh) recurs seven times in the book of Proverbs 
(6:29, 11:21, 17:5, 19:5, 28:20).  Prov. 16:5a bears striking similarity to 11:21a:  “Surely (yaœd⋲ l§yaœd⋲), the 
wicked will not go unpunished (yinnaœqeh).”  In addition to this bold claim, the second half of the verse 
asserts that the righteous will escape.  According to Fox, the sage bases his assertion “not on observation 
but on beliefs about God.”  This consideration will be discussed further below. Fox, Proverbs, 2009, 2:539.  
Cf. Van Leeuwen, “The Book of Proverbs,” 119. 
 
442 See Chapter 2 for further discussion of this verse.   210 
by divine creation, a condition that invites the possibility that the righteous will not suffer 
punishment because they are innately good.  The sage, however, disabuses his righteous 
pupils of this misunderstanding by suggesting that the individual who haughtily thinks 
that  he  is  safe  from  divine  retribution  will  not  go  unpunished.    This  recalls  God’s 
attributes of justice in the liturgical formula, on which Nahum also focuses.
443   
In contrast to Nahum, however, who focuses on God’s wrath to the exclusion of 
his  mercy,  Proverbs  16:6  suggests  that  steadfast  love  and  faithfulness  can  atone  for 
iniquity.
444  The clustered terminology is reminiscent of Exodus 34:6-7, but the explicit 
notion that these divine attributes are also human characteristics that can achieve divine 
appeasement  is  an  idea  found  in  later  interpretations  of  the  liturgical  formula.    For 
example, Psalm 112:4b suggests that the righteous are gracious and merciful, two other 
divine attributes known from the liturgical formula.  While several reuses of the divine 
attribute  formula  have  suggested  that  repentance  can  compel  YHWH  to  display  his 
merciful,  rather  than  vengeful,  qualities,  Prov.  16:5-6  builds  upon  this  tradition  by 
asserting that human emulation of divine attributes can assuage divine anger and lead to 
forgiveness. 
  The notion that the human student of wisdom can model his own behavior on 
divine attributes resurfaces later in Prov. 16:32:  “Better is the one who is slow to anger 
                                                        
443 Cf. Prov. 19:9. 
 
444 Not all scholars agree that it is human steadfast love and faithfulness that atone for iniquity in Prov. 
16:6.  On the basis of the borrowed terminology from Exodus 34:6-7, some scholars, like Van Leeuwen, 
argue  that  the  reference  is  to  divine  steadfast  love  and  faithfulness  because  the  passage  to  which  this 
wisdom alludes, namely Exod. 34:6-7, is a divine revelation of YHWH’s nature.  Van Leeuwen ignores the 
possibility that the sage is adapting Exodus 34:6-7 and its theological implications for his own purposes. As 
advice for a pupil, the passage is more compelling if it provides the student with actions that he can 
undertake to ensure his success.  Indeed, the language of the passage suggests that atonement is achieved 
(y§k⋲uppar) through steadfast love (b§hΩesed⋲) and faithfulness (we}§met◊), which should belong to the human 
subject, not God.  Van Leeuwen, “The Book of Proverbs,” 119.   211 
(}erek⋲ }appayim) than the mighty, and the one who controls his temper than the one who 
captures a city.”  The expression, “slow to anger” (}erek⋲ }appayim), literally translated 
“long of nose,”
445 also occurs in Prov. 14:29, 15:18, and 19:11,
446 which similarly credit 
the patient individual with being wiser and more capable than the one who lacks such 
self-restraint.  Prov. 19:22 encourages the student to demonstrate steadfast love (hΩasdo®).  
As seen already in Psalms 112:4b and 109:16, the righteous individual is expected to 
model  his  own  behavior  on  those  divine  characteristics  that  YHWH  uses  to  define 
himself in Exodus 34:6-7.   
Job 
   Although the language does not appear as clustered in the Book of Job as it does 
in Proverbs, the righteous sufferer protests with terminology familiar from Exod. 34:6-7 
that he will be the victim of YHWH’s vengeance even if he ceases to object to divine 
justice:  “If I say, “Let me forget my complaint, let me abandon my sad countenance and 
be cheerful,” I am afraid of all my suffering for I know that you will not let me go 
unpunished (t◊§naqqeœnˆî)” (Job 9:27-28).  The possible connection to the divine attribute 
formula in Exod. 34:6-7 relies on the presence of only one shared term, however, so one 
must  be  cautious  in  interpreting  Job’s  use  of  this  common  verb  as  an  allusion.  
Nevertheless, the passage is worth considering for the purposes of this study because, as 
Dentan has pointed out, the rather common root n-q-h occurs in the pi‘el stem with God 
as its subject only in Exod. 34:6-7 (and passages dependent upon it), Job 9:28 and 10:14, 
                                                        
445 Or, perhaps more accurately, “long of nostrils.” 
 
446 Cf. Eccl. 7:8, which uses the phrase “long of spirit” (}erek⋲-ru®ahΩ) to refer to patience.  Dentan, “The 
Literary Affinities of Exodus XXXIV 6f,” 42.   212 
and  a  couple  of  other  late  texts  (Psa.  19:13;  Jer.  30:11).
447    Because  the  connection 
between  Job  10:14  and  Exod.  34:6-7  appears  stronger,  I  include  Job  9:28  in  my 
discussion in case it may also have relevance that would otherwise be missed by applying 
stricter criteria for identifying an allusion.   
In Job 9:28, the sufferer accuses God of exercising his justice on someone who 
does  not  deserve  punishment  and  of  not  relenting  once  he  has  acknowledged  his 
wrongdoing.    This  contrasts  with  the  notion  expressed  in  other  inner-biblical 
interpretations  of  Exod.  34:6-7  that  suggest  that  YHWH  offers  mercy  to  those  who 
repent.  Additionally, Job suggests that God’s mercy is not as abundant as the liturgical 
formula  from  Exodus  34:6-7  purports:    “Life  and  steadfast  love  (waœhΩesed⋲)  you  have 
given me, and your oversight has kept (sûaœm§ra®) my spirit.  Yet these things you have 
hidden in your heart; I know that this is with you.  If I sin, you watch me (u®sû§martaœnˆî) 
and  for  my  iniquity  (u®meœ{∞woœnˆî)  you  do  not  let  me  go  unpunished  (t◊§naqqeœnˆî)”  (Job 
10:12-14).  According to Job, God pays close attention to his deeds so as to exercise 
punishment, not mercy, when he stumbles.  Unlike interpretations of Exod. 34:6-7 that 
focus exclusively on God’s mercy, Job focuses primarily on punishment. 
  Although not responding directly to Job’s speech that God is far too exacting in 
executing punishment, Elihu suggests that God is the opposite of what Job claims:  “And 
now,  because  his  anger  (}appo®)  is  not  punishing  (paœqad⋲)  and  he  does  not  take  into 
account many transgressions (bappasû)”
448 (Job 35:15).  God’s merciful nature means that 
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he  has  been  too  lenient  in  punishing  human  sins,  and  Elihu  suggests  that  Job  has 
benefitted from this aspect of God’s personality.
449 
One more passage in Job may have relevance to the reinterpretation of Exodus 
34:6-7.  Although the linguistic connection involves only one shared term, Job 13:26 
accuses God of practicing delayed punishment:  “For you write bitter things against me, 
and you make me possess the iniquities ({∞woœno®t◊) of my youth” (Job 13:26; cf. Psalm 
25:7).  The notion of delayed punishment underlies YHWH’s ability to “forgive” (noœsíeœ}), 
literally “bear” or “lift up,” iniquity and transgression and sin (Exodus 34:7).  The laws of 
the universe demand that things that render a person unholy, like sin, not come into 
contact  with  the  holy,  namely  YHWH  and  his  divine  immanence  on  earth,  without 
disastrous consequences.  YHWH’s amazing power to store up, to “bear,” sin and dole 
out its punishment slowly over time enables YHWH’s continued relationship with the 
human and imperfect Israelite people, who would otherwise be destroyed in a contagious 
outbreak of divine wrath.  Exodus 34:6-7 suggests that YHWH metes out punishment 
over the course of three to four generations of the sinner.  Job observes, as the Israelites 
who  murmured  against  God  in  Numbers  14  experienced  personally  when  they  were 
denied admission into the Promised Land, that YHWH can also punish an individual later 
in his lifetime for an earlier sin.  Because his language does not contain an abundance of 
clustered terminology from Exodus 34:6-7, Job does not appear to be engaging with this 
tradition by rephrasing it, but he may be aware of interpretations, like that of Psalm 25:7, 
that do not consider this type of delayed punishment to be merciful. 
Ben Sira 
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  Several passages from the Wisdom of Ben Sira make use of language and themes 
from the Greek translation of Exodus 34:6-7.  Sir. 2:11, which is no longer extant in 
Hebrew,  speaks  of  YHWH’s  compassionate  and  merciful  nature:    “For  the  Lord  is 
compassionate (oiktirmoœn) and merciful (eleeœmoœn); he forgives sins and saves in time of 
trouble.”
450  Ben Sira, however, does not draw upon divine revelation to conclude that 
this description fits YHWH’s nature.  Rather, he extrapolates these characteristics from 
his reflection upon bygone generations whose faith in YHWH has never led them astray 
according to Sir. 2:10.
451   
Sir.  5:4-7  appears  to  address  those  who  appeal  to  Exodus  34:6-7  as  proof  of 
YHWH’s mercy:  “Do not say, ‘I have sinned, yet what has happened to me?’  For God is 
slow to anger (}rk⋲ }p⋲ym).  Do not trust in forgiveness so that you add iniquity to iniquity 
({wn  {l  {wn).    Do  not  say,  ‘His  compassion  (rhΩmyw)  is  great;  the  abundance  of  my 
iniquities ({wnwt◊y) he will forgive.’ For both compassion (rhΩmym) and anger (w}p⋲) are 
with him, and upon the wicked will rest his wrath.  Do not delay to return to him, and do 
not skip over from day to day.  For suddenly his wrath will come forth, and on the day of 
vengeance you will be swept away.”  Ben Sira’s use of the debate formula (“Do not 
say…”)  suggests  that  the  issue  of  YHWH’s  mercy  had  stirred  a  lively  debate  in  his 
time.
452  The sage responds to his opponents who rely on the revelation of Exodus 34:6-7 
                                                        
450 Note that the Greek translation for rahΩu®m w§hΩannu®n, “merciful and gracious,” in Exod. 34:6-7 is 
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to justify their behavior by recycling and reinterpreting terminology from YHWH’s self-
description.   
The most prominent transformation is his usage of the expression “slow to anger” 
(}rk⋲ }p⋲ym).  The sinner credits his continued, unpunished existence to divine mercy, but 
Ben Sira turns the notion of divine mercy on its head by suggesting that the sinner has not 
yet suffered punishment because God is “slow to anger,” or, perhaps like Nahum, “long 
in anger.”  The sage’s argument, it seems, is that the sinner’s present course of action will 
bring  divine  wrath  upon  himself  at  a  later  time.    This  contradicts  Ben  Sira’s  later 
statement that “retribution does not skip over/delay” (Sir. 7:16).  The change in context 
likely  explains  the  sage’s  change  in  theology.    Whereas  5:4-7  is  addressed  to  the 
individual who has already committed a sin and believes he need not rush to repent 
because  of  the  abundance  of  divine  mercy  available  to  him,  7:16  discourages  an 
individual from interacting with other sinners, who might lead him into sin.  In the latter 
case, the threat of immediate punishment is an effective motivator, but in the former such 
a claim would conflict with observed reality.
453 
Unlike some passages examined from the Hebrew Bible that reuse Exodus 34:6-7 
to emphasize one aspect of YHWH’s divine nature over another, Ben Sira reminds his 
audience that God’s nature is both merciful and punishing (5:6).  The sage reiterates this 
point in 16:12:  “As great as his compassion (rhΩmyw), so is his reproof.  He judges each 
man according to his deeds.”  Although this statement does not make use of terminology 
from Exodus 34:6-7 to the extent that 5:4-7 does, it seems to refute the notion contained 
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within the divine attribute formula that God’s mercy far exceeds his vengeance.
454 Rather, 
God’s mercy and vengeance are equal.  Like Deut. 7:9-10, it also suggests that God 
exercises individual, not collective, retribution. 
Although not extant in Hebrew, Sir. 18:8-14 uses language that overlaps with the 
semantic notions contained in Exodus 34:6-7:   
(8) “What is man and what is his use?  What is good for him, and what is 
bad for him?  (9) The number of the days of man is many if he reaches one 
hundred years.  (10) Like a drop of water from the sea and a grain of sand, 
thus are a few years in the days of eternity.  (11) On account of this, the 
Lord is patient (emakrothymeœsen) with them, and he pours out his mercy 
(eleos) on them.  (12) He sees and recognizes that their end is bad; on 
account of this, he multiplies his forgiveness (exilasmon).  (13) The mercy 
(eleos) of man is for his neighbor, but the mercy (eleos) of the Lord is for 
all flesh.  He reproves and disciplines and teaches them, and he returns 
them, as a shepherd to his flock.  (14) He shows mercy (eleaÇ) to those who 
accept his discipline and who are eager for his decrees.” (Sir. 18:8-14)
455 
 
In  his  reflection  on  the  nature  of  humanity,  the  sage  offers  human  transience  as 
motivation for divine compassion.  This is reminiscent of the reuse of Exodus 34:6-7 in 
Psalms 78:38-39 and 103:14-18.  Whereas Jonah and 2 Chronicles reuse the formula to 
suggest that repentance enables humans to obtain divine mercy, Ben Sira suggests that 
God  pardons  those  who  embrace  the  major  tools  of  the  wisdom  instructor:    reproof, 
discipline, and instruction.  Context dictates how ancient interpreters reuse the Exodus 
34:6-7 tradition.   
Wisdom of Solomon 
  The  Wisdom  of  Solomon  was  composed  in  Greek,  so  one  cannot  be  certain 
whether  or  not  it  is  engaging  with  Exodus  34:6-7  by  drawing  upon  its  terminology.  
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Nevertheless, this concern need not be insurmountable; it is still instructive to consider 
this piece of wisdom literature’s comments on divine mercy and punishment, especially 
where those comments use language that overlaps with that of the Greek translation of 
Exodus 34:6-7. 
  The author of Wisdom describes God’s nature using terminology that occurs in 
the Greek translation of Exod. 34:6:  “But you, our God, are kind and true (aleœtheœs), 
patient (makrothymos) and ruling all things with mercy (eleei)” (Sy de, ho theos heœmoœn, 
chreœstos  kai  aleœtheœs,  makrothymos  kai  eleei  dioikoœn  ta  panta)  (Wis.  15:1).    By 
comparison,  the  Greek  translation  of  Exodus  34:6  describes  YHWH  with  similar 
terminology, but a slightly altered word order:  “The Lord, a God compassionate and 
merciful ( eleeœmoœn),  patient ( makrothymos)  and  abounding  with  mercy  and  true 
(aleœthinos)”  (Kyrios  ho  theos  oiktirmoœn  kai  eleeœmoœn,  makrothymos  kai  polyeleos  kai 
aleœthinos).  In 11:23, the sage insists that God’s mercy is available to all and that its 
purpose  is  to  encourage  repentance  (cf.  Joel  2:13).    McGlynn  argues  that  this  is  an 
important function of the “mercy digression” in Wis. 13:1-15:19.
456 Nevertheless, other 
passages  suggest  that,  although  available  to  all,  God’s  mercy  primarily  benefits  his 
chosen people (Wis. 4:15; cf. 3:9).  The sage speaks of God disciplining the Israelites 
with  mercy  (eleei),  whereas  “the  ungodly  were  tormented  when  judged  with  wrath” 
(11:9).   
By contrast to the treatment of the non-elect, at a time when the Israelites seem to 
deserve punishment, God instead does good for his people (16:2).  When God judges his 
elect, they “expect mercy” (12:22).  God is even said to “judge with kindness” (12:18).  
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God’s kindness and mercy establish a model for the Israelites to emulate, according to the 
sage:  “You have taught your people through such works that it is necessary for the 
righteous to be humane, to make hopeful your children, because you gave repentance for 
sins” (12:19).
457  This is reminiscent of the reworking of Exodus 34:6-7 in Psalms 112 
and 25 to encourage the imitation of YHWH’s kind and compassionate nature. 
  According to Wis. 1:8, “On account of this, the ones uttering unrighteous things 
cannot  hide,  and  justice,  when  it  reproves,  will  not  pass  him  by”  (dia  touto 
phtheggomenos adika oudeis meœ latheœÇ, oude meœ parodeuseœÇ auton elegchousa heœ dikeœ).  
Wis. 1:8 agrees with Exod. 34:7 that sinners do not go unpunished, but it does not echo 
any familiar terminology from the divine attribute formula (“and he will not clear the 
guilty,” kai ou kathariei ton enochon).  However, Wis. 12:2, also in agreement with the 
themes  of  the  liturgical  formula  but  with  no  shared  terminology,  suggests  that  God 
spreads out his punishment over a duration of time:  “Therefore, you reprove little by 
little those who fall away, and, reminding them of the things through which they sin, you 
warn them so that being set free from evil they trust in you, O Lord.”  The sage applies 
this logic to the Israelites’ failure to eradicate completely the Canaanites, whom God 
judged little by little so as to provide them with a chance for repentance (12:10).  God’s 
patience  is  not  described  here  as  being  “slow  to  anger”  or  “bearing  iniquity  and 
transgression and sin,” but the author seems to have these divine characteristics in mind 
in explaining the persistence of the Canaanites as an act of divine mercy.  Obviously, the 
lack of any linguistic connection to Exod. 34:6-7 in these passages suggests that the sage 
                                                        
457 According to Philo, “For what one of the men of old aptly said is true, that in no other action does man 
so much resemble God as in showing kindness, and what greater good can there be than that they should 
imitate God, they the created, Him the Eternal?”  Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 43–44.  See Spec. 
4.73, cf. 1.294; Cong. 171.   219 
is not using allusion to engage with popular notions of the nature of God’s mercy, but the 
thematic overlap suggests that the issue of divine mercy, especially its manifestation in 
the form of delayed punishment, remained an important issue in the time of Wisdom’s 
composition. 
 
III. Jeremiah 31 and Ezekiel 18 in the Biblical Wisdom Tradition 
  Having now considered many of the different ways in which Israel’s wisdom 
literature recycles, reuses, and reinterprets elements of Exod. 34:6-7, a creedal statement 
about YHWH’s nature as a God who exercises intergenerational punishment, this chapter 
will turn to the use of a hallmark of wisdom literature, the proverb, by two of Judah’s 
prophets to engage with the notion that YHWH practices intergenerational punishment. 
  Bernard  Levinson  has  demonstrated  that  although  one  expects  a  static,  fixed 
canon  to  pose  problems  for  cultural  and  theological  innovation,  biblical  exegetes 
introduced new ideas and overturned old ones through various processes.
458  In the case 
of  a  God  who  describes  himself  as  exercising  intergenerational  punishment  (i.e.,  the 
divine  attribute  formula  in  Exod.  34:6-7),  human  exegetes  produced  innovative 
understandings of God’s nature that appeared faithful to tradition but that better suited the 
exegetes’ new contexts by reformulating God’s self-description.
459  Deuteronomy 7:9-10 
provides one such example of canonical innovation by altering the description of a God 
who  exercises  collective  punishment  into  one  who  exercises  individual  punishment.  
Within the wisdom tradition, Ben Sira, for example, draws on terminology from Exod. 
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34:6-7 to create a more balanced description of YHWH’s mercy and anger; the intent is 
to  prevent  his  students  from  sinning  by  presenting  the  expectation  that  the  infinite 
abundance of YHWH’s mercy (Exod. 34:6-7) will spare them divine wrath (Sir. 5:6, 
16:12).  By reformulating YHWH’s own language, these exegetes successfully balance 
tradition and change to present a new understanding of divine mercy and justice. 
By  contrast,  Levinson  argues  that  Ezekiel  18:1-4  accomplishes  innovation  by 
avoiding the biblical language used to describe YHWH’s nature as a merciful and just 
God who practices intergenerational punishment.  Instead of recycling YHWH’s own 
words of self-description, Levinson claims, Ezekiel cites and “rejects a simple human 
proverb, a product of traditional wisdom,”
460 and thus human in origin:   
The word of the Lord came to me:  What do you mean by repeating this 
proverb concerning the land of Israel, ‘The parents have eaten sour grapes, 
and the children’s teeth are set on edge’?  As I live, says the Lord YHWH, 
this proverb shall no more be used by you in Israel.  Know that all lives 
are mine; the life of the parent as well as the life of the child is mine:  it is 
only the person who sins that shall die. (Ezek. 18:1-4) 
 
What is the relationship between this proverb, also cited by the prophet Jeremiah (Jer. 
31:29-30), and the wisdom tradition?  The proverb nowhere appears in any of the wisdom 
books preserved in the Hebrew Bible or Apocrypha, yet it draws upon a literary form, the 
proverb, common in wisdom literature.  What is the origin of this proverb?  How does the 
notion of collective accountability found in this proverb compare to the concept as it is 
found in the wisdom books? 
  The mashal, “proverb,” describes an observation of reality in a pithy and often 
persuasive manner.  Such observations of the world and how it works are often secular in 
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nature.
461  That is, unlike divine commands that dictate righteous behavior and morality 
based on God’s authority alone, a proverb offers a quick lesson in the consequences of 
certain  attitudes  and  behaviors  in  order  to  promote  righteous  behavior  and  morality.  
Proverbs likely have folk origins,
462 but the group that produces them may differ from the 
group that collects and records them.
463  Many scholars consider the origins of the literary 
form  of  the  mashal,  “proverb,”  to  lie  within  wisdom  circles.
464    Did  the  sages  who 
produced,  studied,  and  perpetuated  Israel’s  own  biblical  wisdom  tradition  help  to 
circulate this sour grapes proverb? 
  Both Jeremiah and Ezekiel preach to audiences struggling to make sense of a 
changing  world  order  that  threatened  their  theological  beliefs.    The  Babylonians  had 
destroyed  the  temple  of  their  supreme  deity  and  forced  their  ruling  elite  into  exile.  
Grasping  for  an  explanation  for  this  turn  of  events  that  did  not  conflict  with  their 
understanding  of  YHWH  as  ruler  of  the  universe  who  had  a  special  covenantal 
relationship with the people of Judah, or at least some of them (for an alternate view, see 
Jer.  44),  they  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  the  devastation  through  which  they  had 
suffered was YHWH’s will.  To provoke such a display of divine wrath, the people must 
have angered this deity whose mercy was known to outweigh his vengeance (Exod. 34:6-
7).  One popular explanation for the nature of Judah’s sins, given that the punishment 
seemed disproportionate to any wrongdoing in recent memory, was that YHWH was 
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punishing Judah for the sins of its ancestors and former leaders (for example, 2 Kgs. 
21:11-16,  22:13,  24:3).    The  Deuteronomistic  Historian  puts  forth  this  argument  in 
recounting the history of Israel and Judah.  Both Jeremiah and Ezekiel suggest that the 
people, in response to this interpretation of historical events, had summed up their bad 
fortune with the pithy proverb:  “The parents have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s 
teeth are set on edge.”   
  Ezekiel deals with the issue of collective accountability at length in chapter 18.  
His examples make clear that those who suffer or prosper do so as a result of their own 
deeds, and this would appear to be a clear rejection of collective accountability in favor 
of individual accountability.  However, in setting the stage for this discussion, Ezekiel 
carefully  phrases  the  complaint  of  the  people  and  YHWH’s  position  on  the  issue  of 
collective accountability.  According to the prophet, YHWH asks the people why they 
use the proverb, “The parents have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on 
edge” (Ezek. 18:2).  This line of questioning does not necessarily discount the apparent 
meaning of the proverb (namely, that the people of Judah suffer for the sins of their 
ancestors), but rather sparks the people’s introspection into their use of the proverb and 
attribution of their suffering to others.  YHWH does not declare the proverb, or the notion 
of collective accountability, for that matter, to be invalid.  Rather, he foretells that the 
people will no longer repeat the proverb in Israel (Ezek. 18:3).  While one could interpret 
this to mean that YHWH has rejected the notion of collective accountability and changed 
his own nature to promote individual accountability, this is not the plain sense meaning 
of the text.  YHWH is not the one who will change, according to Ezekiel’s prophecy (cf. 
Ezek.  18:25,  29).    The  people  will  change;  they  will  stop  repeating  the  sour  grapes   223 
proverb.  The simple meaning of this prophecy, then, is that the people, who have, it is to 
be hoped, acknowledged their own shortcomings and resolved to mend their relationship 
with YHWH, will no longer blame their ancestors for their suffering by repeating the 
proverb.    In  other  words,  they  will  no  longer  use  collective  accountability  as  an 
explanation for their suffering.  This does not necessitate that YHWH cease to be a deity 
who exercises collective accountability.   
  Most commentators understand Jeremiah and Ezekiel’s quotation of this proverb 
to reflect the proverb’s historical currency among their respective audiences.
465 That the 
survivors  of  the  Babylonian  campaigns  against  Judah  and  Jerusalem  pithily  and 
poetically described themselves as suffering for the sins of their ancestors is proved by 
Lam. 5:7 (“Our ancestors sinned; they are no more, but we bear their iniquities.”), but 
this is not what the prophets quote.     
A proverb, like the one quoted by Jeremiah and Ezekiel, will often draw upon 
observations  from  the  natural  world  to  support  the  logic  of  its  pithy  argument  (for 
example, Prov. 10:26, 11:22, 14:4, 20:2, 23:32, 25:12, 25:16, 25:18, 26:11, 27:17).  The 
proverb relies on logic and observation of fact rather than divine origins for its authority.  
If the image depicted by the proverb is illogical or does not accurately reflect reality, the 
proverb does not prove its point.  If a proverb distorts reality, then the interpreter must 
investigate what effect such a distortion achieves. 
  The  sour  grapes  proverb  used  by  both  Jeremiah  and  Ezekiel  depicts  a 
physiologically impossible situation, yet presents it, in proverbial form, as an observation 
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of reality.
466  A father’s ingestion of any food cannot have an effect on the teeth or taste 
receptors of his offspring. As will be discussed below, the proverb is a complaint uttered 
by  the  sinner’s  children  who  perceive  that  they  have  suffered  for  someone  else’s 
wrongdoing.
467  The absurdity of the metaphor, children suffering dental harm because of 
their parents’ grape consumption, emphasizes that the wrong person suffers the effect of 
the original action.
468  While Israelite communities did in fact complain that the suffering 
they endured was punishment for their ancestors’ sins (Lam. 5:7, the Deuteronomistic 
Historian’s  explanation  for  the  fall  of  Jerusalem),  one  must  question  whether  their 
complaints actually took the form of this nonsensical proverb.  Is it perhaps possible that 
the prophet(s) devised this proverb in order to create a subtly criticized caricature of the 
Israelites’ complaint that their suffering was unmerited?  In other words, the prophets are 
paraphrasing the people’s claims of unjust suffering by using a proverb that appeals to the 
natural world in order to underscore its logic; yet the reality that it depicts is distorted, 
and thus the people are forced to reflect on the illogical nature of their complaint.   
  An  ancient  Near  Eastern  example  of  a  similar  phenomenon  may  help  to 
understand the subtlety of Jeremiah and Ezekiel’s use of what seems to be a caricature of 
a  circulating  proverb  like  Lam.  5:7,  or  some  similar  line  of  thinking.    In  the 
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propagandistic Persian Verse Account of Nabonidus, the Babylonian king is depicted as 
boasting about his wisdom:   
He would stand in the assembly (and) exalt him[self] (as follows):  ‘I am 
wise.  I am knowledgeable.  I have seen hid[den things].  I do not know a 
tablet (made by) a cut-reed stylus (i.e., cuneiform writing), (but) I have 
seen se[cret things].  Ilteri has given me revelations; he has [made known 
to me] everything.  As for (the series) Uskaru Anu Enlil, which Adapa 
compiled, I surpass it in all wisdo[m].’
469   
 
Believing  it  to  be  an  actual  Babylonian  astronomical  collection,  scholars  had  long 
grappled over the proper translation and referent of the cryptic title, “Uskaru Anu Enlil.”  
However, as Machinist and Tadmor have proposed, the title is more likely an invented 
one for a series that never existed; it is a play on the astronomical collection Enuma Anu 
Enlil.
470    The  author  of  the  text  criticizes  the  illiterate  Nabonidus’s  pretensions  to 
wisdom.  By putting a boast of having greater wisdom than a nonsensical source of 
learning into the mouth of the illiterate king, the author pokes fun at the king’s ignorance 
of important sources of understanding, like Enuma Anu Enlil.  Similarly, Jeremiah and 
Ezekiel’s placing of the satirical sour grapes proverb in the mouths of their audiences 
subtly suggests that their complaints are invalid; their suffering is not unjust.   
  As previously mentioned in the discussion of Jeremiah in the introduction to this 
chapter,  the  prophets’  reject  this  proverb  because  the  attitude  that  it  encapsulates 
exculpates the sufferer from having played any role in his suffering.  For Jeremiah and 
Ezekiel, this is not a productive attitude to encourage people to reform their ways.  So 
long as they can blame someone else for their suffering, they have no motive to do 
                                                        
469 This translation of the Persian Verse Account of Nabonidus 8-13 follows Peter Machinist and Hayim 
Tadmor, “Heavenly Wisdom,” in The Tablet and the Scroll:  Near Eastern Studies in Honor of William W. 
Hallo, ed. Mark E. Cohen, Daniel C. Snell, and David B. Weisberg. (Bethesda, Md: CDL Press, 1993), 
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anything  to  change  their  situation  or  their  relationship  with  God.    Admittedly,  both 
Jeremiah and Ezekiel seem to express solidarity with the complaint of the people by 
rejecting the proverb.  Their critique is subtle enough that it allows the prophets to make 
their audience feel accepted in their feelings of injustice.
471  Ezekiel, for example, words 
his rejection of the proverb very carefully.  He does not state that the proverb is not true 
or invalid; nor does he state that God’s nature has changed.  Rather, he states that the 
people will no longer use the proverb:  “No longer will you repeat this proverb in Israel” 
(}im-yihyeh  laœk⋲em  {o®d⋲  m§sûoœl  hammaœsûaœl  hazzeh  b§yisíraœ}eœl)  (Ezek.  18:3b).    Ezekiel 
redirects his audience’s frustrations by describing what will happen when they accept his 
message  of  repentance  and  loyalty  to  God.    Namely,  the  people  of  Israel  will  stop 
blaming their ancestors for their suffering and focus instead on acting in a manner that 
will put them in good standing with God.  This does not necessitate that their ancestors 
not be blameworthy, just that the people will no longer focus on bygone generations 
whose deeds they cannot change as the source of their anguish. 
The sour grapes proverb, as Levinson has noted, is secular; in contrast to Exodus 
34:6-7, which also deals with the issue of intergenerational punishment, the proverb does 
not  mention  God.    The  prophets,  then,  do  not  deny  that  God  can  punish 
intergenerationally by rejecting an illogical proverb.  Rather, they are denying that the 
people are suffering for the sins of another.  The people’s suffering is not evidence of 
injustice, divine or otherwise.  God’s ways are just (Ezek. 18:25, 29); it is the people’s 
own actions that have produced their current predicament. 
                                                        
471 Contrast this position with that taken by Job’s comforters, who reject outright his claim to innocent 
suffering and thereby elicit only greater protestations from the righteous sufferer.   227 
One major function of intergenerational punishment in wisdom literature is to 
validate divine justice.  Job challenges the conventional wisdom that God rewards the 
righteous and punishes the wicked.  Righteous and bereft of his children, he has observed 
that the wicked prosper and are blessed with many children.  One defense proffered by 
Job’s friends to the sufferer’s critique of theodicy is that the prosperity and abundant 
offspring of the wicked are only temporary.  Although they may have many children, 
they die violent deaths and suffer negative consequences (Job 18:15-21).  This solution, 
offered to Job whose own children have been robbed of life, strikes the modern reader as 
ironic because it attempts to placate the innocent sufferer with the promise of innocent 
suffering for the children of the wicked.  Ben Sira also responds to critics of God’s justice 
by using the promise of intergenerational punishment looming over the children of the 
wicked, who otherwise seem to be prospering (Sir. 40:15, 41:5-10).  What the sages 
know of YHWH’s nature from revelation dovetails with observed reality (the children of 
wrongdoers are part of a cycle of violence) to provide a solution, albeit not satisfying to 
sufferers like Job, to the problem of prosperous sinners.  The perspective here is from that 
of the outsider looking in on what bad things befall the sinful father.  Job, his comforters, 
and Ben Sira are unconcerned with the injustice of the children suffering for their father’s 
sins.  For them, the suffering of children is evidence of justice, of punishment for the 
wicked.  Freed from the prophetic contexts that challenge its validity, the sour grapes 
proverb does not provide support for the contention that YHWH is just.  For the one 
allegedly citing this proverb or expressing a similar sentiment (i.e. Lam. 5:7), YHWH is 
not merely a midwife, a la Koch, in the operation of retributive justice.  Rather, YHWH 
interferes with the natural order of the universe, a reality in which it is impossible for   228 
children to experience any physical effects from their parents’ dietary choices, to exercise 
retribution.  Unlike the use of intergenerational punishment in Israel’s wisdom books, the 
proverb that Jeremiah and Ezekiel quote seems to suggest that God is unjust. 
Very frequently when Israel’s sages mention intergenerational punishment, they 
use it as a pedagogical tool to persuade their students to avoid behavior and attitudes that 
will have far-reaching and long-lasting repercussions (i.e., Prov. 15:27, Job 15:28-35, Sir. 
23:24-27).  The sages’ audiences were concerned about the preservation of their lineages 
in order to secure the closest thing to immortality that this ephemeral world has to offer.  
The  threat  of  intergenerational  punishment  was  therefore  an  effective  deterrent  to 
committing sins or otherwise straying from the advice of the teacher.  The sage concerns 
himself not with the perspective of the innocently suffering children, but rather with the 
father (or future father), who has the power to choose not to sin, and thus to shield his 
children from any negative consequences.   
In  its  context  within  Jeremiah  and  Ezekiel,  the  sour  grapes  proverb  does  not 
discourage sin by pointing out the magnitude of that sin’s reverberations on the sinner’s 
family.  Rather, the proverb is a complaint uttered by the sinner’s children who perceive 
that they have suffered for someone else’s wrongdoing.
472  The unnatural nature of the 
metaphor, which depicts a physiologically impossible situation upon which the proverb 
bases its logic, emphasizes that the sufferer is innocent; the children have not eaten any 
sour  grapes,  yet  it  is  their  teeth  that  are  set  on  edge.    The  prophets’  proverb,  then, 
addresses the suffering children, not the sinful fathers, as the authors of Israel’s wisdom 
books did. As a complaint from the perspective of the suffering children, the proverb is 
                                                        
472 Ezekiel 1-20, 328.   229 
not terribly useful to the sage.  While he can instruct a father (or future father) to conduct 
himself so as not to bring bad consequences upon his children, his wisdom offers little 
value to the innocent sufferer who played no role in the curse he has incurred and has no 
power  to  avert  the  consequences  of  his  father’s  actions  (note  the  case  of  Job,  the 
righteous sufferer who takes no comfort in the words of his comforters).  If one were to 
understand the sour grapes proverb as a genuine piece of folk wisdom and not a prophetic 
tool for satirizing the audience’s complaint, its origins cannot lie among collections of 
instructions offered by a teacher to his pupil. 
Thus, Jeremiah and Ezekiel challenge a widespread belief that the people of Judah 
were suffering for the sins of their ancestors by satirizing and rejecting a proverb that is 
theologically useless both for prophetic purposes (i.e. exhorting people to turn to God and 
to  reform  their  ways)  and  for  sapiential  purposes  (i.e.  instructing  students  to  avoid 
behaviors that have wide-ranging consequences).  Although Exodus 34:6-7 and the sour 
grapes proverb present a major theological problem involving innocent suffering, both 
the prophets and the sages find the perspective of the innocent sufferers, that is, the 
children of the wicked, to be useless for their objectives.
473  Acknowledging or explaining 
the  merits  of  innocent  suffering  cannot  help  them  in  their  mission  to  empower  their 
audiences to lead moral and virtuous lives.
474 
                                                        
473 Kaminsky, Corporate Responsibility in the Hebrew Bible, 146.  Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation, 337–
338.    According  to  Adamiak,  similar  motivations  inform  the  tendency  to  emphasize  individual 
accountability in the Book of Deuteronomy (i.e. Deut. 7:9-10, 29:15-20).  The generation entering the land 
would construe the wilderness generation’s numerous sins as crippling their ability to succeed in the land 
through  their  own  acts  of  covenant  faithfulness.    Richard  Adamiak,  Justice  and  History  in  the  Old 
Testament (Cleveland: John T. Zubal, 1982), 65–66. 
 
474 Levinson suggests that Ezekiel offers a sophisticated critique of Exod. 34:6-7 by rejecting a proverb of 
human  origin  instead  of  YHWH’s  own  self-description.      I  think  the  prophet  is  in  fact  offering  a 
sophisticated  critique  of  the  people’s  complaint  that  allows  him  to  appeal  to  their  concerns  about  the   230 
While the proverb cited by Jeremiah and Ezekiel expresses a sentiment similar to 
that of Exodus 34:6-7, one notable difference between the two is, as I have noted, the 
secular nature of the former.
475  The proverb, “The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the 
children’s teeth are set on edge,” makes no mention of YHWH or his role in the suffering 
of children for the sins of their parents.  By contrast, Exodus 34:6-7 makes clear that 
exercising  intergenerational  punishment  is  a  part  of  YHWH’s  very  nature.  Many 
references to collective punishment in Israel’s wisdom tradition do not directly implicate 
God as responsible for the intergenerational effects of a father’s sins.  In light of Koch’s 
thesis that God acts as a midwife to justice in a universe ordered by the act-consequence 
model, God’s role in all collective accountability would appear to be only indirect.
476  
Although, if one understands that God created and ordered the universe in this manner, 
then God is ultimately, albeit indirectly, responsible for the consequences that any given 
act produces.  According to Collins, 
The merit of Koch’s observations lies in noting the impersonal character 
of  this  system,  whether  one  refers  to  it  as  retribution  or  not.    While 
Yahweh  is  undoubtedly  personal,  his  personality  does  not  modify  the 
order of justice.  We do not read in Proverbs of a God who ‘repents’ or has 
mercy.  The ‘retribution’ of Yahweh can also be expressed in impersonal 
terms as the consequence of human acts.  The sages perceive no tension 
between  the  impersonal  character  of  this  order  and  their  belief  in  a 
personal God, but their explicit starting point is human experience, not 
mythological  formulations  of  an  anthropomorphic  God,  or  special 
revelations.  The sages identified God in their perception of the order of 
the universe but they retained to a great extent the impersonal formulation 
                                                        
injustice of intergenerational punishment without denying the truth of YHWH’s revealed nature in Exod. 
34:6-7.  Levinson, “The Human Voice,” 53. 
 
475 Ibid., 52–53.   McKane, Proverbs, 29–30. 
 
476 Koch’s thesis, as the upcoming quotation from Collins suggests, is too rigid in its universal application 
of the system and strict definition of retribution, but otherwise offers a good model by which one can 
understand the sages’ general understanding of retribution.     231 
of common human experience.
477 
 
According to divine revelation, the defining attributes of YHWH’s personal character are 
those of mercy and vengeance (Exod. 34:6-7).  Yet in a divinely created universe that 
strictly  operates  impersonally,  there  is  no  room  for  mercy.    Retribution  occurs 
mechanically, and God does not interfere.  As has been demonstrated in the previous 
chapters  examining  the  references  to  collective  accountability  in  Israel’s  wisdom 
literature,  Israel’s  sages  do  not  generally  view  the  exercise  of  intergenerational 
punishment as a merciful act of God to intercede for the sinner who would otherwise be 
wiped out by the natural and ineluctable consequences of his actions.  In most cases, the 
sages rely on observed reality and a need to motivate students to justify the existence of 
collective accountability; they do not generally appeal to YHWH’s character. 
  Both Fox and Van Leeuwen claim that the repeated use of the familiar expression 
“will not go unpunished” (yinnaœqeh) in Proverbs attests to the sage’s reliance on the 
revelation of YHWH’s nature and not on reality as he and his forebears have experienced 
it.
478  The author of Proverbs, of course, alludes to the divine attribute formula not to 
appeal to YHWH’s merciful nature, but rather to validate the continued operation of 
retribution for sins.  Despite the dominance, especially in the earliest wisdom books (i.e., 
Proverbs), of a mechanical retributive system as envisioned by Koch in Israel’s wisdom 
tradition, the God of the authors of Proverbs,
479 Job,
480 and Qoheleth
481 is capable of 
                                                        
477 John Joseph Collins, Encounters with Biblical Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2005), 99. 
 
478 Van Leeuwen, “The Book of Proverbs,” 119.  Fox, Proverbs, 2009, 2:539. 
 
479 The notion of mercy is admittedly hard to find in Proverbs, but 28:13 “accommodates itself to the idea 
of a compassionate deity.”  James L. Crenshaw, “The Concept of God in Israelite Wisdom,” in In Search of 
Wisdom: Essays in Memory of John G. Gammie, ed. Leo G. Perdue and Bernard Brandon Scott (Louisville, 
KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1993), 4.   232 
mercy.
482  And by the time of Ben Sira, divine compassion emerges as a fairly common 
theme, even if it does not mitigate the sage’s staunch belief in divine retribution (Sir. 
51:30).
483  Divine mercy occurs relatively frequently in the Wisdom of Solomon as well.  
The observation of reality, namely that all of humanity has not been consumed by divine 
wrath, attests to the existence of mercy.  Given the imperfect nature of humanity, no sage 
can fully subscribe to a system of mechanized retributive justice that is as strict and free 
from divine interference as the one envisioned by Koch.  The natural world teaches this, 
and revelation confirms it. 
  The revelation that reveals YHWH’s nature as both punishing and merciful is 
Exodus 34:6-7, which purports to be YHWH’s self-description.  Yet, Levinson has noted 
that the formula’s reuse in Exodus 20:5-6 draws upon legal ideas that are prominent in 
international treaties.
484  The notion that a sovereign could inflict punishment upon the 
children of the person with whom he enters into a treaty occurs in ancient Near Eastern 
                                                        
480 For example, Job’s friends urge the sufferer to acknowledge his guilt and repent so that he can receive 
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481  See  Eccl.  9:1.    For  his  part,  Qoheleth  has  not  “ruled  out  the  possibility  that  God  might  smile  on 






484  For  example,  “A  strikingly  similar  tri-generational  structure  occurs  in  the  group  of  treaties  made 
between the neo-Assyrian ruler Esarhaddon and his eastern vassals in 672 B.C.E.  Esarhaddon’s intent in 
the treaty is to ensure his vassals’ loyalty to his designated successor, his son Ashurbanipal.  One of the 
concluding  series  of  paragraphs  involving  curses  for  disobedience  employs  such  a  tri-generational 
formulation to designate those who are to be obedient to the new suzerain as well as those who are to be 
requited in the absence of such fealty:  ‘If, as long as we, our sons and our grandsons live, the crown prince 
designate  Ashurbanipal  will  not  be  our  king  and  lord,  if  we  place  another  king,  another  prince  over 
ourselves, our sons, our grandsons—may all the gods mentioned (here) call us, our offspring, and our 
descendants, to account’” (Levinson’s translation and italics). Levinson, “The Human Voice,” 46.   233 
legal documents.
485  Given that Exodus 34:6-7 is situated within a narrative about the 
divine promulgation of law and that YHWH’s covenantal relationship with the people of 
Israel  has  strong  parallels  to  ancient  Near  Eastern  treaty  language,
486  Levinson’s 
suggestion is appealing.  Israel’s sages do not seem to limit their understanding of the 
phenomenon  to  a  simple  truth  of  divine  revelation.    The  observation  of  human 
experiences confirmed for the sages the theology expressed in Exodus 34:6-7.
487   
 
IV.  Summary of Findings 
  The  preceding  discussion  of  the  relationship  between  two  formulaic  sayings 
concerned with the notion of intergenerational punishment found in the Hebrew Bible 
and  their  connections  to  Israel’s  wisdom  tradition  has  produced  several  important 
findings.  With respect to Exodus 34:6-7, Israel’s wisdom tradition is engaging with this 
liturgical formula in ways that are familiar from other biblical corpora.  They adapt its 
meaning to fit their own contexts by reusing its terminology.  Often, these adaptations 
overlap with, modify, or disagree with interpretations of the formula found elsewhere in 
the Bible.  YHWH’s nature was an important theological issue that interested Israel’s 
sages and prompted them to incorporate their thoughts on it into their teachings. 




486 Weinfeld has drawn an analogy between grant formula and the promise of rewards to future generations 
of the grantee.  M. Weinfeld, “The Covenant of Grant in the Old Testament and in the Ancient Near East,” 
Journal of the American Oriental Society 90 (1970): 184–203, doi:10.2307/598135. 
 
487 Krasovec proposes this solution as the explanation for the presence of intergenerational punishment in 
all of the Hebrew Bible, but this claim is not adequately substantiated.  For example, the observation of 
human experience alone cannot explain why Achan’s family would suffer for his sin in Joshua 7.  To make 
sense of his family’s death, one must rely on notions of holiness and divine wrath.    Jože Krašovec, “Is 
There a Doctrine of ‘Collective Retribution’ in the Hebrew Bible?,” Hebrew Union College Annual 65 
(1994): 80–83.   234 
wisdom literature is to encourage imitatio dei.  Just as YHWH is merciful, gracious, 
patient, and abounding in steadfast love in faithfulness, so too should the sage’s pupils 
aspire to espouse these attributes.  However, the sages encourage their students only to 
emulate those qualities that describe YHWH’s mercy.  Israel’s wisdom literature does not 
encourage human jealousy of or vengeance against other humans (i.e. Prov. 3:31, 6:34, 
14:30, 23:17, 24:1, 24:19, 27:4;
488 Job 5:2; Sir. 9:1, 37:10).  Not clearing the guilty is an 
activity restricted to the divine realm. Wisdom literature nowhere suggests that humans 
should exercise vengeance or justice in the manner that the attribute formula describes 
YHWH’s vengeance and justice.  Deuteronomy 24:16 prohibits the human exercise of 
intergenerational punishment:  “Fathers will not be put to death for their sons and sons 
will not be put to death for their fathers; each man for his own sin will be put to death” 
(Deut.  24:16).  Israel’s  wisdom  tradition  appears  to  agree  with  this  law.    Human 
jurisprudence and Israelite wisdom both prohibit humans from imitating the punishing 
aspect of YHWH’s personality. 
  Several scholars have argued that Jeremiah and Ezekiel’s challenging of the sour 
grapes proverb represents an attempt to align divine justice with human justice.
489   Just 
as humans are restricted from practicing vicarious punishment in their legal systems, 
humans will no longer complain that the human standard for justice does not match the 
divine standard.  Israel’s sages do not appear to support such a shift in the understanding 
of  divine  justice.    They  recognize  YHWH  as  both  merciful  and  vengeful,  and  they 
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489 I follow Kaminsky, who acknowledges that this is the effect of Ezekiel’s reuse of language from Deut. 
24:16, although he does not believe that this is Ezekiel’s intention.  Kaminsky, Corporate Responsibility in 
the  Hebrew  Bible,  173.    See  also  Greenberg,  “Some  Postulates,”  1991,  344.  Fishbane,  Biblical 
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encourage  their  students  to  emulate  YHWH’s  merciful  characteristics  so  as  to  avoid 
personally experiencing his vengeful ones. In other words, Israel’s wisdom literature does 
not object to the double standard for human and divine justice.  Humans should emulate 
YHWH’s  merciful  and  compassionate  characteristics,  but  intergenerational  vengeance 
belongs exclusively to the divine realm. 
  The  sour  grapes  proverb  quoted  by  both  Jeremiah  and  Ezekiel  reflects  the 
perspective of one who perceives himself to be an innocent sufferer.  As the comforters 
of  Job  unwittingly  demonstrate  in  their  dialogue  with  the  indignant  and  righteous 
sufferer, wisdom instructors are not inclined to acknowledge righteous suffering because 
to do so impedes their ability to teach their students that they possess the power to choose 
between  good  and  evil,  reward  and  punishment.    Without  the  power  to  choose 
righteousness, wisdom instructions are ineffectual.  The sour grapes proverb represents 
the victim’s expression of hopelessness and self-pity.  If my suggestion that it may be a 
prophetic paraphrase of a popular complaint is correct, the prophets are suggesting that 
intergenerational  punishment  considered  from  the  perspective  of  the  children  of  the 
wicked is also an ineffective means of understanding and correcting one’s predicament.  
Examples of collective accountability that appear in Israel’s wisdom literature are the 
sages’ tools in validating theodicy and motivating adherence to wisdom instruction in 
order to preserve one’s posterity.  The sages do not indiscriminately make use of all folk 
wisdom that relates to collective accountability; they filter out that which does not suit 
their  context  and  purpose.    Like  Jeremiah  and  Ezekiel,  they  would  also  probably 
challenge the sour grapes proverb. 
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Chapter Eight:  Summary and Conclusion 
 
I.  Introduction 
  In light of the previous seven chapters that have attempted to consider the issue of 
collective accountability in Israel’s biblical wisdom tradition in a systematic way, this 
chapter will attempt to summarize and offer a conclusion to the foregoing analyses.  I will 
integrate into this summary a comparison of the picture of collective accountability found 
in biblical wisdom literature with its conception in the rest of the Hebrew Bible (II).  In 
order to appreciate the differences among each wisdom’s book depiction of collective 
accountability, I will briefly consider diachronic developments that have emerged from 
this study of collective accountability in the biblical wisdom tradition (III).  In addition to 
highlighting the major conclusions of this study and their significance for understanding 
wisdom literature and collective accountability, I will also consider further directions in 
which this line of research could proceed (IV). 
 
II.  Summary of Findings 
  This study of collective accountability in Israel’s wisdom literature has examined 
each wisdom book on its own so as to avoid flattening the distinctions among the various 
works. Additionally, this method will allow me to note any diachronic developments in 
the  conception  of  collective  accountability  in  Israel’s  biblical  wisdom  tradition.    A 
summary of my analysis of each book can be found at the conclusion of each book’s 
respective chapter, so I will not reproduce those summaries here.  Rather, this summary   237 
will attempt to bring together the analyses of each book so as to consider Israel’s wisdom 
literature as a whole.  This approach will allow me to highlight the ways in which the 
different examples of Israelite wisdom are similar to and yet also different from one 
another.  
  The  discussion  of  collective  accountability  in  Israel’s  wisdom  tradition  is  not 
limited to any particular terminology, but several trends do emerge in the language used 
to describe this phenomenon.  In the book of Proverbs, and also to some extent in Job, 
references to the dwelling place (house, abode, tent, etc.) of the wicked or righteous (i.e. 
Prov.  3:33,  21:20;  Job  5:3,  8:22)  are  common.    Plant  imagery  and  metaphors  are 
especially popular in Ben Sira and the Wisdom of Solomon, and Job also makes use of 
them (Sir. 44:8-13; Wis. 4:3-6; Job 5:3-5).  The notion of children as seeds, a plant image 
found throughout the Hebrew Bible, also appears in the wisdom books (Prov. 11:21; Sir. 
44:11).  The use of plant imagery to depict human lineages and communities is not, of 
course, limited to Israel’s wisdom tradition.  In Deut. 29:17-20, for example, touches on 
issues of collective accountability through the use of plant imagery (cf. Isa 37:31; Mal 
3:19).  Although the depiction of collective accountability in Israel’s wisdom literature 
may not align precisely with its depiction in the rest of the Hebrew Bible, Israel’s sages 
nonetheless drew upon familiar biblical terminology in formulating their discussion of it. 
  As it does in the Hebrew Bible more generally, collective accountability takes 
many forms in biblical wisdom literature.  By far its most common manifestations are as 
intergenerational  punishment  and  reward.    Although  the  sages  normally  envision 
intergenerational accountability as parents producing consequences for the children, the 
actions of children can also affect parents (i.e., Sir. 22:8). Within the family, the wife’s   238 
conduct has consequences not only for her children, but also for her husband (Prov. 
12:4).    Such  examples  of  collective  accountability  reflect  an  acknowledgment  of 
intragenerational accountability by Israel’s sages.  Most of the wisdom books appear to 
contain examples of intragenerational reward or punishment (i.e. Prov. 13:20; Job 22:28-
30; Sir. 22:13; Wis. 18:20), although this form of collective accountability appears far 
less frequently than intergenerational reward and punishment.   
  In general, collective punishment occurs with greater frequency than collective 
reward.  This may suggest a particular sapiential concern to discourage bad behavior or to 
explain to skeptics that the wicked suffer for their sins even though that suffering may not 
be immediately apparent.  Given that the collective rewards promised to the righteous 
person are usually distant and vague, it may also be the case that the threat of collective 
punishment was a more effective motivator than the promise of collective reward.  The 
emphasis on punishment may also reflect the sapiential desire to defend divine justice by 
claiming that the wicked will eventually suffer for their misdeeds despite their apparent 
prosperity. 
Not  every  reflection  on  collective  accountability  appears  to  agree  that  divine 
retribution can be collective.  Although Qoheleth does not accept the notion of divine 
retribution that is intelligible to humans, the sage appears to be more inclined toward 
individual accountability (Eccl. 2:18-21, 8:11).  Only Job appears to challenge the notion 
of intergenerational punishment outright (Job 21:19-21), but a closer examination of this 
passage and Job’s statements on this topic as a whole suggests that he seeks only to 
modify, not completely to reject the concept, so that the sinner suffers personally in 
addition to the harm that will befall his children after he is dead.  Most instances of   239 
rejecting, or favoring individual accountability over, collective accountability occur in the 
later wisdom books of the Apocrypha that draw upon historical examples familiar from 
the biblical narrative.  Thus, Ben Sira describes famous cases of group punishments in 
which those (usually just a single individual) who are righteous are spared (Sir. 16:7-11).   
In  the  Wisdom  of  Solomon,  the  sage  rewrites  historical  accounts  of  collective 
accountability so as to deemphasize the collective nature of the original tale and perhaps 
to promote individual accountability as a means of controlling one’s own destiny through 
righteous behavior (Wis. 10:6-8, 12:10-11, 16:5-9). 
  The types of crimes meriting collective punishment are general.  Whereas in most 
of  the  Hebrew  Bible  collective  punishment  is  limited  to  cases  of  covenant  infidelity 
(Deut. 5:9-10),
490 Israel’s wisdom literature is often vague about the nature of the sinner’s 
wrongdoing.    Collective  punishment  generally  falls  upon  those  associated  with  the 
wicked, the sinful, the foolish, or the ungodly (e.g., Prov. 3:33; Job 5:3-5; Sir. 41:5-10; 
Wis. 3:12).  In some cases, specific crimes, like adultery, are mentioned (e.g., Sir. 34:24-
27; Wis. 4:3-6), but this is not the general trend.  In the case of collective reward, the 
deeds meriting reward are similarly vague.  For example, good things may come to those 
associated with the righteous, the virtuous, the wise, or the godly (e.g., Prov. 21:20). 
  The  kinds  of  punishments  administered  include  general  suffering  like  loss  of 
one’s wealth or inheritance, the failure of the lineage to prosper, or the cutting off of the 
line.  For Job, Ben Sira, and Wisdom of Solomon, the cutting off of the family line is 
often depicted metaphorically with plant imagery (e.g., Job 15:28-35; Sir. 40:15; Wis. 
3:12-19).    Wisdom  of  Solomon,  however,  does  not  emphasize  the  suffering  of  the 
                                                        
490 Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation, 344.  Levinson, “The Human Voice,” 47.   240 
children so much as the suffering endured after death by the sinner himself.  Punishment 
for the sinner includes not only loss of progeny, but also the destruction of the immortal 
soul,  an  idea  rejected  by  earlier  sages ( e.g.,  Wis.  3:12-19).    Both  of  these  concepts, 
however,  suggest  the  same  basic  punishment,  namely,  loss  of  immortality.    For  the 
righteous, collective reward holds the promise of inherited wealth, successful progeny, 
peace, and security (e.g., Prov. 14:26; Job 5:24-25; Sir. 44:8-13).  Essentially, collective 
rewards ensure one’s chance at immortality through a long lineage. 
  The divine role in executing punishment or rewarding righteousness is not often 
explicit.    Nevertheless,  God’s  role  is  sometimes  mentioned  specifically,  especially  in 
historical examples (Prov. 3:33; Sir. 47:18-23; Wis. 18:20).  In general, the sages observe 
that collective accountability is part of the way in which the world works.  Because 
Israel’s sages understand God to be the creator of the universe, they likely consider God 
to be the ultimate source of the collective punishments and rewards that are built into the 
structure of the universe.  The Wisdom of Solomon comes closest to expressing explicitly 
the notion that consequences are built into the structure in the universe in such a way that 
an individual is the recipient of those actions that he brought upon others (Wis. 11:16; cf. 
Prov. 17:13).  Rather than basing the notion that God exercises collective punishment 
upon divine revelation as is frequently the case in the Hebrew Bible (see Chapter 7 for 
the reuse of the revelation of YHWH’s character in Exodus 34:6-7), the sages rely upon 
observed reality. 
  Israel’s sages appear to have numerous motives for using collective accountability 
in their teachings.  For most of the books considered in the previous chapters, the sages 
do  not  have  solely  one  purpose  that  can  account  for  every  use  of  collective   241 
accountability.    The  simplest  motive  for  some  sapiential  appearances  of  collective 
accountability is dependence upon historical accounts of collective accountability.  So, in 
the case of the depiction of the Canaanites in the Wisdom of Solomon, God’s delayed 
execution of punishment over several generations appears to be an act of mercy (Wis. 
12:10-11), albeit one that, at least in the mind of the sage, renders morally acceptable the 
punishment of a people predetermined to be evil.  
In addition to historical memory, the sages who employ collective accountability 
frequently do so for pedagogical reasons.  Through the use of collective accountability, 
the sage teaches his students that their actions will have long lasting and far-reaching 
consequences  (i.e.  Prov.  3:33);  actions  affect  not  only  the  person  who  sets  the 
consequences  in  motion,  but  also  his  friends  (Prov.  13:20)  and  family  (Prov.  14:1), 
sometimes for generations after him.  Whereas the Israelite legal system operates on the 
principle of lex talionis, which limits the punishment of a crime to the same severity of 
the criminal’s offense,
491 the consequences of a person’s sin, according to the sage who 
penned Prov. 17:13, for example, can extend beyond the sinner.  This emphasis on the 
magnitude  of  an  action’s  ramifications  has  two  functions.    First,  it  discourages 
wrongdoing and encourages good deeds, which are certainly important objectives for the 
sage (Sir. 23:24-27, 41:5-10).  Second, it also matches observed reality.  Although the 
legal system may place limitations on, for example, the rights of a wronged family to 
seek vengeance that exceeds the wrong done to its members, such a law exists because it 
was human nature to want to inflict great hurt on one’s enemies.  In modern terminology, 
people often speak of the law of unintended consequences.  Israel’s sages had observed 
                                                        
491 This limitation on punishment applies only to full members of the community.  Slaves, for example, are 
punished according to a different principle.   242 
this phenomenon long before the expression was coined.  The individual who seeks to 
inflict harm on another brings negative consequences upon himself and his family for 
generations.  The use of collective accountability for pedagogical purposes relies upon 
observed reality to undergird the logic of the sage’s argument (Sir. 23:24-27).  Collective 
punishment is not generally meant to indicate divine mercy as it is in many cases in the 
Hebrew  Bible ( e.g.,  Num.  14;  1  Kgs.  21;  2  Kgs.  20),  but  rather  to  instill  a  fear  of 
punishment that extends beyond what was expected. 
   Another  major  purpose  for  the  use  of  collective  accountability  is  to  vindicate 
divine justice, a major concern for many of Israel’s sages.  This purpose is especially 
popular among Job’s comforters (Job 18:15-21), Ben Sira (Sir. 40:15), and the Wisdom 
of Solomon (Wis. 4:3-6).  In response to complaints, like that of Job (Job 21:19-21), that 
God’s punishment does not seem to fall upon the wicked, some of Israel’s sages claimed 
that God achieved justice by punishing the children of the wicked.  By describing the 
punishment that befalls the children of the wicked, sages like Job’s comforters and Ben 
Sira emphasize the emotional distress inflicted upon the original sinner who must witness 
or anticipate the misfortunes that will befall his children (Job 18:15-21, 27:14-15; Sir. 
41:5-10).  These assurances that God punishes the wicked and rewards the righteous 
appear at times to be based on lived experience (Job 20:21).  The depiction of collective 
accountability here is vindictive, not merciful.   
  To some extent, especially in allusions to specific biblical examples of collective 
accountability, Israel’s sages do rely upon revelation as a source for their understanding 
of collective accountability.  In such cases (e.g., Wis. 18:21-25), it is clear that notions of 
contagious  divine  wrath  or  the  divine  nature  may  help  to  inform  the  sage’s  use  of   243 
collective accountability.  However, this, in general, dovetails with reality as the sage has 
observed it.  The observation of patterns in actions and consequences taught the sages 
that when the consequence of a sin boomerangs back to the original sinner, it often hits 
not  only  the  sinner  but  also  his  associates.    Whereas  the  depiction  of  collective 
accountability  in  the  Hebrew  Bible  more  generally  may  originate  in  the  sphere  of 
lawgiving  or  international  treaties,  the  notion  of  a  God  who  exercises  collective 
punishment relies heavily on a pragmatic understanding of the divinely created universe 
and its impersonal operation (i.e. Sir. 22:13, 37:12). 
  None  of  Israel’s  wisdom  books  presents  a  straightforward  and  unambiguous 
position on the issue of divine determinism vs. human free will.  This lack of clarity 
enables collective accountability to be used to vindicate theodicy.  From the perspective 
of the survivors of the Babylonian destruction of Jerusalem, the fate of Judah was a 
consequence of its former leaders and inhabitants and was thus an unfair punishment of 
the generation that endured punishment for its ancestors’ sins.  This innocent suffering 
caused people to challenge God’s justice.  However, if the children who suffer negative 
consequences for the deeds of their parents are innately wicked themselves, then the 
problem of innocent suffering dissipates because the sufferers are not innocent.  The 
question then arises to what extent wisdom can empower an individual to overcome the 
curses of his ancestors (Sir. 41:5-10).  Because the purpose of wisdom literature is to 
empower students to choose good and reject evil, biblical wisdom must acknowledge the 
capability of the children of the wicked to avoid sin and punishment (Sir. 15:14-17).  
Nevertheless, Israel’s sages simultaneously acknowledge the limits of their wisdom (Job 
28:13) for certain kinds of people (Prov. 9:7-9; Job 11:12, 30:1-8, 14:4-6).  None of   244 
Israel’s wisdom books provides a satisfactory answer to the question of how the suffering 
of the innocent children of the wicked proves God’s justice because they are in general 
not concerned with the perspective of the innocent children.  They aim to instruct the 
parents of those children to make choices that will produce the best possible outcomes.  
Israel’s  sages  likely  never  meant  for  their  doctrine  of  collective  accountability  to  be 
examined from the perspective of the child.  The feelings of the children of the wicked 
are mostly irrelevant for the sage’s purposes.  
  The sour grapes proverb quoted by Jeremiah and Ezekiel reverses the sapiential 
method of ignoring the perspective of the suffering children.  The proverb emphasizes 
through its distortion of reality that the children suffer wrongly. In my understanding of 
the  prophetic  use  of  this  proverb,  Jeremiah  and  Ezekiel  are  subtly  criticizing  the 
community that considers itself the innocent victim of its forebears.  Like Israel’s sages 
and Job’s comforters, the two prophets do not consider the fixation on innocent suffering 
to be a productive means of improving one’s current situation. 
  Although some scholars claim that Jeremiah and Ezekiel are attempting to align 
divine justice with human justice by quoting the sour grapes proverb,
492 I find it more 
likely that the prophets, like the sages, appreciated the bifurcated nature of YHWH’s 
character  and  were  comfortable  reserving  the  exercise  of  vengeance  and  collective 
punishment to YHWH alone.  Such attributes do not belong to humans (i.e. Prov. 3:31, 
6:34, 14:30, 23:17, 24:1, 24:19, 27:4;
493 Job 5:2; Sir. 9:1, 37:10), although Israel’s sages 
                                                        
492 I follow Kaminsky, who acknowledges that this is the effect of Ezekiel’s reuse of language from Deut. 
24:16, although he does not believe that this is Ezekiel’s intention.  Kaminsky, Corporate Responsibility in 
the  Hebrew  Bible,  173.    See  also  Greenberg,  “Some  Postulates,”  1991,  344.  Fishbane,  Biblical 
Interpretation, 339.  
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did encourage their students to emulate YHWH’s gracious and merciful qualities.  In this 
respect, the sages agree with Israel’s legal texts (Deut. 24:16) about the human exercise 
of  vicarious  punishment.    While  the  divinely  created  universe  may  bring  about 
unintended consequences for wrongdoers, humans should not.   
  Israel’s sages were very much concerned with understanding the divine nature, 
but not necessarily imitating every aspect of it.  Nevertheless, even when  aspects of 
YHWH’s personality were not useful as a model for student behavior, Israel’s sages still 
applied them to their lessons in order to discourage wrongdoing.   
 
III.    Diachronic  Developments  in  the  Depiction  of  Collective  Accountability  in 
Israel’s Biblical Wisdom Tradition 
 
  In  order  to  trace  diachronic  developments  in  the  depiction  of  collective 
accountability in Israel’s biblical wisdom tradition, one must first establish the dating and 
sequence of the books that constitute this literary tradition.  For some wisdom books, a 
consensus  has  emerged,  but  for  others,  the  books’  historical  periods  of  composition 
continue to stir up controversy among scholars.
494  It is not the purpose of this study to 
end the debate concerning the dating of Israel’s wisdom books.  However, it is necessary 
to establish what dates are accepted for each book so that changes in the depiction of 
collective accountability can be correlated to historical changes. 
  Because of their composite nature, the dating of many of Israel’s biblical wisdom 
books is complex.  Additionally, the oral origins of some of the most common forms of 
wisdom (for example, the proverb) complicate any attempt to date a wisdom book and its 
                                                        
494 For example, in his commentary on Job, Marvin Pope analyzes the wide range of dates proposed by 
interpreters and scholars and concludes, “The date of the Book of Job, then, is still an open question and 
will remain so until more convincing arguments can be given for assigning it to any given century.”  Pope, 
Job, XL.   246 
contents.  The sages of both Proverbs and Job likely drew upon pre-exilic sources and 
traditions,  but  the  final  form  of  each  book  probably  emerged  in  the  post-exilic  era, 
probably not later than the Persian period (539-332 BCE).
495  These books are followed 
by Qoheleth in the Hellenistic period (third century BCE),
496 then Ben Sira in the early 
part of the second century BCE before 180 BCE,
497 and finally the Wisdom of Solomon 
in the first century CE.
498  The order of chapters two through six of this study follows the 
chronological sequence of these wisdom books. 
  As all of Israel’s wisdom books reflect some level of post-exilic composition and 
editing, a trend already present in the concept of collective accountability in the Hebrew 
Bible more generally manifests itself in the wisdom tradition as well.  Whereas collective 
punishment originally represents an act of divine mercy in the earliest biblical episodes, 
those  who  have  suffered  through  the  trauma  of  exile  and  considered  themselves  the 
victims of their ancestors’ sins no longer associate collective punishment with mercy.  
Israel’s sages also do not generally understand collective punishment as merciful, but 
their position is not centered on the innocent victims of collective punishment.  Rather, 
they  use  collective  punishment  as  a  pedagogical  tool  to  scare  (future)  parents  from 
behaving in a way that will bring negative consequences upon their lineages. 
  The  other  major  diachronic  trends  in  the  sapiential  depiction  of  collective 
accountability reflect developments within the wisdom tradition itself.  For example, the 
                                                        
495 Fox, Proverbs, 2009, 1:6.  Habel, The Book of Job, 42. 
 
496 However, note that some commentators consider the book to be earlier.  Seow places it in the fifth to 
fourth centuries BCE.  Seow, Ecclesiastes, 18C: 38. 
 
497 Di Lella and Skehan, Wisdom of Ben Sira, 10. 
 
498 Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 20–25.  Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age, 178–179.   247 
sage of the Wisdom of Solomon does not rely on the promise of collective punishment 
alone as assurance that the wicked will suffer eventually.  He also draws upon the notion 
of an incorruptible soul (Wis. 3:12-19) to augment his argument about future suffering 
for the children of the wicked, an argument that he shares in common with both Job (for 
example, Job 15:28-35) and Ben Sira (for example, Sir. 41:5-10).   
  Furthermore,  one  notes  in  both  Ben  Sira  and  the  Wisdom  of  Solomon  an 
increased  use  of  historical  examples  of  collective  accountability.    Many  of  the 
occurrences  of  collective  accountability  in  these  books  are  historical  allusions.    This 
reflects a greater emphasis on scripture in Israel’s wisdom tradition generally.  While 
historical  references  to  biblical  tradition  in  the  earlier  books,  like  Proverbs,  Job,  and 
Qoheleth, are so vague that they are usually barely visible, both Ben Sira and Wisdom of 
Solomon frequently draw upon biblical figures and narratives to support their teachings.  
These historical remembrances at times reinterpret the original biblical narratives and 
their statements on collective accountability. 
 
IV.  Concluding Thoughts 
  This study of collective accountability in Israel’s wisdom literature has produced 
a  couple  of  important  findings  that  will  nuance  our  understanding  of  both  wisdom 
literature and collective accountability.  Firstly, this study fills a gap in the scholarship of 
collective  accountability,  which  does  not  include  any  systematic  study  of  the 
phenomenon in wisdom literature.  Secondly, although scholars often consider wisdom 
literature to be individualistic, more so than any other part of the Hebrew Bible, this 
study has demonstrated that collective notions were both important for and useful to   248 
Israel’s sages.  The impact of an individual’s actions affected those surrounding him and 
those following him.  The longevity of an individual’s lineage was threatened by sin, yet 
secured through good deeds.   
  In addition to the major findings mentioned above, this study has also produced 
other noteworthy observations.  Collective accountability in Israel’s wisdom literature 
shares much in common with its depiction in the rest of the Hebrew Bible, but also 
manifests some significant differences (see section II of this chapter above for a fuller 
discussion). In the biblical wisdom tradition, collective accountability appears as both 
intergenerational and intragenerational accountability.  The divine exercise of this type of 
punishment  is  not  always  explicit,  but  it  is  unlikely  that  the  sage  envisions  the 
consequences experienced by the children of a sinner to be human jurisprudence.  Its 
primary power for the sage is not explanatory (as it is for historians, like that of the 
Deuteronomistic  History,  reflecting  on  the  past  to  explain  the  present),  but  rather 
pedagogical.  The threat of long-lasting repercussions for sin discouraged wrongdoing 
and encouraged good deeds.  The sage focused on helping his students produce a good 
future, not explaining current suffering as the result of the past.  Nevertheless, the sage 
draws upon observations of the past to distill a universal truth about actions and their far-
reaching  consequences.    Although  several  stories  of  the  Hebrew  Bible  reflect  on  the 
innocence  of  the  suffering  children  (David  and  Bathsheba’s  son),  Israel’s  sages  are 
largely silent on the children’s perspective.  In this respect, one might expect collective 
punishment to function as an act of mercy as it was likely originally conceived (Exod. 
34:6-7), but this is not the case.  Collective punishment generally functions as a threat, 
not a promise of mercy.     249 
  Future studies of collective accountability in wisdom literature promise to shed 
light on questions left unanswered by this study.  For example, a comparison of the 
results  of  this  study  of  Israel’s  wisdom  tradition  with  the  wisdom  literature  of  other 
ancient  Near  Eastern  societies  could  help  to  advance  our  understanding  of  why  this 
concept appears in a body of literature that for so long has been considered to be highly 
individualistic.    Determining  whether  collective  accountability  exists  in  the  wisdom 
literature  of  other  ancient  Near  Eastern  cultures  would  help  to  understand  if  Israel’s 
biblical wisdom tradition is aberrational in this respect, and, if so, what significance that 
has  for  its  concept  of  the  individual  vs.  the  collective,  mutatis  mutandis,  versus  the 
wisdom literature of other ancient Near East societies. 
  As I hope this study has made clear, collective accountability appears in many 
shapes and forms, serves multiple functions, and originates from diverse spheres.  Future 
studies of collective accountability would benefit greatly from an attempt to treat and 
define these various facets of collective accountability, as well as their interrelations, 
systematically.  One especially promising avenue of study involves the rabbinic concept 
of the merit of the fathers.  This concept may have some relationship to the presence of 
collective  reward  in  the  Hebrew  Bible,  and  an  exploration  of  its  precise  definition, 
function, and origin could help to shed new light on the diachronic developments in 
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